Book Summary: Western Foundations of the Caste System
Western Foundations of the Caste System Hardcover– 20 Jul 2017 Palgrave, Macmillan
Table of Contents
· Introduction: Caste Studies and the Apocryphal Elephant
Pages 1-30
Fárek, Martin (et al.)
· Caste-Based Reservation and Social Justice in India
Pages 31-55
Balagangadhara, S. N.
· Are There Caste Atrocities in India? What the Data Can and Cannot Tell Us
Pages 57-84
Jalki, Dunkin (et al.)
· Dissimulating on Caste in British Law
Pages 85-126
Shah, Prakash
· Were Shramana and Bhakti Movements Against the Caste System?
Pages 127-172
Fárek, Martin
Book Summary
Balagangadhara proposes that, the caste system, the phenomenon constructed by the West, is an experiential entity only to the West and not to Indians. In this sense, the caste system has no existence outside of the Western experience of India.
It is unclear why there is such a strong conviction that SCs as a population group are subject to atrocities in India. There are some serious studies which suspect that holding the ‘caste system’ responsible for generating ‘caste violence’ is unjustified.
One of the most important books in recent times is the book, ‘Western Foundations of the Caste System.’ The book consists of eight strong chapters on the ‘caste system’ of India based strongly on the pioneering work and research of S.N. Balagangadhara, professor at the Ghent University in Belgium, and director of the India Platform and the Research Centre for ‘Comparative Science of Cultures.’
It is quite clear today that colonial rule stripped us economically. But what is not yet evident is how the colonial ideas continue to strip and divide us in the name of religion and caste. Unfortunately, the strongest wedges dividing people in Indian society today are religion and caste; and Balagangadhara has clearly shown that both are a result of Western narratives and Christian themes. The narratives are now secular, but the roots are clearly different. Balagangadhara handles religion in his other classic, ‘The Heathen in His Blindness.’
We, as Indians, have perhaps never thought of caste the way it gets a description in the book. Every English knowing Indian must read this book to understand how the present caste discourse plays at several layers of deep distortion. A new paradigm for thinking about caste comes forward, and I would feel there is a strong need to translate this book into every single Indian language. Caste affects each one of us deeply. The distorted ideas lead to emotions ranging from extensive pride to extreme shame and anger; and the irony is that most of these ideas have western roots.
This book has deeply influenced me. I must acknowledge Dr Saumya Dey’s brilliant review of the book which started me off. As I now try to come out of a lifetime fed narratives, I feel that this book should reach out to everybody. This is a humble effort to summarize the contents of the book to help in the initial understanding, and in motivating readers to undertake the full journey. It will not and cannot replace the original book, because many of the contexts would be clear only by reading the main book. ‘More than many’ are direct quotes from the book, and I absolutely claim no originality in these series of articles. I have taken permission from Balagangadharagaru himself to do the summary. The article belongs to all the authors. Any mistakes or problematic interpretations are totally mine, as there is no scope for such in the main book. I have also slightly altered the ordering of the chapters from the main book in the notion that it may help a better understanding of this ‘caste system.’
The Difficulties in Defining and Describing Caste
Martin Fárek, Dunkin Jalki, Sufiya Pathan and Prakash shah
In vernacular Indian literature, jati denotes professional, regional, linguistic, religious, only locally recognisable, and even gendered communities, thus referring to an entity that is neither discreet nor homogeneous. Those who favour varna as the mode of classification fare worse since it is impossible to get any clear correlation between sets of jatis and varnas, with jatis constantly disputing which varna they belong to. We also have no consensus on the status of textual sources, like Manava-dharmashastra, which are supposedly the source of the theory of varna.
Propagation of Caste System- a Mystery
S. N. Balagangadhara says that it is a sociological impossibility that the ‘caste system’ emerged as a full-blown social system, simultaneously all over India, some 3500 years ago. Just as it is an impossibility that it originated at different places and later converged. The only reasonable hypothesis is to assume that it emerged in some place at some time. In which case, how did it propagate itself?
If we now consider India of some 4000 years ago with vast distances, and huge differences in languages, it is a prerequisite that some central political, or administrative system imposed this system on society. We know this was not the case. Without such an imposition, however, there is no way that a system with the same four varnas, with the same four names with an identically structured set of practices could come into being across the length and breadth of the country. It is impossible to conceive this based on what we know about human beings, societies, and social organisations.
Instead of asking the question about the origin and propagation of ‘the caste system,’ the mainstream opinion on ‘the caste system’ simply assumes that ‘the caste system’ somehow came into being, somehow propagated itself, and that it holds the Indian culture as a hostage. The current theories of the origin and propagation of the caste system in India are simply untenable, but questioning them seem unthinkable now.
In defence, Orientalists systematically dated every reference to what they saw as the caste system in classical Indian texts as an extrapolation, which must have come at a much later date than the original dating of the text itself. Preferences for the dating of the extrapolations usually then went to periods of more consolidated pan-Indian sovereignties to ascribe to the reigning political class the power of the central authority for creating and upholding the system.
Caste and Social Categorisations- a Selective Framework
Some propose that the Portuguese and later British colonial categories of caste overlaid on to existing social categories. These were ‘rigid birth derived categories’ with ‘mental and physical traits associated with them’ that were native to the land and extremely ancient. Such a hypothesis does not explain how birth-derived hierarchies (or the caste system) make their appearance even within the Semitic religions as they developed in India, especially Islam.
There is, however, ample evidence all over the world for social categorisations based on birth in the same period. What makes such categorisations evidence for caste system exclusively in India, but not in England for instance? Again, this question did not preoccupy the nineteenth-century writers on caste. This is still to find adequate answers and yet disappears in the current discourse on caste. In widespread social discrimination all over the world, why did colonial officials not recognise the caste system in any form back home but saw it in clear terms in India? This is either cognitive deficiency or dishonesty of Western authors.
Properties of Caste System-slippery Eels
How do we establish that a particular property found in Indian society, present also in other societies across the world, is the result of the caste system and not of any other multiple social forces or organisations? How do we distinguish the caste system from other social systems in other parts of the world? Mostly by saying – the caste system is a social system; the social system of the South Asian region is the caste system- the fallacy of petitio principii(a conclusion taken for granted in the premises).
Of all the properties ascribed to the caste system, none of them are unique to it. This is a major hurdle. Hierarchy, purity-pollution, endogamy, occupational communities and any such properties have been and continue to be properties of several human social systems across the globe and continue to be produced in multiple social settings (even within India itself), that do not seem to have anything to do with the caste system.
Muslims, Christians, various ethnic groups, national groups, and various class groups across the world are just as endogamous as any caste groups. Similarly, the idea of a hierarchical caste system based solely on birth is difficult to prove or disprove as presently some of the groupings referred by the term jati are birth related, others are not. Besides this, sociologists have long noted that even where the categories are birth related, they do not mark a static designation in hierarchy.
Some scholars solve this problem by characterising the caste system as the only system that brings these properties together. However, this does not solve the problem because scholars are hard-pressed to show that these properties do indeed coexist wherever the caste system purportedly manifests itself. Thus, most scholars have a cafeteria approach whereby any and every property may be primary or secondary, depending only on the scholar’s preference.
Caste and Narratives of Social Conflict
Balagangadhara says that almost all the discussions about the ‘caste system’ refer to or narrate (i) stories of discrimination about water wells; (ii) physical beatings; (iii) denial of entry into the temples; and (iv) ‘untouchability’. In discussions it is never clear whether the above four aspects are the empirical properties of ‘the caste system’ or they are the consequences of ‘the caste system. Only if they are primary empirical properties, and not secondary properties, only then we can condemn the ‘caste system’. Else, the discussion will have to take an entirely different route. If they are the consequences, we need to know whether they are necessary consequences of ‘the caste system. If these are not the necessary consequences of ‘the caste system’ or that other things generate these consequences severally, again, the discussion takes a different route.
The confusion comes from a clear conviction that a relationship between caste and social conflict necessarily exists and therefore this relationship must be fundamental to understanding caste. Yet, it is impossible when no consensus exists in relation to the properties of the caste system, to say whether conflict is a property or a consequence of the caste system, let alone examine which property of the caste system leads to the consequence of social conflict.
Complex Definitions and Explanations With Persisting Questions
One set of answers to the dissatisfaction raised in relation to the status of caste studies proposes that the caste system is such a complex social structure with so many regional variations and with evolutionary patterns that are so unpredictable, that it is impossible to reach a consensus about the fundamental properties of the caste system or caste relations in India. However, if there cannot be a consensus in relation to fundamental properties of the caste system or to a story of how it evolved across India, how can we have reached a consensus on the first set of ideas: that there is a caste system in India, that it is oppressive towards the lower castes, and that it has been practically impossible to eradicate?
There are scholars who have raised similar suspicions about the premises of caste studies, but for the wrong reasons. Some suggest that Orientalist/colonial scholarship constructed the notion of the caste system as understood today. There are two problems with this assertion. One is its implausibility.
How could the census, using ‘caste’, which did not last longer than 60 years (1871 to 1931), successfully ‘create’ the caste system in India? The second problem is the lack of clarity about the implementation of what? The states constantly invent and discard the State classifications, like poverty lines. Thus, state categorisation has the power to change social reality in this specific and limited sense. These claims unbelievably say that a state classificatory scheme, flawed as it was, short-lived as it was, created a social order in India which has been extremely tenacious and extremely resistant to change. This brings us to the same kinds of logical questions about what sustains the caste system.
What is the ‘caste System’?
There is no denying the existence of ‘jatis’ like Lingayat, Paraya, Kamma, Jaat and innumerable others. Denying the existence of the notion of the caste system does not imply that those facts (beliefs, practices, texts, etc.) that went into the construction of the ‘caste system’ do not exist. What one denies is that these (taken together) constitute a phenomenon called the ‘caste system’.
Balagangadhara proposes that the ‘caste system’ names the structure that the British tried to develop using different criteria, none of which worked in ordering and classifying the data they assembled. That is to say, the British failed in classifying data (which they collected) about marriage, commensality (practice of eating together), profession, entry into temples, accepting water, etc. into a single structure, whose units carried indigenous jati names.
He also proposes that, the caste system, the phenomenon constructed by the West, is an experiential entity only to the West and not to Indians. In this sense, the caste system has no existence outside of the Western experience of India. The West, because of their specific cultural experience, tied together a series of discreet elements and transformed them into one distinct and unified phenomenon. In fact, the dominant descriptions we have today are results of originally Christian themes and questions; they reflect European historical experiences and European thinking about society much more than the real state of society and its domestic understanding in India.
All attempts to give a better description of the caste system have failed to answer some of the most fundamental questions: why do Indians not know the caste laws? How can the caste system exist if no central authority exists to ensure its survival? How come no one can empirically show the existence of a clear-cut caste hierarchy across the length and breadth of the country?
Caste-based Reservation and Social Justice in India
S.N. Balagangadhara
Was Social Justice a Normative Concept?
Balagangadhara says that the strangest statement in India is, ‘caste-based reservation is a socially just policy’, because he notes very tenuous conceptual relationships between social justice and caste-based reservation.
He looks deeply at the Constituent Assembly debates to answer whether it was possible to discern that ‘social justice’ used in those debates were normative or not; and whether the framers of the Indian Constitution use the notion of ‘social justice’ to morally defend the caste-based reservation system. He feels the answer is a distinct no.
There is some prima facie evidence for suggesting that the notion of ‘social justice’ is normative (matter of opinion, ethics, or morals which cannot undergo testing) in nature or that such a moral dimension is present in the term ‘social justice’, but for most part of the debates, such evidence is thin and inconclusive.
The normative statements might express things like disapproval, or emotions. But they could not describe anything in the world. In short, there are no moral facts but only moral opinions. Thus, normative statements are moral opinions and statements which are beyond evaluation. For most Assembly debaters, social justice was a practical goal and not a moral ideal. In fact, even though most of them endorsed the term ‘social justice’, there was no detectable consensus about what that term meant or how it was related to caste-based reservation.
For most, social justice meant instituting policy measures that, taken together, constitute a social security system. This makes it very clear that (a) there is nothing normative in his notion of social justice and that (b)there is no postulation of any relationship between social justice and caste-based reservation. Whatever the case, we find no evidence here that caste-based reservation had anything to do with social justice; or that social justice is a ‘normative’ term, denoting an ideal.
Caste based reservation seems to have the eminent function of allaying the suspicions of a set of communities. For all political purposes, it is a happy decision to give a section of the people what they want, provided what they want is ‘social justice’, as they ‘understand’ the term. The framers of the Constitution of India found it normal to allow some group or another to enjoy the fruits of the reservation system on grounds of political expediency too.
Even Dr. Ambedkar’s interventions in the Assembly follow the same trend. He wants ‘to make economic, social and political justice a reality’ and recognises that ‘doing justice socially, economically and politically’ is important. It must have been a practical, realisable, and non-normative goal achieved in 10 or 60 years at the most.
Thus, the conclusion must be: caste-based reservation is either an expression of political expediency or a psychological tool to allay suspicions of some communities or both. There was no defence or invoking of moral grounds.
The lack of consensus about the meaning of that word and our ambiguity in knowing how they understood the relationship between caste-based reservation and social justice opens a huge question: on what grounds do some in the judiciary, most intellectuals, and all the Ambedkarites in India claim that their normative or moral notions find their justification in the Indian Constitution? There is no view from the inside that allows any kind of normative association between social justice and caste-based reservation.
Were the Framers of Indian Constitution Immoral, Inauthentic?
If now the claim comes that the framers of the Indian Constitution used a normative conception of social justice, then almost all the framers of the Indian Constitution become inauthentic, deceitful, and immoral. This because if we look at the intellectual currents involved in the debate on social justice during the period under consideration, we discover only one dominant force in the first half of the twentieth century discussing social justice as a normative concept. They were the Christians in general and Catholic Christians in particular.
In fact, the normative notion of ‘social justice’ and the way later used by all and sundry was first by a politically conservative Italian Jesuit priest, Taparelli, in his five-volume work published from 1840 to 1843. Taparelli’s students included Pope Leo XIII, who authored the famous encyclical, ‘Rerum Novarum’ (On the condition of the working classes),hailed as the first official Catholic statement on the ‘social question’.
Equality consists here in equalizing the office to the person’s capacity, the recompense to the merit, punishments to demerit, and the real order to the ideal proportions of means to end. And each person should be content to make the same contribution as every other to the common purpose. (cited in Burke 2010, 102–103)
Leo Shields, in ‘The History and Meaning of the Term Social Justice’, gave the precise meaning of social justice.:
Society ensures social justice when it provides the conditions that allow associations or individuals to obtain what is their due, according to their nature and their vocation. Social justice is linked to the common good and the exercise of authority. (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1993. Chap. 2, Art. 3)
Which normative conception of ‘social justice’ was available to the framers of the Indian Constitution in the late 1940s and early 1950s? Only the Christian notion of ‘social justice’. It is Christian for an entirely different reason: this notion of social justice made absolutely no sense outside the Christian notions of man and society. Whatever we might think about the term ‘social justice’ today, until the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century at least, it made normative sense only in the presupposed truth of Christian theology.
We have positive evidence from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly proceedings that the framers of the Indian Constitution did not use ‘social justice’ normatively. There is positive evidence that the only available normative notion of ‘social justice’ was Christian in nature. Not all members of the assembly who intervened in debates about ‘social justice’ were Christians. There is finally no evidence at all for a secular notion of ‘social justice’ in those times which members could know about. Hence, using a moral conception of social justice would make the Constitution framers as secret Christians and they were doing something which was deceitful or immoral. Clearly, we know that is not the case.
Other Alternatives on the Social Justice Narrative
Today, a lot of people use the term samaja nyaya around as if it translates the normative notion of ‘social justice’. However, this situation tells us more about the ignorance of such people regarding the meaning of these words and indicates that it has become an empty slogan without any content. The author shows that the term samaja nyaya could maximally mean a ‘social rule’ or a ‘social model’.
Amartya Sen makes a distinction between niti and nyaya– ‘niti’ is about rules and institutions; and ‘nyaya’ is about their realisation’. His distinction completely undercuts that samaja nyayacould be translating the term ‘social justice’. In his words:
Reservations as a policy cannot be justified on grounds of redressing the past. It would be justified in terms of improving the present. Therefore, we have to judge reservations as a ‘niti’ in the light of what it actually does rather than what it is theoretically expected to do.
One cannot hence appeal either to the word meaning or to the Nobel Prize to justify the claim that the framers of the Indian Constitution spoke normatively, i.e., morally, and idealistically, when they used the term ‘social justice’.
Hence, those claiming that the framers of the Indian Constitution used the notion of social justice to defend caste-based reservation system ‘morally and ethically’ are not telling the truth. They are dishonest when they propagate constantly that the caste-based reservation policy was a moral redressing of an unjust past by the framers of the Indian Constitution.Dunkin Jalki and Sufiya Pathan, in this extremely important chapter, show clearly that data hardly supports the popular perception of caste atrocities. Most of the caste studies run into problems while dealing with the hard data. Hence, they focus more on the soft data, the ambit of which is wide and accommodative; allowing anything and everything remotely considered discriminative as an instance of caste violence. In other specialties and sciences, similar studies would have a rejection; but somehow in the Indian context, caste studies have acquired the status of unquestioned respectability. The authors elaborate on the constant puffing up on numbers by all and sundry regarding caste atrocities, helping in no small way by giving us a terrible international reputation.
Are There Caste Atrocities in India? What the Data Can and Cannot Tell Us
Dunkin Jalki and Sufiya Pathan
‘Caste violence’ or ‘caste atrocities’ have acquired an axiomatic status which says that violence and exploitation of all kinds, including physical atrocities, are an integral part of the caste system, and are always on the rise. Yet, available data reveals some startling anomalies in respect of such claims.
Some studies (the hard data) explicitly seek to show that the lower castes routinely face violence, which includes physical assault, rape, arson, abduction, and other such criminal acts, at the hands of the upper castes. These studies document cases and analyse police statistics to make their case.
The wider and more pervasive model (the soft data) for studying caste violence is documenting much wider sets of practices and events within the ambit of studying ‘caste violence’ like the following: ‘untouchability’ practices, land ownership and labour, remuneration for labour patterns, occupational access, economic and social mobility, access to education, access to particular spaces and resources (especially temples and wells) and so on.
On the Statistical Evidence for Caste Atrocities-large Numbers Are Important
There is a clear trend in research on ‘caste violence’ to draw on data made public by the police departments in India in order to show (i) that the lower castes face a great deal of violence; (ii) that this violence requires attention because it is an inordinate amount of violence faced by one particular group of people and it is of an especially gruesome nature; (iii) that this violence is always on the rise; and (iv) that this violence is motivated by attempts to keep up the ‘caste system’ in its original form, maintain its traditional hierarchies and the subjugation of the lower castes.
Citing large numbers plays an important role in these studies. Caste scholars currently depend upon the data provided by government bodies like the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), which publishes annual reports on crime that contain separate chapters on caste atrocities. This practice of separate tables on ‘Incidence, Rate and percentage contribution to All India of crimes committed against SCs’ began in 1995.
Caste studies now include the total crime against SCs as well as those lodged under the so-called Special Laws: Protection of Civil Rights Act (PCR) and Prevention of Atrocities Act (PoA) as caste atrocities, without much scholarly justification for such a move. But one may minimally infer from this strategy that these scholars consider all kinds of crime against a specific ‘lower caste’ group as a valid indicator of ‘caste atrocities’ against that group.
Hard Data
According to the NCRB annual crime reports, the total number of ‘Incidence against Scheduled Castes [SCs]’ in India during 2011 was 33,719. This can become sensational by stating ‘every 18 minutes a crime is committed against SCs; every day, 27 atrocities against them’, and so on. To get another perspective, one may juxtapose the 33,719 cases with the two other figures provided by the NCRB:
(a) There were 6,252,729 cognisable crimes reported in total for the year 2011 in India. This implies that the total number of reported crimes against the SCs in 2011 was about 0.53% of the total reported crimes in India in 2011.
(b) In 2011, the SCs comprise about 16.6% of the total population of India. If 16.6% of the population faces 0.53% of the total criminal incidents in India, the remaining 83.4% faces 99.47% of the rest of the criminal incidence. Hence, on average, every percentage of non-SC population faces roughly 1.19% of the incidence of crime, while every percentage of the SC population faces about 0.04% of the crime. If measuring crime against a group is a reliable measure for atrocities against the group, then can we not conclude that SCs face fewer atrocities than the rest of the population?
Problems With Data Generation and Interpretation
NCRB collects data under 10 categories. The cases registered under special acts are those that are committed by a non-SC person against a SC person. If we consider only the cases lodged under the special laws in question, the percentage of atrocities against SCs decreases considerably, 0.18% of the total incidence of crime in 2011.
These crimes, though not statistically significant, may be harmful and heinous, meriting serious attention. Without looking at the numbers, scholars and NGOs surprisingly claim with unanimity that caste violence is extremely widespread and that the lower castes face greater violence in Indian society than any other groups. Where is the data that shows this to be the case?
It is disconcerting that scholars and ‘social activists’ ignore basic rules of statistical analysis to fit the data into their theories. For instance, the data about general crime against SCs/Schedule Tribes (STs) does not document the caste of the perpetrator. The NCRB data is based on complaints or ‘first information reports’ (FIRs) prepared by the police when they receive information about a ‘cognisable offence’ from either the victim or by someone representing the victim.
Thus, the NCRB data for the total crimes against SCs, save the ones recorded under special laws, does not decide whether an offence is a ‘caste offence’ or not. It is simply a record of a crime committed against an SC person. In the whole majority of the ‘crime against SCs’, excluding those recorded under PoA, therefore, the perpetrator could well be a lower caste person. Yet, there is sweeping away of this fundamental consideration in puffing up the figures.
Caste Violence-always on the Rise?
In complete contradiction of the proposition that caste scholars make about the constant rise in caste atrocities, the percentage of crime against SCs has remained rather constant over the last decade and has not, in fact, shown any significant rise. If one considers the rate of crime against SCs (i.e. number of incidences per one lakh of SC population); it has in fact decreased over the years according to some scholars.
In 2013, 39408 cases of cognizable crimes committed against SCs in India equates to a crime rate of 19.57 incidences per one lakh of SC population. Though the number of crimes has increased from 32996 in 1995 to 33501 in 2001 and to 39408 in 2013, the rate has substantially declined – from 23.24 in 1995 to 20.14 in 2001 and further to 19.57 in 2013.
One also needs to show that crime against other castes or communities is significantly less than that faced by the SCs. Yet, there is no data available today for this. The NCRB reports provide separate data only about the SC and ST communities and no other caste communities. Given this scenario, they simply cannot tell us anything that is statistically significant about ‘caste violence’.
Though crime against SCs is undeniable, statistics contradict the claim that lower caste people face greater violence in society than other groups. Minimally one may say that the idea of widespread caste atrocities is not based on the data available.
Underreporting- a Popular Caveat
Scholars counter the challenges that emerge from the hard data on the popular caveat that ‘the data is unreliable because caste violence is under-reported’. What do we make of this oft-repeated caveat?
Crimes are always under-reported to a considerable extent, for various reasons. Is the case with caste atrocities any different from this general situation? Caste scholars must show that in addition to the general tendency to shy away from reporting crime, there are obstacles and hindrances specific to reporting caste crimes.
Even if we accept one scholar’s statement that ‘the number of unregistered cases of atrocities might range between one and one and a half times that of the registered cases’, the total number of crimes against the SCs, say, in 2011 would not be more than 1.32% (0.53 × 2.5 = 1.32), of the total incidence of crime. This would still not put the rate of crimes against SCs at anywhere close to what the rest of the population faces. To bring the 0.04% (percentage of crime per percentage of SC population) closer to the figure 1.19% (percentage of crime per percentage of non-SC population), we must increase it by about 30 times.
Government compensations offered to victims of the PoA acts as an incentive to lodge complaints on non-serious grounds of the PoA act, thereby inflating the number of cases of ‘caste atrocities.’ Hence, when authors and scholars claim that figures are only indicative and do not reflect the actual situation on the ground’, it cannot be a foregone conclusion that the figures for ‘caste atrocities’ ought to be higher. They may as well be lower.
If one takes seriously the claim that most ‘caste atrocities’ go unreported, this renders the data completely faulty, thereby rendering it completely useless. In the absence of credible data on caste violence, how do caste scholars conclude that caste violence is widespread and is constantly on the rise? Yet, this has not proved a deterrent to caste scholars and human rights organisations generating reports on the issue.
The caveat concerning under-reporting does not signal a dissatisfaction regarding statistics since it predates any statistical records of violence against lower caste people. It also persists in all studies about ‘caste violence.’ This caveat stands independent of the credibility or availability of data about caste violence and unfortunately, no amount of statistical data can prove this caveat wrong.
This caveat of under reporting is thus a priori claim, not a conclusion derived from empirical investigation; and we can perhaps understand this as one of the elements of an inherited narrative about the caste system. But none of the studies on caste violence tell us what the premises for this claim are, much less provide any defence of these premises.
To say that Indian society is ‘casteist’ and therefore caste violence must go unreported is not to provide any logical support for the claim that caste violence must be high. Also, remarkably, absence of credible data, which should have raised questions about the plausibility of the research on caste atrocities, is now evidence for, and an indication of, the magnitude of caste violence and the hold of the caste system on Indian society.
Thus, the difficulty of generating satisfactory data on caste violence ends up acting as evidence for the claim of disguised caste violence and, therefore, more intense than it appears at the outset.
Violence Not Defined by Crimes Against Scheduled Castes-the Soft Data
Studies on ‘caste violence’ relying on NCRB data are a relatively small number. The dominant trend in studies tend to look at ‘violence’ in broad terms and establish the violence of the caste system independently of the hard data.
How do we then know what to classify as caste violence if it is in disguise? This is precisely what reports on ‘untouchability’ or ‘caste disabilities’ (the soft data on caste violence) handle with. Where do the scholars locate caste violence? It is not simply in acts of violence against SC individuals or groups; rather, it is everywhere – from mundane acts of limiting social interaction to economic patterns of land ownership to actual acts of violence.
Government records and reports, independent and credible research institutes, present an alarming picture of the situation of the people affected by caste-based discrimination and violence – an increasing trend in the denial of basic livelihood rights, growing numbers of atrocities, high dropout rate of students, unabated land and labour rights violations, disregard to public health, denial of access to any place or service, obstruction of political participation, negligence of law enforcement authorities in filing complaints, undue delays in police investigation and trial of cases and low conviction rate, etc.
This disregard and apprehension about hard data is in parallel to another predominant feature of writings on caste atrocities: exclusive reliance on anecdotal evidence. Most do not take up surveys of any kind but conclude on a few interviews or ‘fact finding’ missions to the sites of atrocities. Providing discrete micro instances (individual instances of violence reported by victims and their relatives and friends) as evidence for an abstract macro claim (about the age-old caste system and atrocities it generates) would be a fallacy in any other field. In caste studies, however, this has been the dominant way of making the argument.
What Exactly is Caste Violence?
Instead of studying crimes against SCs as the basis for their analysis of caste violence, writers have included a wide array of ‘social disabilities’ in the list of ‘caste violence’. Consider some of the disabilities mentioned earlier: lack of access to education and public health facilities, unjust patterns of land distribution, labour remuneration irregularities, discriminatory practices in the kinds of work offered to SCs, etc. Since studies and reports on caste atrocities resort to collection of anecdotes, all kinds of the problems that an individual face and/or relates, becomes evidence for the existence of caste violence in society.
These studies document problems that large sections of human beings across the world have been facing (predefined as ‘social disabilities’) within samples of the SC and Other Backward Classes (OBC) population group. This makes for a staggering number of social problems attributed to a single cause: namely, caste discrimination. None of these studies makes even a perfunctory attempt to prove that it is the so-called caste system that causes these ‘social disabilities.’ This is an assumption that guides their data collection, not a hypothesis that they take up for investigation.
Irrespective of their relative dominance, the SCs still suffer social disabilities according to writers and scholars across the years. For example, in a village study, one author claims that Dalits form 80% of the population and control the socio-political affairs of the village; and yet‘caste still impacts and shapes’ the lives of the people of the village. The same facts can however argue that the practices constituted as ‘social disabilities’ simply do not obstruct social mobility, nor do they place any obstacles to the so-called lower castes taking on a position of dominance. And if ‘caste-related social disabilities’ continue whether the social status of the community is high or low, then one may logically reach the conclusion that caste does not affect the social status of groups.
One scholar places the fact that different caste groups have different places of worship as a remnant of caste disabilities. Yet, such an argument about different places of worship used by different denominations among Christians or Muslims in India is not a disability of any kind. Clearly, there are assumptions that guide the general instinct to pick out such phenomena as facts about caste disabilities.
Citing these studies as proof that the caste system exists, or to use them to raise any dispute about whether the caste system causes violence is to be disingenuous. The studies that document ‘caste violence’ do not form a defence of the theory that generates this notion.
Reporting Caste Atrocities: Trends and Strategies
An analysis of writings related to caste violence (comprising, letters to the editor, editorials, reports, and research articles) published in the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) over five decades from 1949 to 2000 show some definite trends in the way scholars have dealt with the issue.
One of the most striking aspects of this literature is that one clearly finds that the idea of ‘caste atrocities’ is largely a late-1960s development, which ‘caught on’ in the 1970s. A review of this literature reveals how scholars have coped with contradictions brought up by the data on caste violence by using ad hoc strategies in their studies of caste violence.
Caste scholarship uses the term ‘caste violence’ or ‘caste atrocity’ to refer to the victimisation of ‘lower caste’ people by a wide variety of means. Surprisingly, in caste violence reportage, it is not necessary that the perpetrator of atrocities or victimiser be an upper caste individual or group. Where upper caste persons are not involved, the ‘system’ – read ‘the caste system’ or/and ‘Brahmanism’ – is responsible for the so-called atrocities. This trend is visible in the most scholarly writings of the last several decades that India has produced.
In 60 relevant articles on ‘caste atrocities’ in 2283 issues of the EPW journal over 50 years, interestingly, Brahmins do not feature anywhere as perpetrators of violence. Only in one case is it alleged that a convict had the support of a Brahmin moneylender. The articles, nevertheless, talk about ‘upper castes’, without always specifying who the upper castes are. In addition, one finds the following words and phrases liberally used in these writings while analysing the issue: ‘Brahmanical caste system’, ‘Brahmanical social setup’, ‘Brahmanism’ and ‘brahmanical model’. These words act as ‘explanations’ for the violence that has occurred. The caste system is violent because it is ‘Brahmanical’.
Do the Brahmins Hold So Much Power?
Thus, the Brahmins seem to have a disembodied power which allows them to wield a destructive influence on Indian society without any concrete personal involvement. None of the articles attempt to show what is ‘Brahminical’ about violence perpetrated by non-Brahmins. In fact, much of this violence comes from castes that are not part of the classical ‘upper castes’ at all, but are part of what the government categorises as ‘other backward classes’ (OBC). What is ‘Brahminical’ about violence perpetrated by the OBCs?
Such studies achieve the following: they explain the violence perpetrated by so-called lower caste groups by attributing the source of the violence to an upper caste group without any empirical evidence to show any connection between the two. In any other sphere of social science research, such work would become ‘a conspiracy theory’ and written off with disdain. In caste studies, however, it gains the status of a respectable knowledge claim, and earns its author degrees, positions, and honours, in India and abroad.
While reporting the actual cases of atrocities, the authors name the castes that are allegedly responsible for the violence. While talking about ‘caste violence’ in abstract and generalised terms, that is, while theorising the violent incidents, they resort to generalised terms like upper castes, caste Hindus, Harijans, backward castes, Dalits and so on. This creates a very peculiar situation. Even when the violent incidents involve two ‘lower castes’, that is, a perpetrator and a victim who are both from ‘lower castes’, which is not uncommon, they get reported as ‘caste violence’ and are theorised as an incident of violence for which upper castes are considered responsible. This is possible because the terms like ‘Harijans’, ‘Dalits’ or ‘lower castes’ are empty categories and comprise of different castes and units of castes, as the case might be.
Obcs-both Upper and Lower Castes as Per Convenience
The laws against caste atrocities, such as the Prevention of Atrocities Act 1989, consider only SCs and STs as ‘lower castes.’ However, in academic articles on caste violence, often even the OBCs are included under categories like ‘Dalits’ or ‘lower castes.’ Ironically, they may also be categorised as ‘upper castes’ if the argument so requires. Not just that, violence amongst OBCs may also get characterised as ‘caste violence’. OBCs feature both as perpetrators as well as victims of the caste atrocities, as and when required.
For example, in his lengthy report, K Balagopal, an acclaimed human rights activist of his time, a lawyer, and a mathematician by training, provides a list of ‘known incidents of murder or large-scale arson perpetrated against Dalits by caste Hindus in AP, ‘post-Karamchedu.’ On July 20, 1987, as the list mentions, ‘One Dalit labourer was killed in a dispute over a small patch of tank-bed land by a mob of backward caste farmers.’ While in the foregoing entry the perpetrators of crime are a bunch of OBC farmers, in the immediate next entry an OBC person is a victim. On August 13, 1987, ‘One person of a backward caste (Golla) killed in a mob attack by Kammas.’ This game of shifting from one to the other, at will, continues in the list. Here is another example from the later part of the list: ‘About 180 houses of fishing community set on fire by a mob organized by prominent … BC [backward caste] leader …’. A few lines later we read, ‘A backward caste (Boya) farm-servant shot dead by his property owner, G Narayan Reddy’.
As per the 2001 census data, the SCs comprise about 16.2% of the total population. There is, however, a lot of confusion about the population of OBCs. It is safe to consider then that the total SC, ST and OBC population in India is about 65% of the total population. That means, the reports on caste violence may document any violence (‘disguised’ or overt, as the case may be) that occurs amongst or against 65% of India’s population as ‘caste violence’, which is strange indeed.
Unreasonable Convictions
It is unclear why there is such a strong conviction that SCs as a population group are subject to atrocities in India. There are some serious studies which suspect that holding the ‘caste system’ responsible for generating ‘caste violence’ is unjustified.
However, scholars are busy today in presenting wealth- and market-related crimes as ‘caste crimes.’ While ‘caste atrocities’ are a legal fact under the SC and STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the circumstances that led to the perceived need for new legislation have not yet acquired an appropriate explanation. Unfortunately, the study of caste violence has more anomalies than explanations.
The enthusiasm for new laws related to caste atrocities does not match with new insights, and as a result, at the most fundamental level, we are unable to establish how we should define caste violence. How do we establish that some violence has been committed for ‘casteist’ motives rather than out of personal or economic or any other motives? The law solves this problem by simply registering any case of violence against an SC by a non-SC as a ‘caste atrocity’ and promptly providing compensations at various levels for any such crime registered under the PoA.
Expenditures and Consequences
Central government’s expenditure on the PoA has gone from INR 38.31 crores in 2005–2006 to 127.65 crores in 2013–2014. Each of the state governments also match the centre’s expenditure by 50%. For the year 2013–2014, then, the total expenditure would be over INR 200 crores. These expenses go towards compensation, legal aid to victims, covering travel expenses incurred by the victims, the establishment of special courts, special cells in police stations, sensitisation programmes, as well as, surprisingly, incentives for inter-caste marriage. In other words, in less than 10 years, the expenditure related to the PoA has increased fourfold while we have been unable to settle with any clarity what constitutes caste violence and therefore, what measures could curb it.
This is a serious matter to investigate not just because of the economic implications of the waste of public resources. India faces serious criticism from many international agencies based on reports that project a great deal of ‘caste violence’ by generating slippery definitions of the same. Such reports serve not just to generate international outrage but also fuel faulty and damaging legislative moves like the inclusion of caste in the discrimination laws of the United Kingdom. We must hence do more research on the source of the current assumptions guiding caste studies on the one hand and generating new models to understand the Indian reality on the other.![Book Summary Western Foundations of the Caste System- I]()
http://indiafacts.org/book-summary-western-foundations-of-the-caste-system-i/
NEUROSCIENCE NEWS
Rim of jar
whose answer is 
. Interestingly, Śrīpati offers a clue for the answer in the problem itself: he says the multiplication of the 2 numbers results in a necklace of clear, sparkling, spherical pearls for Maheśvara. This is clearly an allusion to the palindromic structure of the product, with the 0s forming the pearls, since they were written historically as circles and the two flanking 1s form the bindings of the necklace. Some numerical savants are known to exhibit a synesthesia with respect numbers — perhaps such was indeed the situation with Śrīpati for a palindromic number such as this could simultaneously produce in ones mind the vivid image of a pearl necklace.![f[n]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5Bn%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[n]")
of Maheśvara’s necklaces thusly: ![f[n]=10^n+1](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5Bn%5D%3D10%5En%2B1&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[n]=10^n+1")
, where 
is an integer and ![f[n]^m](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5Bn%5D%5Em&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[n]^m")
, where 
, is also palindromic. This implies that 
Thus, the first few terms of our sequence are:
![f[9]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B9%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[9]")
is one such: ![f[9]=7\times 11\times 13\times 19\times 52579](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B9%5D%3D7%5Ctimes+11%5Ctimes+13%5Ctimes+19%5Ctimes+52579&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[9]=7\times 11\times 13\times 19\times 52579")
. We can then ask questions such as: 1) which primes will divide a given 
be a factor of ![f[2]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B2%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[2]")
and every 4th term thereafter. Thus, we can formally write that 11 divides every 
, where 
. Similarly, 101 divides every 
. Thus, it also becomes obvious that 11 and 101 will never be co-factors of the same 
, where 
: the reason for writing it this way will become clear below. The first few 
where 
; when for the first time 
, that 
is 
the multiplicative order of 
. Carl Gauss had famously shown in his Disquisitiones Arithmeticae that 
. Thus, it is also clear that 
for the first time when 
. For example, for 7 we get 
because 7 divides 
to give 
. Likewise, the repeat pattern in the decimal expansion of 
which is of length 6. From the above we can easily see why a 
. Thus, the sequence of 
. However, because 
, it therefore divides 
? We can see from polynomial factorization that a polynomial of the form 
can frequently have two factors of the form 
, namely 
or 
. For example, 
and 
. Now, in our case 
and 
. Those are primes and the first two terms of 
are divisors of another such number for a larger 
which is a factor of 
. If 
. But 
; hence, 
A corollary to this is only 
would be an integer. Hence, those primes with odd 
; 
etc will never be factors of any ![m=18 \; \therefore p | f[n] \iff n=18k+9; \; k=0,1,2...](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=m%3D18+%5C%3B+%5Ctherefore+p+%7C+f%5Bn%5D+%5Ciff+n%3D18k%2B9%3B+%5C%3B+k%3D0%2C1%2C2...&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "m=18 \; \therefore p | f[n] \iff n=18k+9; \; k=0,1,2...")
Hence, next term would be:![f[27]=1000000000000000000000000001](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B27%5D%3D1000000000000000000000000001&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[27]=1000000000000000000000000001")
will always co-occur. Further, if a certain 
for a certain 
. Now, ![f[21]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B21%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[21]")
will be divisible by both 7 and 13 as they have ![f[21]= \underline{7} \times \underline{7} \times 11 \times 13 \times 127 \times 2689 \times 909091 \times 459691](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B21%5D%3D+%5Cunderline%7B7%7D+%5Ctimes+%5Cunderline%7B7%7D+%5Ctimes+11+%5Ctimes+13+%5Ctimes+127+%5Ctimes+2689+%5Ctimes+909091+%5Ctimes+459691&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[21]= \underline{7} \times \underline{7} \times 11 \times 13 \times 127 \times 2689 \times 909091 \times 459691")
. Likewise, 
will correspond to a ![f[39]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B39%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[39]")
. Thus, ![f[39]=7 \times 11 \times \underline{13} \times \underline{13} \times 157 \times 859 \times 6397 \times 216451 \times 1058313049 \times 388847808493](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B39%5D%3D7+%5Ctimes+11+%5Ctimes+%5Cunderline%7B13%7D+%5Ctimes+%5Cunderline%7B13%7D+%5Ctimes+157+%5Ctimes+859+%5Ctimes+6397+%5Ctimes+216451+%5Ctimes+1058313049+%5Ctimes+388847808493&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[39]=7 \times 11 \times \underline{13} \times \underline{13} \times 157 \times 859 \times 6397 \times 216451 \times 1058313049 \times 388847808493")
. All other 
![f[45]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B45%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[45]")
, which the most composite 
. We then merge all cliques sharing common nodes for ![f[n], n=1..50](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5Bn%5D%2C+n%3D1..50&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[n], n=1..50")
. The edges and the nodes are then scaled as per their frequency of occurrence across all 50 cliques. The result is a factor graph for 
, where 
corresponds to a particular 
, we get the 11 family. 11, as we saw above, divides every 
. Thus, every 
, we get the 101 family. 101 draws all 
, we get the 1001 family. 1001 being composite is centered on its two factors 73 and 137 and corresponds to the terms where 
.
, we get the 100000001 family. This number being composite is centered on its factors 17 and 5882353 and corresponds to the terms where 
.
, we get the 10000000000000001 family centered on its factors 353, 449, 641, 1409 and 69857. This encompasses the terms corresponding to 
.
, we get the 100000000000000000000000000000001 family centered on its factors 976193, 19841, 6187457 and 834427406578561. This includes the terms corresponding to 
.![p_m[n]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p_m%5Bn%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "p_m[n]")
which divides the corresponding ![\log_{10}p_m[n]](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Clog_%7B10%7Dp_m%5Bn%5D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "\log_{10}p_m[n]")
against ![\log_{10}(f[n])](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Clog_%7B10%7D%28f%5Bn%5D%29&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "\log_{10}(f[n])")
.
appears to be linear with 
, where 
and 
. The upper bounding slope 
is easy to understand: as we observed above, some ![f[19]=11 \times 909090909090909091](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B19%5D%3D11+%5Ctimes+909090909090909091&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[19]=11 \times 909090909090909091")
![f[31]= 11 \times 909090909090909090909090909091](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B31%5D%3D+11+%5Ctimes+909090909090909090909090909091&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[31]= 11 \times 909090909090909090909090909091")
![f[53]= 11 \times 9090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909091](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=f%5B53%5D%3D+11+%5Ctimes+9090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909091&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "f[53]= 11 \times 9090909090909090909090909090909090909090909090909091")
![\sqrt{f[n]}](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Csqrt%7Bf%5Bn%5D%7D&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "\sqrt{f[n]}")
and the other half being lesser than 
where ![x^{13}+1=(x + 1) (x^{12} - x^{11} + x^{10} - x^9 + x^8 - x^7 + x^6 - x^5 + x^4 - x^3 + x^2 - x + 1) \\[5pt] x^{14}+1=(x^2 + 1) (x^{12} - x^{10} + x^8 - x^6 + x^4 - x^2 + 1) \\ [5pt] x^{15}+1=(x + 1) (x^2 - x + 1) (x^4 - x^3 + x^2 - x + 1) (x^8 + x^7 - x^5 - x^4 - x^3 + x + 1) \\ [5pt] x^{16}+1=x^{16} + 1 \\ [5pt] x^{17}+1=(x + 1) (x^{16} - x^{15} + x^{14} - x^{13} + x^{12} - x^{11} + x^{10} - x^9 + x^8 - x^7 + x^6 - x^5 + x^4 - x^3 + x^2 - x + 1)](http://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=x%5E%7B13%7D%2B1%3D%28x+%2B+1%29+%28x%5E%7B12%7D+-+x%5E%7B11%7D+%2B+x%5E%7B10%7D+-+x%5E9+%2B+x%5E8+-+x%5E7+%2B+x%5E6+-+x%5E5+%2B+x%5E4+-+x%5E3+%2B+x%5E2+-+x+%2B+1%29+%5C%5C%5B5pt%5D+x%5E%7B14%7D%2B1%3D%28x%5E2+%2B+1%29+%28x%5E%7B12%7D+-+x%5E%7B10%7D+%2B+x%5E8+-+x%5E6+%2B+x%5E4+-+x%5E2+%2B+1%29+%5C%5C+%5B5pt%5D+x%5E%7B15%7D%2B1%3D%28x+%2B+1%29+%28x%5E2+-+x+%2B+1%29+%28x%5E4+-+x%5E3+%2B+x%5E2+-+x+%2B+1%29+%28x%5E8+%2B+x%5E7+-+x%5E5+-+x%5E4+-+x%5E3+%2B+x+%2B+1%29+%5C%5C+%5B5pt%5D+x%5E%7B16%7D%2B1%3Dx%5E%7B16%7D+%2B+1+%5C%5C+%5B5pt%5D+x%5E%7B17%7D%2B1%3D%28x+%2B+1%29+%28x%5E%7B16%7D+-+x%5E%7B15%7D+%2B+x%5E%7B14%7D+-+x%5E%7B13%7D+%2B+x%5E%7B12%7D+-+x%5E%7B11%7D+%2B+x%5E%7B10%7D+-+x%5E9+%2B+x%5E8+-+x%5E7+%2B+x%5E6+-+x%5E5+%2B+x%5E4+-+x%5E3+%2B+x%5E2+-+x+%2B+1%29&bg=ffffff&fg=333333&s=0 "x^{13}+1=(x + 1) (x^{12} - x^{11} + x^{10} - x^9 + x^8 - x^7 + x^6 - x^5 + x^4 - x^3 + x^2 - x + 1) \\[5pt] x^{14}+1=(x^2 + 1) (x^{12} - x^{10} + x^8 - x^6 + x^4 - x^2 + 1) \\ [5pt] x^{15}+1=(x + 1) (x^2 - x + 1) (x^4 - x^3 + x^2 - x + 1) (x^8 + x^7 - x^5 - x^4 - x^3 + x + 1) \\ [5pt] x^{16}+1=x^{16} + 1 \\ [5pt] x^{17}+1=(x + 1) (x^{16} - x^{15} + x^{14} - x^{13} + x^{12} - x^{11} + x^{10} - x^9 + x^8 - x^7 + x^6 - x^5 + x^4 - x^3 + x^2 - x + 1)")
tends to have more factors than other polynomial adjacent to it. Thus, these tend to be among highly composite 
