EU Parliament (Credit: Botond Horvath - Shutterstock.com)
The reason France and Germany are so important — and vital — in the EU is to a large extent due to their propensity to disagree on virtually everything.
But they are not without substance. The two countries' economic philosophies are so far apart that when they can agree on something — or increasingly anything at all — everybody else in Europe often finds the compromise acceptable. (The United Kingdom is a special case, not relevant for this analysis). With the signing of the Maastricht treaty, the Germans could reasonably assume that they had won the intellectual debate over economic strategy and practice in Europe once and for all. The eurozone crisis has decided otherwise. The rift has reappeared and is widening. Seen from Berlin, France (like other southern countries) is paying for her failure to implement the painful structural reforms that have transformed Germany from the sick man of Europe into the continent's powerhouse. Meanwhile, terms that sound downright horrific to German ears, such as "industrial policy" and "a new mandate for the ECB," are reappearing in Paris.
That is a narrative that is broadly shared by other eurozone members, leaving the Germans to feel isolated. However, from the painful piecemeal solutions that have accompanied the European response during the last three years, a consensus seems to emerge that what is needed is "more Europe." This implies that the euro (and indeed the entire European project) can only be saved if the move towards "political union" is made. This is a debate that France and Germany have carefully tried to avoid ever since the days when De Gaulle launched his war against Europe's supranational institutions. Are they really ready for it now? The conventional wisdom tells us that the Germans are instinctive European federalists, ready to replicate on a continental scale what they have at home. The French, on the other hand — as we saw on the occasion of the referendum on the European "constitution" in May 2005 — continue to cherish unimpeded national sovereignty. Here again, stereotypes can be misleading. France has moved a long way from Gaullist dogma, while the Germans have become more reluctant to share sovereignty (and money).
All the power had to be placed in the European Council, with the implication that the two countries would effectively run the show. This plan has not worked. The French have realized that, given the power shift in favor of Germany, joint dominance is an illusion — which explains Hollande's move. The Germans, for their part, are understandably uncomfortable with a situation where everybody else calls on them to exercise "leadership," but resents what could look like a "German Europe." That is why many Germans would prefer a system where the ultimate decision-making responsibility would be based on common, well-legitimized institutions. Advocates of this institutional model in Germany are expected to favor this approach because they believe that these institutions would essentially continue to sing to a German tune. They may be surprised. "Common" institutions can develop an operating logic that can easily make them very different from that of an intergovernmental system. The ECB is a case in point. It was designed with the Bundesbank as its institutional and cultural template.
He has done so with a wise political nod from Berlin, but to the horror of many in the German establishment. More nods and more horror are likely to come in the near future. However we define it, political union is not a small thing. It is also very possible that Europeans will miss the target. Nevertheless, there is also the possibility that many EU nations (though not all) will be driven by necessity in that direction. If and when we come to that point, we will discover that the problem of sovereignty is only the tip of the iceberg. Marianne and Brunhilde: The Prince and the Law, Part II | |||||||||||||||||||||
By Riccardo Perissich | Tuesday, May 28, 2013 |
Political union in Europe would, indeed, be no small undertaking. It's true that EU member countries are all parliamentary democracies. But as Riccardo Perissich explores in the second of a two-part series, "political power" has different meanings in the different countries.
We Europeans tend to project onto Europe the experience of our own national systems.
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Nowhere is the difference in style and in substance bigger than between France and Germany.
Despite the republican rhetoric, in France politics still turn around the "power of the Prince."
It is he who must enjoy democratic legitimacy. In no other western country is the executive stronger and the parliament weaker than in France.
Indeed, for French culture, the whole point of having a government is to expect it to shape events, to "make history." Supported by the "will of the Nation," its discretionary powers are considerable.
The reverse is true in Germany. Nowhere else is the central government weaker and the parliament stronger. Even the power of the Bundestag, which seems increasingly almighty even in a pan-European context, is constrained.
While France is still highly centralized, Germany's federal system gives lots of power to the states — that is, the regions around the country, away from the center.
The other true power player in Germany is the nation's constitution, whose guardian, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (supreme constitutional court) is possibly the most respected institution of the country.
The French Conseil Constitutionnel has acquired importance in recent years, but its authority cannot be compared with that of its German equivalent.
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The French expect from their politicians fast and decisive action.
In contrast, the Germans have an understandably difficult relationship with the notion of "making history" and are deeply suspicious of any form of discretionary power.
As a result, Germans believe that markets must be regulated. But they have as little appetite for French "dirigisme" as they have for Anglo-Saxon "laissez-faire."
They expect politicians to establish rules and to enforce them consistently with as little derogation as possible.
Furthermore, rules must be sustainable because even the best can only be trusted (in particular by the markets) if they are implemented consistently over a long period of time.
This is not to say that the French don't like rules. On the contrary, they like them so much that they try to change them all the time. And when a new one is adopted it is immediately challenged, often in the streets.
In other words, the core German policy concept of "Ordnungspolitik" is not only an economic recipe. It encompasses an entire political culture favoring a highly regulated market where politicians, having established rules, then refrain from further intervention.
The French system embraces the idea of acting fast and decisively. The German one is focused on building consensus and is slow and cumbersome, sometimes painfully so.
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In fact, the French envy the Germans for this, but seem incapable of changing their political culture.
This stability reflects the preference of the electorate; while parliamentary majorities tend to change in France at every election, governments last much longer in Germany.
All this has important effects for the European policies of the two countries, irrespective of the political color of the government of the day.
The Germans expect the EU to establish rules. The French expect the EU to decide "policies." The French accept that there should be rules, but say that they should be "flexible."
It seems reasonable; but who applies "flexibility"? Translated into a German mindset, the concept sounds dangerously like discretion.
When it comes to institutions, they both are suspicious of the Commission.
However, that suspicion is based on different reasons: defense of national sovereignty for the French and fear of discretionary power for the Germans.
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When the moment comes to give substance to the concept of "political union," the gap to fill will therefore be huge.
Should the French ever overcome their obsession with sovereignty and accept moving towards some sort of federal system, they will want to compensate at the European level for the loss of discretionary power incurred at the national level.
As a consequence, they will be naturally driven to ask for a strong executive, possibly directly elected. It should not be surprising that the only concrete proposal coming from Hollande is that of a (still undefined) "permanent government" of the Eurozone.
The Germans are likely to fight for a constitution with clearly defined rules, a weak executive and a powerful parliament.
To find a workable compromise will be a hard job. But those who think that it would be "mission impossible" should not despair too early.
They can be reassured that "political union" — whatever its ultimate shape (and if it comes to pass) — will certainly not be designed in one big shot.
If we in Europe will ever have our "Philadelphia moment," its purpose will be to consolidate an already existing balance. Its elements will gradually develop from the process of trial and error that has characterized the eurozone for the last three years.
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The debate on whether it is the polity who generates institutions or vice versa is of course as old as democracy.
It can be easily dismissed only by those who believe that nations as we know them are metaphysical entities that predate the existence of the institutions that govern the people of those nations.
In reality a "polity" is a product of history. It is generated by shared interests and values, but also by a political debate that can only take place around existing institutions.
In Europe, the only place for such debate is the European Parliament. At present, that debate is still more "national" than "European"; on many key issues German socialists are closer to their conservative citizens than to their French comrades.
These differences will never completely disappear. However, as the power of the Parliament continues to increase and as more decisions have to be made in common, compromises be reached not only by governments but also by directly elected politicians.
And so a European polity may well emerge from that process and debate.
Fortunately, the French and the Germans will not determine the result alone. In order to bridge the cultural gap, the design of a European political architecture will require courage and vision.
It will also require a great deal of Italian or Belgian style pragmatism — and propensity to fudge.
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It even led to a civil war and is possibly the cause of the present dysfunctional American system.
But that hasn't prevented the United States from having a glorious history and becoming the dominant power in the world.
http://theglobalist.com/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=10009
Ballistic-missile defenses, joint-strike fighters, Black Hawks, and more — Chinese hackers have their hands on plans for these and more of the Pentagon's most sophisticated weapons systems, just the latest sign that the culture of hacking in China continues to put America on the defensive ahead of a tense meeting between President Obama and Xi Jinping, a summit bound to be tense with cyberwarfare diplomacy.
The new breach comes as a newly disclosed part of a classified Defense Science Board report. Back in January, the board 
So while that big Mandiant report from February — the one linking a nondescript building all the way to the PLA and back to critical U.S. infrastructure, the one the Pentagon outright 
“What Pakistan is signaling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level.”
As Robert said “Pakistan has in few uncertain words declared that such an attack would be a threat to Pakistan’s existence,and that they’d more or less nuke at the border if there was a major blitzkreig attack like that.”
But if India does not respond to Pakistans sustained support to Terrorists, even this Status Quo is also not good.
I am not a supporter of Nuclear Weapons but India is in a dangerous neighbourhood. Mr. Shyam Saran’s statement not only raises the bar for Pakistani Military but also the cost of any further “Mumbai 2008″ like events for ISI.
If countries like USA, France and Israel can do it. Why not India.
O.K. Let’s go with that scenario. Pakistani terrorists manage to kill 10,000 Indians. Enraged Indian leaders proclaim their intent to invade and occupy half of Pakistan for 5 years. Distrustful Pakistanis assume India plans to occupy Pakistan for 50 years.
George,
O.K. Let’s go with that scenario. Pakistani terrorists manage to kill 10,000 Indians. Enraged Indian leaders proclaim their intent to invade and occupy half of Pakistan for 5 years. Distrustful Pakistanis assume India plans to occupy Pakistan for 50 years.
Our Tolerance is our main problem — aggression is not and is responsible for the destruction of our civilization mainly. Today’s Pakistan(East or West) is also a proof of that.
So, please, don’t try to teach us on that matter at least.
“But the Indian government has also disowned ‘Cold Start’, the conventional war doctrine that was supposedly designed to punish further Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India. Obviously, mixed messages, the bane of deterrence efforts.”
http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/india-has-no-cold-start-doctrine-army-chief-70159
April 30, 2013 - Updated 941 PKT
From Web Edition
NEW DELHI: India will retaliate massively even if Pakistan uses tactical nuclear weapons against it. With Pakistan developing "tactical" nuclear warheads, that is, miniaturizing its weapons to be carried on short-range missiles, India will protect its security interests by retaliating to a "smaller" tactical attack in exactly the same manner, as it would respond to a "big" strategic attack, said a report published in The Times of India.
Articulating Indian nuclear policy in this regard for the first time, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, said, "India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective." This is significant, because Saran was placing on record India's official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in New Delhi.
Giving a speech on India's nuclear deterrent recently, Saran placed India's nuclear posture in perspective in the context of recent developments, notably the "jihadist edge" that Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability have acquired.
Saran argued that as a result of its tactical weapons, Pakistan believes it has brought down the threshold of nuclear use. "Pakistani motivation is to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes such as the horrific 26/11 attack on Mumbai. What Pakistan is signalling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level. This is nothing short of nuclear blackmail, no different from the irresponsible behaviour one witnesses in North Korea," he said.
One of the main reasons for Pakistan miniaturizing its nukes is actually to keep its weapons from being confiscated or neutralized by the US, a fear that has grown in the Pakistani establishment in the wake of the operation against Osama bin Laden. "Pakistan has, nevertheless, projected its nuclear deterrent as solely targeted at India and its strategic doctrine mimics the binary nuclear equation between the US and the Soviet Union which prevailed during the Cold War," Saran said.
However, warning Pakistan, he added, "A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons."
There have been significant shifts in Pakistan's nuclear posture recently. First is the movement from uranium to a newer generation of plutonium weapons, which has enabled Pakistan to increase the number of weapons, outstripping India in weapons and fissile material production, although they are still to be verified. Pakistan has claimed it has miniaturized nuclear weapons to be used on cruise missiles and other short-range missiles. The newer generation of Pakistan's weapons is also solid-fuelled rather than liquid, making them easier to transport and launch.
http://www.thenews.c...s:-Shyam-Saran-