Security missing: Survivors | ||
| JAIDEEP HARDIKAR | ||
Jagdalpur (Chhattisgarh), May 27: The Congress convoy ambushed on Saturday had “no security cover unlike the previous two days”, survivors said on a day the National Investigation Agency began probing possible security lapses by the central forces or the state’s BJP government. “There was no road-opening party ahead of us; no anti-landmine vehicle leading the convoy; no police team tailing it. There were no police even at the Parivartan Yatra rally in Sukma,” Ajay Singh, aide of slain Congress leader Mahendra Karma, said in Faraspal village where the Salwa Judum founder was cremated today. Karma and state party chief Nand Kumar Patel were among 27 Congress leaders, workers and personal security officers (PSOs) who died as the convoy, travelling from Sukma towards Jagdalpur, was waylaid. “We had protection in Bijapur on day one (May 23) of the Yatra; we had cover on day two (May 24) in Jagdalpur. It is strange that we had none on day three,” Singh said. Two other survivors corroborated him. It appears an intelligence input about an increased presence of Maoists in Geeram valley, the site of the massacre, was ignored. Many senior Congress leaders have suggested a conspiracy behind the attack that has wiped out virtually the entire top rung of the party’s state leadership. Jagdalpur superintendent of police Mayank Shrivastav, though, claimed a road-opening party had preceded the convoy on its way to Sukma earlier in the day, and later again as the motorcade headed towards Jagdalpur. Shrivastav suggested the patrol passed the attack site 45 minutes before the convoy and the “Maoists laid the ambush in a very short time”. He admitted there was no anti-landmine vehicle or police escort apart from the 35 police PSOs of the party leaders. Patel puzzle One other question being asked in Congress circles is: why did the Maoists kill state unit chief Patel and his son Dinesh who, unlike Karma, had no personal enmity with the rebels? Especially when they let off local MLA Kawasi Lakhma, who was in the same car? “I’m sure the National Investigation Agency team (which arrived in Chhattisgarh today) will probe this angle. It smacks of a political conspiracy,” state Congress media chief Shailesh Trivedi said. Patel would have been a front-runner for the chief minister’s post if the Congress had won the upcoming state polls. Dinesh, married two years ago, looked set to play a major role in the Youth Congress. Father and son had worked very hard to make the Yatra a success, Singh said. “We are confused why the Maoists killed Patel and his son. Dinesh was not even a full-time politician,” Singh said. “He was extremely polite and had a spotless character.” Route ‘rumour’ Singh and state Congress leaders including the injured Lakhma chorused their denial of a buzz, started apparently by the administration, about a last-minute change to the convoy’s route. “We went there and came back according to a pre-decided plan,” Singh said. “To my knowledge, the route was not changed,” said Lakhma. There was a change to the Yatra’s schedule, though, but it was conveyed to the police, Trivedi said. The rallies in Sukma and Jagdalpur were slated for May 24 and 25, respectively, but the dates were switched because former chief minister Ajit Jogi could come to Sukma only on May 25. “There was no change to the Yatra’s route on May 25; the state government is propagating this rumour to cover its own lapses,” Trivedi said. “Security lapses could have taken place,” junior Union home minister R.P.N. Singh said in Delhi while announcing the NIA probe. “(In case of) any lapse on the part of central forces or the state government, we have to take action.” |
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130528/jsp/frontpage/story_16944802.jsp#.UaQWzNIwevc
Chhattisgarh attack: Why India is losing its war against Maoists
by Praveen Swami 17 mins ago
Five decades ago, the special forces officer Roger Trinquier set about understanding why his nation losing to enemies it outgunned and outmanned. France, he wrote, was “in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again, while we pay only passing attention to the war we lost in Indochina and the one we are about to lose in Algeria. The result of this shortcoming is that the army is not prepared to confront an adversary employing arms and methods the army itself ignores. It has, therefore, no chance of winning”.
Trinquier concluded: “our military machine reminds one of a pile-driver attempting to crush a fly”.
Like the French army Trinquier wrote of, India counter-Maoist campaign will not and cannot succeed. The Indian state doesn’t have enough boots on the ground. The lessons its fighting women and men receive are inadequate. The tools they’re being are issued are the wrong ones.
India’s way of counter-insurgency isn’t that different from Mughal emperors, who despatched great imperial columns to put down rebellious governors and or bandits preying on their trade routes. In 2003, a group of ministers which review internal security after the Kargil war, assigned the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) frontline responsibility for counter-insurgency operations—backing up police forces across the country. The force, at the time of the war, had 167,367 personnel. It is now up to 222 battalions—over 222,000 armed personnel, and 300,000 including administrators and support staff.
The site of the attacked convoy. PTI
Yet, the results haven’t been luminous. Even as the CRPF’s numbers have ballooned, the government’s own data shows the number of Maoist insurgents eliminated has declined year-on-year since 2009, from 317 to 114. The number of insurgents and unarmed supporters has stayed steady, at 25,000 plus.
In 2010, an entire company of the 62 Battalion was annihilated in an ambush at Tarmetla. In the years since, the CRPF has become increasingly defensive — wary both of taking casualties, or killing civilians in crossfire.
There’s a simple reasons for this. In 2003, the CRPF had seven recruit-training centres, each processing 600-700 women and men through nine-month courses. That number has increased, but using ad-hoc facilities. There’s no dedicated theatre-specific warfare schools and an intelligence service that exists only in name. The force doesn’t fly its own helicopters, necessary in Maoist-hit areas where it can’t use heavily-mined roads, or its own photo-reconnaissance capabilities.
If the CRPF was doing what it was supposed to do—just backing up police forces, who would generate intelligence and carry out cutting-edge operations—this wouldn’t matter quite as much. The thing is, those police forces themselves are in a mess.
Figures for 2011, the last year for which government data is available, show just how acute personnel deficits are in state hit by the Maoist insurgency. Bihar had just 54,196 police personnel for a population of 82,998,509—65 for every 100,000 population, against a United Nations norm of 250:100,000 or better. West Bengal has 60,450 police for a population for its 91.34 million residents, 66:100,000.In Odisha, there are 29,481 for a population of 49.95 million, a ration of 70:100,000. The state of Jharkhand—among the better-administered new states—does a little better, with 40,579 officers for 32.9 mn residents, but even that’s just 123:100,000.
Delhi, with 16.75 mn residents, had 66,686 on its rolls at end-2011—far more than Chhattisgarh, which had 27,597.
Having more police officers, of course, won’t solve the problem on its own. The sad truth, though, is more cops doesn’t mean more peace. Nagaland, which now has a staggering 1,677 police for every 100,000 population, and Manipur with 669.6, and have some of the highest population to force ratios in India—but haven’t helped put down insurgencies. Mizoram, which has no insurgency, has 1268.6, suggesting police hiring is in fact serving an employment-generation imperative.
In a June, 2010, speech, then-home minister P Chidambaram noted that in the states worst-hit by Maoist violence, “there are police stations where there are no more than eight men; and even these eight or less men do not hold any weapons for fear of the weapons being looted”. He called on states to “enhance the capacity of training institutes in the States to at least double the present capacity, and to recruit at least double the number of policemen and women that are being recruited at present”.
He said it, and it hasn’t happened. Both New Delhi and state capitals need to be held to account for this.
There’s no shortage, though, of states which got counter-insurgency right — without tanks and gunships and armed drones and whatever else phalanxes of apoplectic retired generals have been calling for on television. Pile drivers, as Trinquier pointed out, can’t swat flies.
In the late-1990s, Andhra Pradesh’s politicians united behind a decisive counter-Maoist strategy. Former director-general of police HG Dora built a highly-rated intelligence service, boosted the numbers of police stations and upgraded training. It called in NS Bhati, a veteran of the legendary RAW covert force code-named Establishment22, to train crack special jungle warfare force, the Greyhounds. The state’s police are still the most feared by Maoists of all their adversaries.
Punjab’s KPS Gill famously routed an insurgency that seemed poised for triumph. Prem Mahadeven has pointed out that the success was achieved by strategy, not machismo: among other things, Gill moved forces out of static duties into operations, and enhanced manpower “to attain a reaction time of 3-5 minutes in urban areas, and 15-20 minutes in rural areas”.
Tripura the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal records, brought “one of the most virulent insurgencies in the country to near-complete end”—an insurgency, like the one in Chhattisgarh, was alleged to be driven by irresolvable tribal-rights issues.
Andhra Pradesh was ruled by the Telegu Desam Party; Punjab by the Congress; Tripura by the Left. Counter-insurgency success isn’t about party politics: it’s about professional skill and political will.
Instead of will or skill, we’re getting buck-passing. The Union Government has ordered a National Investigations Agency probe—though what it’s supposed to ascertain is unclear, since the perpetrators are bragging about their act. The Ministry of Home Affairs has been saying that it warned of an attack—neglecting the minor detail that the 26 April Intelligence Bureau alert it refers mentioned only non-specific specific threat. The National Technical Reconnaissance Organisation and the Air Force are blaming each other for why drones aren’t located closer to the combat zone. Ajit Jogi wants President’s Rule; Rajnath Singh is complaining about the NIA.
Tragedy is of two kinds. There’s the kind that comes about because of consequences which cannot be foreseen; the consequence of fate. Then, there’s what Socrates pithily described as going “willingly toward the bad”. Akrasia, he called it.
It doesn’t take a lot to see which script we’re acting to.
SC ban on Salwa Judum not implemented: Nandini Sundar
by Pallavi Polanki May 27, 2013
“On no count has the government done anything to implement the Supreme Court judgment. In fact, they have done everything to subvert it and make the situation worse,” says author and sociologist Nandini Sundar, on whose petition the apex court in 2011 banned the Salwa Judum, a state-sponsored militia propped up to counter Maoists in Chhattisgarh.
In its hard-hitting judgement, the Supreme Court had ordered the prosecution of all those involved in criminal activities of Salwa Judum, the architect of which was controversial Congress leader Mahendra Karma. On Saturday, Karma, the tribal leader from Bastar was among the 27 people gunned down in a deadly Maoist attack on a convoy of Congress leaders while they were returning from a political rally.
CRPF jawans carry of the body of a victim. PTI
The Supreme Court had directed the state government to investigate all previously “inappropriately or incompletely investigated instances of alleged criminal activities of Salwa Judum”, file appropriate FIRs and diligently prosecute the guilty.
But no one has been prosecuted, says Sundar. “Somebody like Mahendra Karma should have been in jail a long time ago,” she adds.
Has the Supreme Court verdict impacted the government’s response at all? “No. For one thing, we had explicitly named Mahendra Karma and shown from police diaries and the Collector’s monthly reports of his involvement. Right from the beginning we had shown the involvement of the Chhattisgarh government in what was going on. It wasn’t a people’s movement at all.”
Describing the response by the state government to the Supreme Court’s order to disband the 6500 “barely literate” and inadequately trained tribal special police officers to fight the Maoists, as a “slap in the face of the court”, Sundar says “The SPOs were supposed to be disbanded. Instead, they were constituted into an armed constabulary force from the date of the judgment. The Chhattisgarh Act says very clearly that everyone who was an SPO on the date of the judgement would now be considered an armed constabulary force and they were given better guns and more money.”
Asked whether the scale and nature of response by the government to the deadly attack was a cause of worry and what she would like the government response to be, she said, “I am very saddened by the attack and I think it is terrible… Firstly, I would like to see the government implement the Supreme Court judgment. Secondly, I would like to see them resign for their complete failure to address the whole issue.
“The judgment laid down very clearly the fact that people who violated human rights should be prosecuted. I would like to see the SPOs disbanded. I would like to see the compensation and rehabilitation of all those who were affected by the Salwa Judum. I would like to see the schools being vacated and restarted in every village. They continue to be occupied by the security officers (despite the Supreme Court’s order). We would like to see some element of justice and normalcy as the main plank rather than just military operation.”
Published: May 27, 2013 23:28 IST | Updated: May 28, 2013 01:41 IST
Congress tom-tom made it easy for rebels
— PHOTO: SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTThe turn in Darbha where Maoist's ambushed Congress workers on Saturday, Cars with flat tyres are in the background.
Party announced travel plans well ahead — a violation of standard operating procedures in conflict areas
Maoist military planners chose the ‘deliberate ambush’ method in the Darbha attack on Saturday to kill Congress leaders. They set up traps, planted improvised devices and placed sharpshooters at strategic locations after a recce of the terrain. Maoist documents and the testimonies of the ground-level security forces bear out this theory.
Maoists have one of the oldest divisions in the Darbha area, reporting to the Chhattisgarh State committee, DKSZC. Apparently, the hilly road connecting Jagdalpur to Sukma, where the ambush took place, was well mapped by the division members. As the convoy approached a sharp turn, the blast took place. The impact tossed a vehicle 20 feet above the ground and it fell into the steep, rocky low ground by the road.
“At least 100-150 kg of explosive was used for the blast,” said an officer. An undefined number of sharp shooters opened fire from a higher ground and bullets slanted into the vehicles. All the vehicles of the motorcade, still resting by the road, had flat tyres. Rebels then forced the leaders out, made them walk upland and peppered them with bullets.
Maoists have three types of ambush — Deliberate, Opportunity and Mobile. Opportunity and Mobile are resorted to when they do not get enough time to plan an attack. But like in the 2010 Chintalnar massacre in Chhattisgarh in which 76 soldiers were killed, on Saturday the cadres had enough time to plan. The Congress helped the Maoists comfortably coordinate a ‘deliberate ambush’ by announcing their travel plans well ahead — a violation of standard operating procedures in a conflict area.
“The Congress was going deep inside Bastar to campaign, unlike in the last election. Their leadership should also have kept in mind that every Maoist release named the party’s top leaders as their enemies,” said a security official.
However, one may counter the official’s argument that Saturday’s ambush did not take place in any remote area, but on a busy road, 43 km from Jagdalpur city and 20 km from one of the tourist hotspots, Tirathgarh. “Even on Saturday, 15-20 tourist teams came to visit the waterfall and the caves at Tirathgarh,” said a forest guard.
Congress workers told The Hindu that they were told to mobilise more people for the rallies to grab the “empty political space.” “This time the party chief told us to go deep inside to build a mass base, to resist any attempt to manipulate the election,” said a Congress worker.
However, the man who tried to mobilise the party to ensure its victory in the November election, Nand Kumar Patel, himself has paid with his life.
Usually, fighting intensifies between the security forces and the Maoists in Bastar between February and June, just before the monsoon sets in. The forest cover disappears after spring, making each other’s target more visible. The Maoists organise their Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC) around this time and plan the offensives.
“If we do not go on an offensive this time of the year, the rebels will corner us, like in 2010. We have to plan our offences around this time of the year, to protect ourselves,” said a senior Home Ministry official.
The security operations were particularly intense for the last one year. The forces were entering areas where they never thought of venturing before. For example, Pidiya in south Bastar is one Maoist stronghold where the forces had hardly entered before, but they did at least twice in the last five months.
“In addition, the number of operations increased by six to eight times in the last couple of years,” said a senior official.
The operations were making life difficult for the rebels. Police claim that Maoist recruitments were declining, their mobility was getting restricted and surrenders were increasing. The operation on the Andhra Pradesh border virtually wiped out the entire leadership a few weeks ago.
The joint forces operations in Edesmeta that killed innocent civilians also irked the Maoists. “The more innocents die, the more they [Maoists] feel guilty. They feel they should avenge these deaths. Collateral damage, like in Edesmeta, never helps,” said a journalist.
In this context, it was inevitable that the guerrilla fighters would counter-attack sooner rather than later to loosen the stranglehold of the security forces. Congress workers wish they had this security advice before.
Published: May 27, 2013 23:07 IST | Updated: May 28, 2013 02:39 IST
Raman Singh acknowledges security lapse as NIA starts probe
NIA starts investigation; judicial inquiry ordered
Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh has acknowledged that there was a “lapse” and that led to Saturday’s Maoist attack on a Congress motorcade.
“An incident of such a magnitude could not have happened; there must have been some lapse somewhere. That is why in order to get to the bottom of the truth an impartial inquiry by a sitting judge has been ordered. The Government of India has also ordered an inquiry by the National Investigation Agency (NIA),” Mr. Singh said.
So far, two inquiries have been ordered. One would be led by a sitting judge of the High Court and the other by the NIA. “I have an open mind with regard to any kind of inquiry as long as it brings out the truth,” said Mr. Singh. His office told The Hindu that Mr. Singh insists on “speedy investigation.”
A five-member NIA team, headed by Inspector General (IG) S. K. Singh, arrived in Raipur on Monday. The team’s itinerary and work plan has not been disclosed. But, sources told The Hindu, the team will be based in Raipur for a “longish period.” The team members will visit the hilly tracts of Darbha and talk to officials concerned.
The NIA team visited a Raipur hospital to talk to some of the injured Congress workers and leaders.
Simultaneously, a security operation has been launched in and around Bastar and Sukma. “Six hundred paramilitary persons have been engaged in the operation. However, some of them are guarding the area where Saturday’s incident took place. It is a joint operation with the State police,” said a senior official. Additional Director-General (Naxal Operations) R.K. Vij told The Hindu that there is an ongoing operation in the Minapa area of Sukma where about one thousand members of paramilitary forces have been engaged. “That is an ongoing operation. However, there is no fresh deployment in the area,” he said. He has also claimed that 300 police personnel were deployed for road sanitisation on Saturday. “This was a reserve force for special operations, which was used for road opening. So this allegation, that road was not sanitised on Saturday, is not correct,” said Mr. Vij.
Meanwhile, the last rites of Congress chief Nand Kumar Patel and his son Dinesh, killed in the attack, were performed with State honours at their native village, Nandeli, in Raigarh district on Monday.
Mr. Patel’s younger son Umesh performed the rites, in the presence of Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi, Governor Shekhar Dutta, and Mr. Raman Singh.
About three thousand people, including State Minister for Home R.P.N. Singh, attended the last rites of Mahendra Karma in his hometown in Pharsapal in Dantewada.