China’s Ladakh intrusion: Two maps tell this dangerous story

China’s Ladakh intrusion: Two maps tell this dangerous story

by Praveen Swami 29 April 2013

Image courtesy: University of Texas

Late on the night of 19 October 1962, Chinese artillery began pounding five Indian posts perched to the east of India’s northern-most military base, Daulat Beg Oldi.  Faced with impossible odds, the men held out for three days—and then, fought their way back along the track towards the base.  India’s XV corps knew those men were all that lay between the advancing Chinese troops and Leh. Major Sardul Singh Randhawa was ordered to lead the surviving troops of the 114 Brigade back across an iced-over river to the 5,411-metre Saser-La pass—where, armed with just 100 rifle rounds each and a handful of machine guns, they were to make a last stand.

Then, something odd happened: the advancing Chinese forces drew up to the line that their country had claimed as its border in 1960, and stopped dead. India’s official war historyargues China’s “pattern of deployment inducted and forces do suggest they were satisfied with reaching their 1960 claim-line.  It seems doubtful [that] they had the aim to capture Leh”.

For the first time since that murderous battle, Chinese troops have established positions west of their own claim-line, ahead of where they stopped in 1962. Fifty-odd Chinese soldiers who are now perched in temporary shelters in the middle of the strategically-significant Depsang Bulge.

Ever since 1999, Chinese patrols have frequently probed land India claims as its own, leaving behind signs of their presence like juice-cans, cigarette packs and graffiti. Highly-placed military officials Firstpost spoke acknowledged Indian troops do the same, traversing routes east into Indian-claimed territory.  In the event patrols are confronted, troops put up banners proclaiming friendly intent—and back up.  The system has avoided loss of face—and deaths.

Large swathes of the Line of Actual Control are disputed—nothing but the Karakoram pass is accepted by both sides as a frontier.  There’s been plenty of disputation as a result, notably over the construction of a road in 2005-2006 across parts of the Depsang plateau claimed by India. The former intelligence official RN Ravi has recorded that incursions in this sector went up from 150 in 2005 to 240 in 2010. Neither side, though, has ever held ground—that is, until now.

No-one knows exactly why China has done so, but this much is clear: India’s hard-nosed military commanders aren’t committing resources to Daulat Beg Oldi because its fun being there.  In the summer, access to the post involves a brutal two-week hike over the Sasser-La—described by historian John Keay as “probably the most impressive and dangerous” of the passes on the ancient spice-route between Ladakh and Yarkand. From there, the route leads on to Murgo, a windswept plateau that, in Yarkandi, means “the gate of hell”.  The Sasser-La is impenetrable in the winter, except by the dangerous trek through the iced-up Shyok river. The government committed to building a road in 2007—but work has barely begun.

From a military perspective, Daulat Beg Oldi and its airstrip are held for one, and one reason alone. Perched just south of the great Karakoram pass, it offers India a means to snap the road route between China and Pakistan and guard the eastern gates to the Siachen glacier. The defence of Leh itself no longer needs Daulat Beg Oldi; there are effective positions in depth.

Though Daulat Beg Oldi is thinly held—it has just one company, on average about 125 men, of Ladakh Scouts, and four from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police—that is mainly because there isn’t a significant opposing Chinese presence. The Depsang Bulge has long provided defensive depth to Daulat Beg Oldi, to allowing soldiers perch along key heights, like the magnificent Trishul peak.

Making sense of the Depsang incursion necessitates a careful navigation of the complex, and bloody, history of China-India map-making.  Ever since 1951, Indian forces had begun setting up scattered checkpoints along the McMahon Line—the colonial-era boundary between Tibet and British India drawn in 1914. In New Delhi in November-December 1956, China’s premier, Chou En-Lai, left Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with the impression the McMahon Line would form the basis of their post-imperial frontiers. Chou, Nehru wrote in 1958, said his government was “of the opinion that they should give recognition to the McMahon Line”.

The problem was, however, that India’s notion of where the line lay was somewhat different to that of China.  In a 1960 brochure, the External Affairs Ministry asserted that when “discrepancies between Indian and Chinese maps were brought to the notice of the Chinese government, they replied that their maps were based on old maps of the Kuomintang period and they did not assert any claims on the basis of these maps”.

No-one has ever explained just why—or if—the Indian government actually believed this.  In 1955, China had begun constructing a road through the Aksai Chin, linking its garrisons to Xinjiang to Tibet.  From then-Intelligence Bureau director BN Mullik’s memoirs, there is evidence the Indian trade agent in Gartok reported the construction work in 1955.  India’s military attaché in Beijing, Brigadier SS Malik, is also believed to have done the same.  These claims, India’s very useful official war history of 1962 states, were corroborated by former Cabinet Secretary SS Khera, who said intelligence on the new Chinese roads was available by 1952.

That New Delhi chose not to protest this road-building until September 1958 was, Chou later said, “eloquent proof that this area has indeed always been under Chinese jurisdiction and not under Indian jurisdiction”.

From 1955, China also began a series of deep reconnaissance missions on to the Indian side of the McMahon line—marching to Barahoti and Damzan; the Shipki-La in Himachal Pradesh; and the Lanak La in Ladakh.  In 1957, not long after Chou’s visit to New Delhi, Chinese survey groups entered Walong—the scene of one of India’s worst debacles in the 1962 war.  In  June, 1958, Chinese troops occupied Khurnak Fort, along the Pangong lake. Things came to head in the autumn of 1959, when nine men of an Indo-Tibetan Border Force—the local wing of the Intelligence Bureau—were killed in an ambush on the Chang Chenmo in Ladakh.

In meetings held between June and December 1960, Chinese officials proposed a fresh claim line—running well to the west, for the most part, of their 1956 position. This was the eventual line China forced in place in 1962.

The Central Intelligence Agency’s maps show China’s 1956 claim-line cut north-west from the source of the Chip Chap river, which would have placed the Depsang Bulge out of Indian hands. The fact that China officially insists its troops in Depsang are on Chinese territory seems to suggest it is once again asserting the legitimacy of the 1956 claim-line—a peculiar position, since that would involve significant backward-movement in its position.  It is unclear if this question has been explored in ongoing China-India talks, but nothing has been said in public.

Zorawar Daulet Singh, an expert on the China-India military relationship, has recently notedthat  both sides have long engaged in “probing up to their preferred Lines of Actual Control”. That’s true, but Depsang is different: the area is well outside of China’s claimed line.

Finding a speculative explanation for what is going on is easy. For example, it is possible Chinese want to lean harder on Indian positions facing the Karakoram, or that they are signalling irritation about India’s wider build-up on its eastern borders, which includes the raising of an entire new corps. Facilitated by an excellent road network, China’s troop locations are at considerable depth—15-20 kilometres or more from its claimed borders, unlike Indian positions jammed up close to the 1962 ceasefire line.  It is also, of course, possible that China is telling the truth when it suggests the action may be a protest against defensive fortifications India has put up in Phuktsé, to compensate for its vulnerable logistical chain.

So what should India do? There’s no shortage of suggestions. In a thoughtful commentary in the Business Standard, defence expert Ajai Shukla recommended India place more aggressive diplomatic pressure on China, for example by pushing it on the conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang. The eminent commentator Swapan Dasgupta, similarly, has suggested “lending a shoulder to countries such as Japan, Vietnam and even Singapore who are fearful of China’s hegemonism”.  Singh, for his part, has suggested a grand territorial bargain on Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin.

These ideas all merit very serious discussion, but none will get the Chinese post out of the Depsang Bulge before the winter—and that is India’s critical short term concern.

It is interesting to consider the historical antecedents of this uncomfortable situation. From 1950-1959, a declassified Central Intelligence Agency history notes, “Nehru continued to see a border war as a futile and reckless course for India. His answer to Peiping [sic., Beijing] was to call for a strengthening of the Indian economy to provide a national power base capable of effectively resisting an eventual Chinese military attack”.

Eventual, the CIA’s analysts observed, was a neat evasion: “in the context of the immediate situation on the border, where Chinese troops had occupied the Aksai Plain in Ladakh, this was not an answer at all but rather an implicit affirmation that India did not have the military capability to dislodge the Chinese”.

There are things India can do, short of setting off a firefight, which can signal seriousness of purpose: among them, more aggressive probes and presence-marking operations. There will be a price—but it will be cheaper than the cost of doing nothing now.

http://www.firstpost.com/india/chinas-ladakh-intrusion-two-maps-tell-this-dangerous-story-738131.html

Why’s Khurshid rushing to China when their soft invasion continues?
by Rajeev Sharma Apr 26, 2013

By agreeing to go to China on 9 May, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, who himself announced his date of visit to China, has in a way given China a long handle. The Chinese will treat it as a licence to stay put where they are – 10 km inside Indian territory in the Depsang area of Ladakh.

As a corollary to the Khurshid announcement, one can expect many more Chinese incursions in the Depsang area in the coming days as the Chinese will have to provide food and other logistics to their 40-odd soldiers who have pitched their tents on Indian soil. The new incursions will be even more serious as they will inevitably be heli-borne operations. Indeed, there have been reports that Chinese helicopters have para-dropped food articles for their soldiers in Depsang and propaganda pamphlets for the consumption of Indians.

External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. Image courtesy PIB
The question is: did Khurshid or his officials indicate a pre-condition to his China visit? Did they tell the Chinese through diplomatic channels that he will visit them only if they end their incursion into Ladakh first? If not, why not? There are no answers to these nagging, but vital, questions.

The immediate implication of Khurshid’s visit to China is that the platoon-strong Chinese troops will continue to be on Indian soil for another fortnight at least. Khurshid, the MEA and the UPA government would have done a great service to the country if they had ensured that the Indian land is vacated forthwith.

As there is nothing to suggest that the Indian government has obtained any guarantees to that effect. In this writer’s opinion it projects a poor picture of India – a self-styled emerging superpower cowering before an actual superpower.

It is important to note that Li Keqiang, the new Chinese Premier who took over on 15 March 2013, was also tipped to visit India. Though the two sides have not yet announced dates for his visit, diplomatic circles hinted that he could land in New Delhi on 20 May. Two questions arise from this.

One, if at all Khurshid had to announce a date for visit to China, why he could not ensure that the Chinese side also simultaneously announced the date of Li’s India visit? This may perhaps have happened if Khurshid had not jumped the gun and unilaterally announced his own visit. By doing so Khurshid has denied India a balancing opportunity to India.

Two, did Khurshid obtain any guarantees from the Chinese that their incursion will be ended while he is on the Chinese soil? The answer to this question, in this writer’s view, is an emphatic ‘no’. That is because the Chinese are past-masters in the art of diplomacy by other means. They respect power and accord the necessary dignity to the other side if they find the other side on a strong footing.

The Chinese will have to end their incursion, sooner or later. But the question is: how soon will the ‘sooner’ be and how late the ‘later’ be?

Now China has all the trump cards up its sleeve. It will decide when to call off its incursion in Ladakh. It may like to do so just before Li’s proposed India visit, if that visit takes place at all. Much will depend now on how Khurshid plays Chinese Checkers during his 9 May China visit.

Equally worrying is the fact it has been 10 days since the dragon landed in Ladakh but the UPA government has not taken Parliament into confidence even though a parliament session is on.

This speaks volumes for the opposition parties as well. They too have been busy in trying to score brownie points over the government in parliament on petty political issues whereas all-important national security issues do not form their agenda in parliament.

Army Chief General Bikram Singh has briefed Defence Minister AK Antony a little while ago about the current status of the Chinese incursion. The UPA government must take parliament immediately into confidence on the issue. The opposition parties will be failing in their national duties if they they are unable to force the government to make a statement in parliament, preferably by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself.

After all, it is up to us whether we allow the Chinese to rub our noses in dirt. Their 10-km-deep incursion is still very much in place and there are no guarantees that it won’t be beefed up or the Chinese won’t open more such theatres in the same or other areas. If India allows this festering sore, it might well become a soft or mini-Kargil in the near future.
The writer is a Firstpost columnist and a strategic affairs analyst who can be reached at bhootnath004@yahoo.com.

http://www.firstpost.com/world/whys-khurshid-rushing-to-china-when-their-soft-invasion-continues-727875.html
China building road, rail lines on Indian territory; Government stays still


By Niticentral Staff on April 29, 2013

China’s dubious intentions were revealed yet again when reports claimed that it is building road and railway lines in Indian territory.

According to a Times Now report China is building rail lines near the Burtse Post area.

Members in the Lok Sabhaon Monday voiced concern over intrusion by Chinese troops in Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, with crucial UPA ally Samajwadi Party objecting to the upcoming visit of External Minister Salman Khurshid to Beijing.

Samajwadi Party chief Mulayam Singh Yadav took the lead in targeting the Government for “doing nothing” and alleged that it was acting in a “cowardly” manner in dealing with the intrusion.

Describing China as the “biggest enemy”, the former Defence Minister said during Zero Hour, “We have been warning that China has started occupying our territory. But Government is not listening to all this.”

He said the Indian Army has said it is ready to remove all intruders but there is no action.

“This Government is cowardly, incompetent and good for nothing,” he said, while objecting to the upcoming visit of Khurshid to China.

Amid continuous slogan-shouting by BJP members in the Well over coal issue, Yadav said he had raised the issue several times with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister AK Antony, but to no avail. “I went to his (PM’s) chamber to talk to him. But no action was taken.”

Claiming that one lakh square km of Indian territory has been “occupied” by China, he accused the Government of “doing nothing”.

“When the Army Chief himself says the troops are ready to respond, why is the Government not issuing instructions to it? They (China) insulted us in 1962. They are insulting us now in the world fora,” Yadav said.

He was supported by B Mahtab (BJD) and Sudip Bandyopadhyay (TMC), who demanded a statement from the Prime Minister on the incursion on April 16 by Chinese troops who have pitched tents 19 km inside Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie area.

Meanwhile, on Monday the youth wing of BJP in Jammu protested against the Chinese incursion in Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector in eastern Ladakh and also blamed Centre’s wrong policies for the incident.

The Government recently admitted that soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army have intruded and pitched their tents 19 km into Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir. Earlier, it was believed they had intruded 1o km into Indian territory. China appears to be adamant not to pull its soldiers back to the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control.

Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma and some other senior officials informed the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence that India has deployed forces to “keep a close watch on the border”, sources said.

Sharma and other officials appeared before the Committee after BJP members Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi and Prakash Javadekar wanted to know the actual ground situation in Depsang sector of Ladakh where the Chinese incursion took place in Daulat Beg Oldie area a week ago.

The meeting of the committee was cut short as members were dissatisfied with the insufficient information provided by the officials and they were asked to report back at the next meeting on May 30 with appropriate and exact details of the situation.

The officials told the Committee that Indian Army patrols reported on April 16 the presence of Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Depsang, pitching tents 19 km inside the LAC, the sources said.

(With inputs from agencies)

http://www.niticentral.com/2013/04/29/china-building-roads-rail-lines-on-indian-territory-71378.html