China’s Foreign Policy: Biang Biang Noodles!
Tavleen Singh narrates in her book ‘Durbar’ that having personally witnessed grisly scenes of children dying of starvation in presence of their hapless parents themselves surviving on grass for over a month, when she brought it to the notice of the concerned Chief Minister and the political hierarchy at Delhi, the government response was total denial of any starvation deaths whatsoever and a countercharge that this was propaganda by the Opposition parties.
Are we to blindly follow Nehru’s legacy of “not a blade of grass grows there” with reference to Aksai Chin?
The situation today has not changed, in that, pragmatic recommendations for dealing firmly with China are being brushed under the carpet as ranting by ‘China bashers’. Same was the case in building public opinion for withdrawing from Siachen on grounds it had no strategic significance – now acknowledged otherwise. Similarly, some military veterans and scholars were roped in to portray India’s shameful response to China’s intrusion in Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) into some sort of diplomatic victory, some even saying that the Chinese intrusion was because of ‘forward’ movements of the Indian Army, knowing full well that Indian Army unlike Pakistani Army will not move an inch forward without political approval.
It is only after public pressure for past few weeks that AK Anthony ventured to give a statement on 12 May 2013 (first statement as Defence Minister 42 days after the Chinese intrusion of 15 April) that India has the right to develop infrastructure on own side. But the question remains as to what is ‘own side’ and have we exchanged the claim lines with China? The answer appears to be no, as per an article by a recently superannuated former Chief of Staff of Eastern Command. What then has been the purpose of the numerous meetings on the border issue over the years?
The statement by Sushil Shinde that India has no jurisdiction over the area of Chinese intrusion is ominous. Strategic importance apart, we don’t seem to have any inkling about something known as ‘resources’ over which conflicts are likely to rage in future. Are we to blindly follow Nehru’s legacy of “not a blade of grass grows there” with reference to Aksai Chin. Take Siachen; India constitutes 17 percent of world population but has access to only four percent of global fresh water reserves. Musharraf as a Lieutenant General (much before he became Chief) gave a presentation to Pakistani Defence Ministry stating that at the time of Independence, per capita availability of water in Pakistan was 6000 cusecs which had already come down to 1000 cusecs per head. He strongly advocated that Pakistan must capture Kashmir to meet future requirements of water, besides other reasons. China occupied Shaksgam Valley because of its glaciated fresh water reserves. Yet we are talking of vacating one of our largest fresh water reserve in Siachen despite India heading towards being a water starved nation and China already deploying water weapons by damming rivers flowing into India.
Former ambassador P Stopden (who hails from Ladakh) said on national TV post the Chinese DBO intrusion that over the years India has ceded to China over 400 square kilometres of territory in Ladakh alone.
Both Aksai Chin and Ladakh are known to have large uranium and mineral reserves though no mining has been undertaken. Yet we are gradually ceding to Chinese intrusions. Former ambassador P Stopden (who hails from Ladakh) said on national TV post the Chinese DBO intrusion that over the years India has ceded to China over 400 square kilometres of territory in Ladakh alone. This is not counting Chinese illegal occupation of Aksai Chin (38,000 square kilometres) and Shaksgam Valley (5,800 square kilometres). He would not make such statement without basis. The implications are therefore clear – there have been many intrusions in the past that have been hushed up, as would have been done in the recent one in DBO (acknowledged officially as 19 kilometre deep but actually 30 kilometres) had not an enterprising journalist spilled the beans.
If we have actually ceded some 400 square kilometres of territory in Ladakh, it would not be surprising if similar has been the case in the central sector and northeast. The recent Chinese intrusion at DBO would give them another 275 square kilometres and it is not known whether they came down from KK Pass or Aksai Chin. Times of India of 4th May states that surveillance imagery captured by spy drones showed the PLA made three simultaneous intrusions in the adjoining areas of the DBO sector in mid April this year. But there is silence whether the Chinese continue to sit at these three locations or have gone back. A linked serious question is that when the DBO Sector was earlier held by Ladakh Scouts and controlled by the Army, when, why and on whose order was this sector allotted to the ITBP and given command channels through the ITBP chain. Was this deliberate to facilitate Chinese intrusion, firming in, and to eventually turn the flanks of Indian defences at Siachen, concurrently facilitating handshake between Chinese sitting in Gilgit-Baltistan with Aksai Chin. This actually amounts to silent war crime and the government must come out clean.
If we have been acquiescing to Chinese intrusions deliberately and the army not responding because of political gagging, this may yet turnout to be the mother of all scams paling all the gates (Coalgate, Railgate etc) and scores of scams including 2G, if investigated.
The government says there is no deal with China in exchange to withdrawing their intrusion from DBO. Are we expected to actually believe this? If there is no deal, then why have we agreed to simultaneously withdraw from an area which is 30 kilometres (officially 19 kilometres) inside our territory? Why have we agreed to demolish our fortifications from Chumar and why are we referring to these fortifications as “tin sheds”? if this is not a deal, what is?
What he left unsaid is that China can tie you up in knots in a manner similar to these noodles that may defy your spoon and fork but can be handled deftly by China holding the chopsticks.
Ironically, even former ambassadors and diplomats are questioning why Salman Khurshid went running to Beijing to tie up the visit of Li Keqiang whereas protocol demanded that the Chinese Foreign Minister should have come to India to tie upto the visit of his Prime Minister. In hindsight, government may claim that Salman’s visit was independent of Li Keqiang’s fortcoming visit to India but the facts, in sync with our current policy of bending backwards, are quite apparent. It is obvious that Chinese would have been pleaded to for Li Keqiang making the right noises in India to strengthen government’s hand in forthcoming elections. The Chinese would have readily agreed in exchange to more concessions, that would have been quietly accepted by the Indian side. The public can continue to be kept at bay under the cover of ambiguity of ‘their perceptions of LAC’ and Shinde can be banked upon for more statements of ‘no jurisdiction’ as backup.
At an international seminar on Asia Pacific held at the United Services Institution of India in November 2011, a spokesman from the Chinese Foreign Ministry described China’s foreign policy as “Biang Biang Noodles”; a Chinese delicacy loved by all. What he left unsaid is that China can tie you up in knots in a manner similar to these noodles that may defy your spoon and fork but can be handled deftly by China holding the chopsticks. China has been propagating to the world that it does not accept the Mcdonald-McCarteney Line but the fact is that China’s Representative (read Ambassador of those days) not only affixed his full signatures agreeing to this line on the map during the Simla Convention of 1914 but acknowledged Tibet as a separate country since he put his signatures alongside the Representatives of Tibet and British India – see map below (details available in Atlas of The Northern Frontiers of India with our Ministry of External Affairs):
If China refuses to acknowledge the above map and signatures of its own Ambassador (read Representative), did it expect that the Chinese Premier should have signed such a map? It would not be surprising if China executed her ambassador for signing the map but what is certain that China has habitually gone back on its word and made preposterous claims, as in South China Sea, East China Sea, Tibet and against India. This pattern of deceit was very well foreseen by Sardar Patel who forewarned Nehru but that is another story. Noteworthy is that it is only in 2006, that China expanded her claim from Tawang to entire Arunachal Pradesh. China’s claim to Tawang was also on the plea that residents from Tibet come to Tawang monastery to pay obeisance. That is some strange logic but if this logic is to be accepted then what stops India claiming the sacred Mansarover region where thousands of Indians go for pilgrimage annually organized by Government of India?
The recent Chinese intrusion in DBO was to put India inexorably on the back foot, in which it has succeeded despite it being done in gross violation of the 2005 India-China Agreement on Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity that included maintaining peace and tranquility on the border. The obvious intent also is to push India into a boundary settlement in China’s favour, India having dithered woefully in even developing its border infrastructure with a petrified hierarchy that is alien to both future resources and strategic advantage.
Noteworthy is that it is only in 2006, that China expanded her claim from Tawang to entire Arunachal Pradesh.
Significantly, in 2005, a Deputy Political Commissar of PLAAF had said, “When a nation grows strong enough, it practices hegemony. The sole purpose of power is to pursue power …… Geography is destiny ….. When a country begins to rise, it shall first set itself in invincible position”. But the question here is that has China really reached that “invincible position” having nuclearised Pakistan and North Korea while antagonizing bulk of the world? This perceived invincibility must be viewed in the backdrop of China having too many fault lines that the world may just choose to exploit to desist China from practicing her “Tian Xia Concept” that views “all territories” under the skies (Heaven) as belonging to the Chinese. Chinese economy is linked to the world economy – holding more than a trillion dollars of US debt is just one example. Questions about China’s economic invincibility are already cropping up with growth having gone down to 7.6 percent (three year low) in the second half of 2012.
Analysts suspect economic growth this year will fall between 7.5% and 8.0%, but corruption and policy issues bring it down to 7.0%. Rapid economic growth has developed a whole series of bubbles whose future is unpredictable. The question being asked is whether the Chinese economy is on the brink of decline. China needs Indian markets.
It is time China realizes that she is hindering her own dreams of consolidating in the Indian Ocean Region by following a policy of confrontation with India no matter how sugar coated. How much this aggression can push India into the US Asia Pivot and with what consequences to China is a matter of conjecture but something that Chinese policy makers need to examine. Her supporting and meddling with insurgencies within India bares her actual intentions and it is time for India to do some plain talking with China including Pakistan’s terror factory and China’s tacit support to Pakistan’s anti-India jihad.
A boundary settlement proposal is reported to have been proffered by China during Salman Khurshid’s visit to Beijing, details of which have not been released to the media. This should have actually been done or debated in public or at least discussed in Parliament or in an All Party Meet. However, the federal structure of the country having evaporated and with talks of even clipping the wings of the judiciary, that is unlikely to happen.
This perceived invincibility must be viewed in the backdrop of China having too many fault lines that the world may just choose to exploit to desist China from practicing her “Tian Xia Concept” that views “all territories” under the skies (Heaven) as belonging to the Chinese.
Nevertheless, what India must realize is that China with her extended hegemonic claims wants to settle once for all the question of Tibet by settling the border with India. It sees itself at an advantageous position having developed infrastructure in border areas. But she actually fears enhanced Indian military capability with infrastructure development being attempted on the Indian side and knows our army has no problems in giving a bloody nose to an aggressor at any point along the LAC, fears of hierarchy including cyber and nuclear attacks notwithstanding. We must realize that it is not China but India that is in a position of strength though the psychologically weak may consider otherwise. The Tibet Card must remain open till China agrees to a ‘One India’ policy with J&K as Indian Territory. Shaksgam must be part of the discussion and our LAC claims must be projected strongly. If Tawang is being claimed by China on ‘religious pilgrimage’ grounds, then we should set forth our claim to the Mansarovar region including the approach to it. On no account should we agree to stop patrolling and developing infrastructure up to what we perceive as the LAC. Most likely, this is part of the proposal by China and the very reason why the government is shy of sharing it with the media or other political parties.
There is absolutely no doubt that Li Keqiang and his entourage will make noises ‘what Indians will like to hear’. It has happened earlier with Chinese visitors (copied by Pakistanis) but actions on ground have been exact opposite. The biggest disservice that the government can do to the nation is to agree to stop patrolling and developing infrastructure up to what we perceive as the LAC (freezing development and enlarging our military capability before the final boundary settlement should simply be out of the question), and signing an overall agreement with China underhand; implying without any political / public debate and then put the spin doctors to work to morph public opinion under garb of ambiguity. To quote Tavleen again from her book ‘Durbar’, she writes thus about government manipulating the media, “In insidious form of bribery, they are offered not just access to leaders and junkets when such leaders travel abroad, but nominated seats in Rajya Sabha. Subsidized housing and all sorts of other perks that are usually available only to politicians and high ranking government officials”. We saw this in action in recent months.
Li Keqiang’s visit is litmus test for the Indian resolve and the government must ensure it does not fail the billion plus Indians. It will be better for credibility to take the nation into confidence both before and after Le Keqiang’s visit. Any shady deals are unlikely to remain secret no matter what the veils of secrecy. Can the government for a change desist from media manipulation and more importantly, nation fixing?
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chinas-foreign-policy-biang-biang-noodles/0/
Lessons not learnt
The country may have woken up to the surprising and unexpected news of China entering and tenting in Depsang area, 30 kilometers south of Daulet Beg Oldi, in the Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir. But not the Indian Army.
According to a high-level Indian Army report submitted in 2010, this latest transgression by the Chinese army was pretty much on the cards. The report which was prepared under the command of a Lieutenant General was, “intended to be a guidance document for commanders and staff in evolving, reviewing and refining of operational plans with full knowledge and appreciation of the overall strategic context under which Sino-Indian military confrontation may occur and with deep insight into PLA’s military doctrinal content, its military capability, availability and types of forces for application in each sector and forms in which the threat may manifest.”
The high-level report had noted - quite correctly as it turned out on April 15 - that the Chinese strategy is not to grab territory but to send a message and to make political gains. It had predicted that China will avoid the Chusul sector but will try grabbing territory on the Daulet Beg Oldi side
The report speaks of the rise of both India and China but warns against lowering our guards. “While seeking and expecting a benign Sino-Indian cooperative and collaborative Asian geopolitical order, it would be imprudent to ignore China’s politico-military capabilities, its Asian and global ambitions and its track record, mindset and strategic culture. There is no alternative other than to intimately monitor PLA’s military capabilities and striving to institute appropriate deterrent military responses, operational concepts, operational plans and force postures.’’
The report says that China has a proven record of single-minded pursuit of long term goals and objectives which will lead to an environment of conflict of interests with India. Like in the late 1950s and early 1960s before it culminated in a full-fledged border war, the tactics as far as the Chinese is concerned are tried and tested. Whether by accident or design, Chinese troops are more than ever before, crossing into Indian territory. The Chinese deny the charges and whenever solid evidence is presented, they attribute it to “The inexperience of the post commanders.’’
The military establishment is letting it be known that the latest tactical transgression is aimed at showing to the world that India – which has the third largest standing army in the world – can capitulate because of its own lack of foresight and proper appreciation of security situation in a strategic and sensitive arena.
But the critical question is this: if we continue to ignore threat perceptions issued by the army under the guise of misplaced liberalism, then what happens to the intelligence which is being laid out on a platter? The Chinese are not known for making halfhearted efforts and their focused work in Tibet has significantly added to the threat perception and war waging capabilities against India. In Tibet, China has added 20,000 km of railway tracks over the last two decades, compared to a measly 860 km by India in the same period. Here again, it is question of overlooking sensitive developments. While the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) continues to bicker over its inability to carry loads at high altitude because they do not have helicopters, a decision on it has been conveniently kept on the back burner.
Ever alert to the Chinese threat, the high committee report has systematically collated and presented relevant facts and assessments on aspects which would govern China’s geopolitical and military behaviour in the immediate foreseeable future, especially with regards to India. According to the army, the report is an appreciation of the ground situation and an attempt to put things in perspective – the developments in Ladakh have proved to be uncannily precise.
The report says that in the backdrop of key tenets of PLA’s military doctrine of Active Defence, War Zone Campaign (WZC) and recently-evolved Unrestricted Warfare - keeping in view its sectoral military aims - describes and analyses three plausible operation level scenarios which may emerge in a timeline of 2012-17. The scenarios are analysed for costs-risks-gains to China as well their military and geopolitical impact.
Critical to the Chinese plans is their War Zone Campaign (WZC) Doctrine. According to the report, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) has formulated military doctrine for fighting war at the operational level which it refers to a war zone. The strategic doctrine dictates that military campaign in a war zone is a series of related battles fought under a unified command to seek political capitulation of the adversary.
The report says that it involves a phased rapid yet calibrated rising of conflict threshold and force application while offering an opportunity to the adversary to capitulate and seek negotiations prior to transcending to next phase in the escalatory ladder. Military destruction and annihilation is only a means; political capitulation of the adversary remains the main objective.
The success of this doctrine is based upon preliminary lulling of the adversary into state of complacency while the PLA upgrades its readiness levels. This preliminary phase, to be executed during peace time and over prolonged periods is referred as “External Calm & Internal Intensity (ECII)”. Once PLA’s desired readiness levels are achieved and geopolitical situation is considered appropriate, the actual military campaign under a unified HQ (WZC HQ) would commence under the WZC Doctrine under three phases.
Phase 1 includes actions by ‘Elite Forces and Sharp Arms (EFSA)’ or Jingbing Liqi. In this phase, special operation forces (SOF) are deployed to gain first hand information of the battle, disrupt the enemy’s build up and make a political statement asking the adversary to back off. The aim is political victory, not territorial gain. If the adversary backs off, the WZC is considered successful.
In Phase 2, if the adversary does not capitulate through EFSA measures, the next phase is to ‘Gain Initiative by Striking First' (GISF) or Xianji Zhidi. The purpose is to prosecute ‘deep non-contact battle’ through long range precision strikes at adversary’s strategic locations and major military infrastructures. These are to be conducted in synergy with intense cyber war and other elements of asymmetric threats. The main objective is to cause decision paralysis and convince the enemy of the inevitability of military annihilation unless they capitulate and seek negotiations. This is often referred to as `winning victory with one strike.’
In the last Phase 3, if politico-military aims have still not been achieved, the PLA plans to fight a ‘Quick Battle to Force Quick Resolution (QBQR) or Suzhan Sujue. At this stage, armoured and mechanized infantry divisions are sent in for a quick and decisive result to force a final political resolution of the conflict.
Says the report, “The three operational scenarios described are: Scenario 1 – Dragon March with Beating Drums (theatre wide military offensive by PLA with incremental and protracted build up); Scenario 2 - Bolt From Blue (theatre wide cold start limited offensive by PLA) and Scenario 3 – Lightning in Monsoons (selective sectoral grab action by PLA in non-campaigning season). While each of the three scenarios is considered plausible, the analysis believes Scenario 3 as “most likely and most dangerous”; scenario 2 as “less likely”; and scenario 1 as “least likely”.
Says former Deputy National Security Advisor, Satish Chandra: “This incident was waiting to happen and this will keep happening unless common perception on LAC is not arrived at. China is deliberately doing this and has kept the border problems alive. It did not come to exchange the maps and the aim is to keep us on the backfoot.”
Concurs Admiral Arun Prakash(retd): “We do not have a long term strategy to deal with China. Our reactions are knee jerk. The Chinese approach on issues comes after deep thought. Each step is part of a plan and the way they deal with every sector is different whereas our political elite lack any clarity on the issue. The Chinese move has been described variously as a mere ‘pimple’, ‘difference of perception’ and ‘no intrusion’. This time China came 19 kilometers inside; next time it will be 25 kilometers.”
Military insiders say that while China may not attack India, the casual and lackadaisical attitude of the civilian authorities in India towards national security will demoralize the Indian army in the long run and that can only be considered fatal, a point which the high-level report makes in good measure.
mayank.singh@thesundayindian.com
http://www.thesundayindian.com/en/story/lessons-not-learnt/25/47596/