Minxin Pei Posted online: Sat May 11 2013, 02:18 hrsChina’s strategy of offensive deterrence may have been behind the Ladakh stand-off
To everyone’s relief, China and India have ended their three-week stand-off in Ladakh. Troops on both sides agreed to pull back to their positions before April 15, avoiding a potentially dangerous confrontation. The peaceful resolution of the latest unhappy incident in troubled Sino-Indian relations raises many questions.
The most obvious one is the timing of the incident. The incursion of Chinese troops occurred roughly a month before a scheduled trip to India by China’s new premier, Li Keqiang, and less than a month before the visit to Beijing by India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. For the two countries, whose ties have recently frayed over unresolved territorial disputes, these visits were supposed to help improve the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations. Common sense dictates that China should do everything possible to earn the goodwill of the Indian government and public alike.
Yet, apparently, the Chinese military commanders were oblivious to this diplomatic imperative. Their actions cast doubts on China’s chain of command. One innocent, but not really credible, explanation is that it was a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing. Chinese generals perhaps ordered their troops to cross the unmarked Line of Actual Control (LAC) in ignorance of the planned diplomatic exchanges. Although we should never rule out mistakes caused by poor communication in a stove-piped decision-making system, such an explanation strains credulity because an act of such consequence and with such potential risks must be approved by the highest level of the Chinese military command — the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC). Contrary to popular perception that the People’s Liberation Army generals have grown excessively powerful, the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) actually exercises tight control over the military. It is thus highly unlikely that China’s civilian leadership was not informed of or consulted on the decision. As the new chairman of the CMAC, Xi Jinping, has repeatedly emphasised the military’s loyalty to the party since his appointment as CPC chief, it is hard to imagine that Chinese generals would risk his wrath — and their careers — by either failing to inform him or pressuring him to agree to their plans.
If the highest civilian decision-makers in China were indeed consulted and had given the operations their approval, the question to ask is what they were trying to accomplish with such a risky move.
Given China’s ongoing territorial disputes with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, it seems that it would be prudent for China not to drag India into the fray and needlessly antagonise another important neighbour. In light of the planned high-level diplomatic exchanges, the timing of the incursion appears particularly ill-advised. However, as Henry Kissinger insightfully observed in his book, On China, ostensibly counter-productive measures taken by Beijing actually embody sophisticated strategic thinking and serve key objectives desired by Chinese leaders. Since 1949, China has taken on fights with external rivals or adversaries when it was much weaker or the timing was inauspicious. Kissinger interpreted such seemingly irrational behaviour as “a strategy of offensive deterrence”. China’s calculation was that it would be better off demonstrating its resolve to fight for its vital interests even if it might lose. In the short run, China could suffer military or diplomatic setbacks. But in the long run, China’s deterrence would gain more credibility, thus serving the country well.
In deciphering the specific case of the Ladakh stand-off, Kissinger’s observation may be applicable. By showing a willingness to escalate in the face of India’s increased military deployment in the contested areas, Beijing hoped to send a message to New Delhi that it was prepared to risk a great deal and respond forcefully to defend its claims.
Thankfully, cooler heads prevailed in this face-off. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, in particular, deserves enormous credit for showing restraint during this unfortunate episode. Now that both sides have temporarily defused a dangerous situation, it is time to repair the damage.
Salman Khurshid’s ongoing visit to Beijing and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India, which starts on May 20, constitute a perfect opportunity to restart the long-stalled negotiations on disputed territories. Of course, it may be unrealistic to expect a quick breakthrough because the issues involved are devilishly complex. But getting the negotiations going again will create at least a more conducive atmosphere for resolving these disputes.
Perhaps the most immediate and effective step to take is the implementation of confidence-building measures that will avert similar confrontations in future. Before a final resolution of the territorial disputes can be reached, the Indian and Chinese militaries should agree not to station troops within a certain distance of the unmarked LAC. Movements of any military unit over a certain size must be communicated to the other side a week in advance. Military aircraft should stay clear of the LAC. Local commanders of the Chinese and Indian army units must have direct communication links with each other.
Frankly, these measures will not help resolve Indian-Chinese territorial disputes, but they should greatly reduce the risks of future confrontations similar to the Ladakh stand-off.
The writer is a professor of government and non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US
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