Full texts of select Wikileak Cables follow.
Counterterrorism: Disingenuous US embassy of India mollycoddles Diana Eck and Teesta Setalvad
The SECRET cable of Mulford is a revelation of how US Missions show off their bogus counter terrorism efforts.
US funds Teesta and then uses her allegations in USCIRF report. US embassy finances NGOs engaged in defeating Modi in Gujarat elections.
The US will be well-advised to take care of her Chechnya-Boston marathon jihadi terror instead of interfering in India's internal affairs and mollycoddling the likes of double-dealing pluralism project lead of Diana Eck. See Paragraph 19 of the SECRET Cable.
Acronyms:
S - Sensitive
C - Classified
SBU -Sensitive But Unclassified
PA - Public Affairs Bureau
POL - Political Section of Dept. of State
USAID - Funding agency of Dept of State
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05NEWDELHI7725_a.html
This cable includes a catalogue of Mission India programs since mid-2004 that are geared to combat religious extremism.
...
3. (S) Hindu chauvinist groups in India include the Rashtriya Shyamsevak Sangh (RSS), Bajrang Dal, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Many of their members participate in politics through membership in the center-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
...
6. (C) There are any number of theories on how India evolved to have such a large Muslim minority with such a low incidence of extremism.
...
11. ... (NOTE: Critics and scare-mongerers sometimes try to portray the US as anti-Hindu, but this strain is largely contained to allegations of US-supported missionaries trying to convert Hindus to Christianity. End Note.)
...
12. (SBU) The Internal Political Reporting Unit in the Political Section in New Delhi is an active participant in the mission's Muslim outreach program and works regularly with USAID and PA in Muslim-oriented programs. We identify moderate Muslim clerics for participation in International Visitor programs, visit madrassas regularly, and provide textbooks and instructional material.
...
13. (SBU) In addition, we provide Muslim clerics, political leaders and scholars, including Muslim extremists, with cutting edge research on the growth of a moderate Islamic reform movement. When we engage extremist Muslims in dialogue on a wide variety of issues, we have in some cases won their trust and, as a result, they have approached us for more information or requests on Muslim outreach activities.
We have worked with the Front Office to draft speeches on Islamic themes and to refute allegations that the USG is anti-Muslim. When certain Muslim leaders have made statements that appear sympathetic to terrorism, we have called on them and asked them to clarify or withdraw such statements.
...
14. ...In our meetings with Hindu extremists we condemn hate speech and violence against minorities... We categorically reject their attempts to paint the USG as a member of a Hindu/Jewish/Christian alliance against Islam.
...
16. (SBU) The Mission has successfully used numerous publications in English, Hindi, Urdu, and regional languages, to inform and shape public perception of USG anti-terrorism policy and activities.
...
We support the continued and expanded funding of these projects, such as: -- A grant to the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) in Mumbai allowed them to translate 134,000 copies of the Secular Perspective publications into four regional languages for general distribution.
...
19. (SBU) PA's highly effective book reprint program has, in the past year, allowed us to distribute titles including: "A New Religious America -- How a 'Christian Country' Has Now Become the World,s Most Religiously Diverse Nation" by Harvard Professor Diana Eck (who visited India as a US Speaker in 2002); "On Toleration" by Princeton,s Michael Walzer; and "Diversity in America" by Yale Law Professor and Fulbright India alumnus Peter H. Schuck.
...
[click on the link of the cable to see the long list of those who have been funded.]
...
24. (SBU) Chennai's ACCESS Microscholarship Program funds two years of English language training for 60 Muslim students at the Anjuman-e-Himayath-e-Islam School (all destitute and/or orphaned).
...
25. (SBU) USAID's Madrassa Quality Education Improvement Program reaches approximately 1,000 students in 18 madrassas in Andhara Pradesh state.
...
30. ...-- USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios's October 2004 Lucknow Visit included a roundtable meeting with Muslim leaders and academics.
...
-- Mary Washington College Professor Stephen Farnsworth gave a lecture on American Muslims in US Presidential Elections to Jamia Millia Islamia and the Institute of Objective Studies, a Muslim think-tank.
...
32. (SBU) USAID, through a USAID contractor, is conducting a Cross-Cutting Agra Program (CAP, August 2005 - March 2007). Agra's 1.2 million people and significant Muslim population are growing at twice the national average.
...
45. (SBU) We interact regularly with a cross-section of NGOs, both religious and secular, that encourage inter-faith dialogue, secularism, and actively counter religious extremism of all kinds, as well as providing material comfort to victims of hate crimes. We ensure these NGO leaders participate in the IV program; USAID and PA ensure that they have access to USG funding. We express our support by visibly attending their public events. We make sure that their information on the activities of extremists is included in the Human Rights Report and the Religious Freedom Report.
...
47. (SBU) We interact with many NGOs that focus on combating extremism. Among those we meet with on a regular basis are the following:
-- South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre: a network of individuals that investigates, documents, and disseminates information on human rights protections and violations (www.hrdc.net/sahrdc)
-- Asian Centre for Human Rights: promotes human rights throughout Asia (www.achrweb.org)
-- Centre for Social Research: leading women's rights organization (www.csrindia.org)
-- Druk National Congress: promotes human rights in Bhutan (www.bhutandnc.com)
-- Institute for Conflict Management Studies: leading think-tank on the causes and ideologies of terrorism and extremism (www.satp.org)
-- Center for Study of Society and Secularism: promotes secularism and inter-faith dialogue (www.csss-isla.com)
-- Citizens for Justice and Peace: uses the Indian legal system to enforce India's laws on secular tolerance and anti-communalism (www.sabrang.com)
-- Society for the Promotion of Rational Thinking: promotes communal harmony in a state that was rocked by communal violence in 2002 and where reconciliation and justice have still not been achieved (www.mysprat.org)
The disingenuous claims of Mulford bear repetition.
We ensure these NGO leaders participate in the IV program;USAID and PA ensure that they have access to USG funding. We express our support by visibly attending their public events. We make sure that their information on the activities of extremists is included in the Human Rights Report and the Religious Freedom Report.
...
47. (SBU) We interact with many NGOs that focus on combating extremism. Among those we meet with on a regular basis are the following:
...
-- South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre: a network of individuals that investigates, documents, and disseminates information on human rights protections and violations (www.hrdc.net/sahrdc)
-- Asian Centre for Human Rights: promotes human rights throughout Asia (www.achrweb.org)
-- Centre for Social Research: leading women's rights organization (www.csrindia.org)
-- Druk National Congress: promotes human rights in Bhutan (www.bhutandnc.com)
-- Institute for Conflict Management Studies: leading think-tank on the causes and ideologies of terrorism and extremism (www.satp.org)
-- Center for Study of Society and Secularism: promotes secularism and inter-faith dialogue (www.csss-isla.com)
-- Citizens for Justice and Peace: uses the Indian legal system to enforce India's laws on secular tolerance and anti-communalism (www.sabrang.com)
-- Society for the Promotion of Rational Thinking: promotes communal harmony in a state that was rocked by communal violence in 2002 and where reconciliation and justice have still not been achieved (www.mysprat.org)
From: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05NEWDELHI7725_a.html 2005 October 5, 05:52 (Wednesday) SECRET cable of Ambassador Mulford:
USA FUNDS-- Citizens for Justice and Peace: uses the Indian legal system to enforce India's laws on secular tolerance and anti-communalism (www.sabrang.com)
Teesta's husband Javed Anand runs Sabrang Communications which claims itself as fighting for human rights. Teesta is the official spokesperson of this organization.
Teesta testified at the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom on June 10, 2002 against the BJP-led Gujarat government's role in the post-Godhra communal violence.
MODI, BJP AND ELECTIONS 2014Click on Sabrang Team. Gives a blank page.GOVERNING BODY Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer – Chairman Executive Council Members Prof. Ram Puniyani, Hon. SecretaryMr Ajit Muriken, Hon. TreasurerAdv. Irfan Engineer, Member... General Body Members Prof. Ram PuniyaniMr Ajit MurikenAdmiral RamdasAdv. Irfan EngineerMr. Ashok ChaudharyMr. Sandeep PendseMr. Minar Pimple,Mr. Hanif LakdawalaDr Uday Mehta...
Teesta's husband Javed Anand runs Sabrang Communications which claims itself as fighting for human rights. Teesta is the official spokesperson of this organization.
MODI, BJP AND ELECTIONS 2014
Click on Sabrang Team. Gives a blank page.
GOVERNING BODY
Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer – Chairman
Executive Council Members
Prof. Ram Puniyani, Hon. Secretary
Mr Ajit Muriken, Hon. Treasurer
Adv. Irfan Engineer, Member...
General Body Members
Prof. Ram Puniyani
Mr Ajit Muriken
Admiral Ramdas
Adv. Irfan Engineer
Mr. Ashok Chaudhary
Mr. Sandeep Pendse
Mr. Minar Pimple,
Mr. Hanif Lakdawala
Dr Uday Mehta...
Activism of Teesta Setalvad
- Teesta's magazine Communalism Combat claims to foster communal harmony by attacking entities allegedly propounding communal violence.
- Teesta testified at the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom on June 10, 2002 against the BJP-led Gujarat government's role in the post-Godhra communal violence.[10]
- In 1997, Teesta started work on a project, Khoj (Quest), which aims to rewrite sections of Indian school History and Social Studies textbooks to remove alleged "anti-minority prejudices".[11]
- Teesta claims to be a staunch feminist, campaigns for rights and privileges of Dalits, Muslims and women.[4]
- Co-editor of Communalism Combat magazine (along with husband Javed Anand).
- Teesta's husband Javed Anand runs Sabrang Communications which claims itself as fighting for human rights. Teesta is the official spokesperson of this organization.
- Teesta heads the Mumbai based NGO Citizens or Justice and Peace'(CJP).
- Founder of the Women and Media Committee.[12] The group seeks to bring together working women journalists to raise job-related concerns and awareness of gender-sensitivity in writing and reporting on issues concerning women.
- Founder of Journalists Against Communalism.[12]
- Apart from the journalistic tasks Teesta Setalvad leads the project “Khoj: Education for A pluralistic India”.[13]
- Teesta is General Secretary of People's Union for Human Rights” (PUHR).[13]
- Member of the Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy.[13]
Full text of Mulford's cable titled: Combating extremism
| COMBATING EXTREMISM - MISSION INDIA RESPONSE | |
2005 October 5, 05:52 (Wednesday) | 05NEWDELHI7725_a |
SECRET | SECRET |
-- Not Assigned -- | 38076 |
-- Not Assigned -- | TEXT ONLINE |
EAID - Economic Affairs--Foreign Assistance | IN - India | KDEM - Democratization | KMPI - Middle East Partnership Initiative | KPAO - Public Affairs Office | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PHUM - Political Affairs--Human Rights |PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | |
-- Not Assigned -- | TE |
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- | -- Not Assigned -- |
India New Delhi | -- Not Assigned -- |
-- N/A or Blank -- | |
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B. NEW DELHI 7469 C. NEW DELHI 7400 D. NEW DELHI 7082 E. NEW DELHI 6311 F. NEW DELHI 5165 G. NEW DELHI 4760 H. NEW DELHI 4449 I. 04 NEW DELHI 4668 J. 03 NEW DELHI 6872 Classified By: DCM Robert Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. (C) Summary: India enjoys a democratic, multi-religious, multi-cultural, heterogeneous, multi-ethnic society where all major world religions are practiced freely. Isolated elements of religious extremism of many varieties have, however, occurred in India -- notably among Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs -- although extremists as a whole are by far outnumbered by "secular" moderates. In the Indian context, "secularism" is synonymous with tolerance for all faiths, and does not imply life devoid of religion, although religious freedom -- including atheism -- is absolutely protected and guaranteed by the Constitution and a long history of court precedent. At a time when many nations appear to be losing ground to extremist movements, India's trendlines are pointing in the right direction, bolstered by strong indigenous traditions of communal co-habitation, non-violent political protest, a free press, and a realization by politicians that religious hatred is not a vote getter among the increasingly savvy, globalized, and prosperous Indian electorate. Nevertheless, the risk always remains of isolated outbreaks of sectarian violence, especially in response to the terrorism that has plagued India for decades, or when provoked by regional politicians for their narrow political purposes. 2. (C) Mission India provides numerous exchange, educational, and outreach programs to counter extremism, primarily through the Front Office, PA, POL, and USAID. Front Office, PA, and POL officers provide critical personal and media interaction to perpetuate the USG message of moderation and tolerance. Our outreach ranges from one-on-one engagement with elites to press interviews to mass-audience interaction to overcome misperceptions and stereotypes. We also monitor and report trends in religious extremism. This cable includes a catalogue of Mission India programs since mid-2004 that are geared to combat religious extremism. End Summary Assessment of Hindu Chauvinism in India --------------------------------------- 3. (S) Hindu chauvinist groups in India include the Rashtriya Shyamsevak Sangh (RSS), Bajrang Dal, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. Many of their members participate in politics through membership in the center-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These groups propound a belief that India needs to return to its Hindu roots as a reaction to successive historical waves of non-Hindu invasions. Their ideology is summed up as "Hindutva," and has been abused by a few extremist Hindus to justify acts of violence against non-Hindus, although these groups officially reject the use of violence to achieve their social and cultural aim of ensuring equal treatment for Hindus. The worst recent episode of Hindu violence against minority religions occurred in 2002, due to the failure of Gujarat's BJP-run government to protect Muslims from rioting Hindus following an incident in which Hindus died in a train fire which some alleged had been set by Muslims. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Muslims died as a result of the Gujarat government's failure to protect them. As an example of US opposition to extremism , on 21 March 2005, the Ambassador delivered a statement to Indian TV media defending the 18 March decision to revoke the entry visa of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, who had overseen state officials' failure to protect Muslims. The statement was prepared by the Embassy's Information Officer in conjunction with the Political Section, the DCM and the Ambassador. To prepare for drafting our official statement, the Political Counselor and IO spoke extensively with media outlets including numerous "live" phone-ins with Indian television stations. The Mission received numerous letters, editorials, and verbal messages supporting this decision, even though the GOI officially sought its retraction. Assessment of Islamic Fundamentalism in India --------------------------------------------- 4. (C) Indian Muslim fundamentalist groups include members of India's Sunni Deobandi sect, which is philosophically linked with Wahabhis such as the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin, and some unaffiliated maulvis (clerics) who have expressed support for Al-Qa'ida and other brands of Islamic terrorism. We do not have access to the more extreme Wahabhi clerics and supporters of Al-Qa'ida, or to members of the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which has committed acts of terrorism in the past. The number of extreme Wahabhi clerics is believed to be small, but growing and closely watched by the GOI (see Para 8). (NOTE: The last alleged SIMI terrorist acts were committed in early 2003. End Note.) 5. (C) Our GOI and Indian NGO interlocutors take pride that India possesses the world's largest minority Muslim community while enjoying a near zero rate of indigenous Islamic terrorism. Almost none of India's approximately 130 million Muslims -- a population on par with that of its neighbors Pakistan and Bangladesh -- have been identified as Al-Qa'ida members or affiliates. A small number, however, have provided shelter, intelligence, and/or facilitated cross-border terrorist groups; one recent example was the July 5 attack on the Hindu temple at Ayodhya (Ref F). A larger number hold and publicly espouse extremist views, often to gain political mileage, but stop far short of perpetuating violence to achieve political change. 6. (C) There are any number of theories on how India evolved to have such a large Muslim minority with such a low incidence of extremism. Salman Rushdie, for example, noted that India's secular Constitution affords Muslims legal protection from, and political equality with, the country's large Hindu majority. Furthermore, India's democratic system allows for Muslim participation at all levels (including, at present, President APJ Kalam), and in parts of the country the "Muslim vote bank" is actively courted as a swing electorate. Many Indian Muslims also undoubtedly remember past communal violence, such as in Gujarat in 2002 and during Partition, and steer away from extremism for pragmatic reasons. Moreover, a free and healthy press and a viable, albeit creaky, court system have given ordinary Muslims recourse to broader public opinion whenever intolerant elements or leaders have attempted to sway Muslims toward extremism. Cases in point include the broad outcry after clerics issued fatwas condemning Muslim female tennis star Sania Mirza for playing in normal tennis togs (Ref B) and when religious scholars tried to impose the wearing of the burqa on Muslim women campaigning for elected office. 7. (C) Islamic extremism is by far a minority view even in Jammu & Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state. Political moderates -- including "moderate separatists" -- are ascendant in J&K, and the tide has clearly been moving against political violence for at least a year. Moderate separatists have moved from wanting independence or association with Pakistan, to seeking limited autonomy, "soft borders", and progress on human rights (Ref D). The Political Section has made repeated visits to Kashmir to encourage movement toward moderation in Kashmiri politics. 8. (S) A new area of concern, especially in West Bengal (another state with a proportionately larger Muslim population), is that illegal Bangladeshi migrants are bringing with them to India a radicalized form of Islam that is out of touch with India's primarily moderate religious practices (Ref C). Our contacts there tell us there are a surprising number of Wahabhi-influenced madrassas and mosques in the border areas that appear to have foreign funding. 9. (C) Consulate Mumbai contacts report that there have been increased efforts by both local and foreign groups that are deeply conservative or fundamentalist to strengthen their presence in Mumbai's mosques, schools and social organizations. Most of our contacts tell us that these groups have not made much headway on account of the community's moderate instincts and leanings. Assessment of Sikh Radicalism in India ------------------------------------- 10. (C) Although the Pakistan-supported Sikh separatist movement produced some of India's worst political violence, Sikh radicalism in India is largely a spent force and Punjabi Sikhs are now more interested in economic success and social development than they are in separatism (Ref E). The spurt in purported Sikh violence last spring (Ref H) appears to have been a last gasp by a group which ultimately had to hire non-Sikhs to conduct operations for cash, because it could not command sufficient support from within the Sikh community. Police forensics rolled up the conspirators and several caches of arms and explosives. Sikhs remain for the most part a law-abiding, service-oriented community. Sikhs serve in the Armed Forces and Police in numbers far out of proportion to their numbers in the overall community. Army Chief General JJ Singh and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh are both observant Sikhs. Sikhs remain a respected and admired minority community for their devotion and their charity. Mission Outreach ---------------- 11. (SBU) Senior Mission officers, POL, ECON, PA staff, and senior FSNs in all four India posts meet regularly with a wide spectrum of religious leaders and groups to offer support to moderate thinkers and to help dispel negative, media-driven rumors that attempt to paint the US as an intolerant or even anti-Muslim society. (NOTE: Critics and scare-mongerers sometimes try to portray the US as anti-Hindu, but this strain is largely contained to allegations of US-supported missionaries trying to convert Hindus to Christianity. End Note.) 12. (SBU) The Internal Political Reporting Unit in the Political Section in New Delhi is an active participant in the mission's Muslim outreach program and works regularly with USAID and PA in Muslim-oriented programs. We identify moderate Muslim clerics for participation in International Visitor programs, visit madrassas regularly, and provide textbooks and instructional material. Posts sponsor Iftar celebrations during Ramzan (Ramadan) that bring together Muslims with a wide variety of orientations and non-Muslims, who may not otherwise interact on their own -- in each of the past several years the DCM and several CGs among other Mission officers have hosted Iftars. 13. (SBU) In addition, we provide Muslim clerics, political leaders and scholars, including Muslim extremists, with cutting edge research on the growth of a moderate Islamic reform movement. When we engage extremist Muslims in dialogue on a wide variety of issues, we have in some cases won their trust and, as a result, they have approached us for more information or requests on Muslim outreach activities. We have worked with the Front Office to draft speeches on Islamic themes and to refute allegations that the USG is anti-Muslim. When certain Muslim leaders have made statements that appear sympathetic to terrorism, we have called on them and asked them to clarify or withdraw such statements. 14. (SBU) In instances when Hindu extremist groups have published material or made speeches alleging ties between the USG and Christian missionaries or alleging that the USG has a covert program to convert Hindus to Christianity, we have met with their top leadership to refute the allegations and ask that they be withdrawn; POL and PA have also worked together on press releases and editorials refuting these allegations. In our meetings with Hindu extremists we condemn hate speech and violence against minorities. We also refute their attempts to paint Islam as a terrorist religion and our anti-terrorism efforts as anti-Muslim. We categorically reject their attempts to paint the USG as a member of a Hindu/Jewish/Christian alliance against Islam. Promoting Economic Reform to Combat Extremism --------------------------------------------- 15. (SBU) In November 2003, the Mission submitted a Medium-term Economic and Commercial Strategy for promoting economic liberalization, developing closer trade and investment ties with the US, and catalyzing regional integration, a five-year strategy which was approved by Washington and which boosted our successful engagement with India on terrorism (Ref J). We have made excellent progress in implementing the strategy over the ensuing two years. USAID economic growth and social development programs have been a key element of our success because of the link between economics and extremism. There is a growing recognition that successful economic reform and sustained growth and job creation are necessary conditions to maintain stable democratic development and regional stability in the medium term. Mission Publications Reach Wide, Multi-Lingual Audiences --------------------------------------------- ----------- 16. (SBU) The Mission has successfully used numerous publications in English, Hindi, Urdu, and regional languages, to inform and shape public perception of USG anti-terrorism policy and activities. This approach allows us to repeatedly combat anti-US perceptions among large and geographically diverse populations. We support the continued and expanded funding of these projects, such as: -- A grant to the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) in Mumbai allowed them to translate 134,000 copies of the Secular Perspective publications into four regional languages for general distribution. -- "People, Progress, Partnership: The Transformation of US-India Relations" was a one-time (2004), Mission-wide publication targeting 50,000 elite individuals and institutions, including key Muslim contacts, and was assessed to be highly effective. -- "Muslim Life in America" was a one-time, Mission-wide publication targeted at a general audience. This publication has been widely distributed to show how Muslims are an integral part of America's plural society. 17. (SBU) In addition, the Mission has supported the translation and placement of relevant articles from American Press in Hindi and Urdu. For example, on August 11, PA New Delhi's Press Office translated into Hindi the Washington File byliner "Iraq's Compact With America" by US Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad. It was used in its entirety in Delhi's leading tabloid "Veer Arjun". On May 13, another Washington File article, "Rice Condemns Alleged Disrespect of Quran at Guantanamo Base," was translated and widely distributed to the Indian media. Five Hindi and five Urdu publications used it. Each article has a short shelf-life, but the effects are long-term when viewed as a regular and ongoing PA program. 18. (SBU) An Urdu edition of PA,s SPAN magazine has been in existence since March 2003 and targets Indian Muslims -- 13,000 copies are printed bi-monthly. It is considered a highly effective project and continues to win plaudits and gain subscribers. Magazine content covers themes showing tolerance, pluralism, and multi-culturalism in the US. Reprinted SPAN articles in the Urdu media have had a multiplier effect. 19. (SBU) PA's highly effective book reprint program has, in the past year, allowed us to distribute titles including: "A New Religious America -- How a 'Christian Country' Has Now Become the World,s Most Religiously Diverse Nation" by Harvard Professor Diana Eck (who visited India as a US Speaker in 2002); "On Toleration" by Princeton,s Michael Walzer; and "Diversity in America" by Yale Law Professor and Fulbright India alumnus Peter H. Schuck. Copies of these and other books have been presented to key Embassy contacts. 20. (SBU) PA in 2005 also participated in the widely-attended Delhi Book Fair (20,000 visitors) and the Urdu Book Fair (targeting Jamia Millia Islamia, India's most prestigious Muslim university, in New Delhi). Both these events promoted the PA products listed above, and we consider them highly effective outreach venues. IVL and Other Exchange Programs Cement Strong Messages --------------------------------------------- --------- 21. (SBU) We have used many of our IVL programs to reinforce and solidify messages of tolerance and moderation by giving Indian elites and up-and-comers an up-close view of US values and living. Multi-week engagements make lasting impressions on participants; we view these as highly effective long-term programs, and they almost always have long-term impact on participants and a multiplier effect among participants' audiences (students, newspaper readers, etc.). These programs should be continued, and, where feasible, expanded. Some of the IVL programs we have supported in the past year include (participation figures are for 2004-05 program cycle): -- Indo-Pak Sub Regional IVL Programs (on a variety of themes) Participation: 4 on 3 programs; Indian and Pakistani participants visit the US together. -- Religious Education in the US IVL Program for Madrassa Leaders Participation: 3 in two programs in 2005. Total all-Mission Indian Muslims participants in this program since 2003: 67. -- Freedom of the Press IVL Program Participation: 5 Kashmiri Journalists (4 Muslims, 1 Hindu) -- Multi-Culturalism in US Society IVL Program Participation: 1 (Muslim) -- IVL Program on Religious Diversity In America Participation: 1 -- Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution IVL Program Participation: 1 (Muslim) -- Combating Terrorist Financial Networks and Money Laundering IVL Program Participation: 2 22. (SBU) We also over the past year have promoted other successful exchange programs -- which should also be continued or expanded where possible, including: -- Summer Institute Program On Religious Pluralism Participation: 1 -- Summer Institute Student Leaders Program: Joint Indo-Pak-Bangladesh Program Participation: 4 (all Muslims) -- Fulbright Summer Institute Program on American Politics and Political Thought Participation: 1 (Muslim) -- Fulbright Summer Institute Program on US Political Economy and Global Economic System Participation: 1 (Muslim) -- Fulbright Visiting Specialist Program Participation: 1 (Muslim) -- PLUS: Department of State's Partnerships in Learning Undergraduate Studies program (administered by USEFI, the Indian Fulbright Commission) for young representatives of India's Muslim and other disadvantaged communities Participation: 2 (Muslims) -- Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistantship Program (for countries with significant Muslim populations) Participation: 4 -- South Asia Teacher Training Project (6-week program at George Washington University for secondary school English language teachers from India and Pakistan) Participation: 13 -- YES Program (10 months) Participation: 35, including Muslims, all from non-elite schools. -- SIFE Program Participation: 16 -- Youth American Summer Institute Participation: 1 participant -- Madrassa Programs Participation: 4-10 -- P4L (Partnerships for Learning) Program Participation: 3 -- Seeds of Peace Participation: Twelve 13-to-15-year old participants each year for the last 5 years. Indian and Pakistani students spent 3 weeks in Maine and follow-up sessions every two weeks till they enroll for their undergraduate programs. Also, there have been 3 cross-border home-stays so far. The participants and their parents describe the experience as "life-changing" and said that it forever altered the way they perceive people from the other country -- South Asia Student Leader Conference in Kathmandu Participation: 2 -- ASI Alumni Conference in Dhaka Participation: 6 -- Islamic Life In The US/University of Louisville Participation: 7. Last year's Indian alumnus, Dr. Zafar Mahmood, is Officer on Special Duty with the Prime Minister's Committee looking into the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community in India. -- Indian Journalists Sent to Afghanistan Participation: 10 Indian journalists. Resulting coverage was positive and helped Indian audiences understand Afghanistan's progress towards democracy. Education- and Madrassa-Specific Programs ----------------------------------------- 23. (SBU) The Mission promotes several programs that target educational institutions, including Indian madrassas. These programs reach educators -- many of whom are themselves politically influential -- as well as students, who are otherwise exposed to numerous ideologies, including extremist messages, and are bombarded with conflicting images and impressions of the US. We address their questions -- largely focused on Iraq, Iran, and the status of Muslims in America -- and reiterate America,s commitment to religious freedom. Madrassas and Islamic universities continue to welcome FSOs and other American speakers, which indicates to us that the interaction is working. 24. (SBU) Chennai's ACCESS Microscholarship Program funds two years of English language training for 60 Muslim students at the Anjuman-e-Himayath-e-Islam School (all destitute and/or orphaned). After eight months, the students' language ability and overall academic confidence have risen markedly. In mid-September, a State Department ACCESS consultant said it was the most successful ACCESS program she had seen. Consulate Chennai has hosted these students at Post library, film screenings, and a local art gallery. This school is held up as a model for the ACCESS program. The New Delhi ACCESS Microscholarship Program targets 100 high school students at the Jamia Millia Islamia. During the mid-point certificate ceremony, the Charg also announced the expansion of the program in the coming months and the donation of 65 books and audiocassettes on English Language Teaching. 25. (SBU) USAID's Madrassa Quality Education Improvement Program reaches approximately 1,000 students in 18 madrassas in Andhara Pradesh state. (NOTE: The program started with three madrassas. End Note) A Hyderabad-based secular NGO implements this program to introduce secular education in these Madrassas consistent with state school curricula. A new contract is being negotiated to provide life skills, academic, career, and English language training to Muslim adolescent school drop-outs. Recent visits show high attendance, good participation, and rising enrollment rates, especially for girls. 26. (SBU) The DCM during his July 2004 visit to the Jamiah Salafiah Madrassa, one of the most important madrassas in Varanasi, address hundreds of students and faculty on the topic of America's multi-religious and multi-cutural population. He also donated an English as a Second Language book collection to the madrassa, the first of a series of book donations to be made to Indian madrassas, and was interviewed on a popular Urdu television channel with a primarily Muslim viewership of approximately one million people (Ref I). The DCM and Poloff visited the Darul-Uloom Seminary in Deoband in September 2004 to engage the seminarians on issues of concern and donate a US book collection to their library. (NOTE: The seminary is one of India's premier Islamic institutions and the center of Deobandi Islam. End Note.) The visit was covered by two television networks and eight print journalists, and concluded with a press conference. 27. (SBU) English language training helps students and drop-outs develop job-related skills, which can redirect otherwise marginalized individuals into the mainstream. The Senior English Language Fellow for North India (Lucknow) has been selected and awaits her visa to begin her program here. In July, the Regional English Language Officer joined Post, giving South Asia its first RELO. 28. (SBU) Other Mission-wide madrassa outreach programs include seminars, lectures and exchanges on aspects of madrassa education -- including introducing modern curricula -- and on Islam and religious education in the US. 29. (SBU) Book donations garner goodwill and help us shape political messages and impressions. Among frequent book donations to universities and schools, with special emphasis on Muslim institutions, the Mission in 2005 donated books worth $30,000 to Jammu University's central library and to the Center for Strategic and Regional Studies in Jammu. Separately, Consulate Mumbai distributed educational books to eight Madrassas and Urdu academies in 2004-5, including ESL books. Promoting Tolerance Through Lectures, DVCs, Conferences --------------------------------------------- ---------- 30. (SBU) Speaker programs at universities and other venues, including Muslim universities, have covered MPP themes including counter-terrorism, bilateral relations, American art and literature, environmental issues, political processes, women,s equity, human rights, the role of the media, and HIV/AIDS. Speakers at undergraduate schools have talked on art and literature, tolerance and multi-culturalism in the US. Although individual speakers only visit India for a few weeks at a time, taken as a whole, they represent a long-term investment in educating important segments of the Indian population on how America's multi-cultural, multi-religious society functions. Prominent lectures, DVCs, conferences, and other direct, two-way interactions include: -- USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios's October 2004 Lucknow Visit included a roundtable meeting with Muslim leaders and academics. -- The DCM talked to Urdu editors on Muslim issues regarding detainees at Guantanamo Bay in New Delhi and with Muslim leaders in Mumbai. -- PAO Mumbai conducted lectures on Muslim life in America. -- PA Mumbai held book discussions at University of Pune "On Toleration" (a title under the PA Book Reprint Program, see above). -- A DVC discussion on US policy in Iran and IAEA concerns over proliferation, featured US Ambassador to the UN in Vienna Greg Schulte and eight Indian security analysts. -- Dr. Christine Fair, a researcher at the US Institute of Peace, conducted a two-week program on aspects of terrorism and extremism. -- Davison College Professor Brenda Flanagan talked with faculty and students at Jamila Millia Islamia on "Multi-Culturalism in American Literature." -- Arizona State University Professor Robin Haarr talked with students and faculty at universities in Chandigarh and Kurukshetra and to police officers, activists and grassroots workers on the topic of "Gender Justice and Violence Against Women." -- Boston University Professor Hillel Levine spoke with Madrassa leaders in Varanasi and at Jamia Millia Islamia on non-violent conflict resolution. -- Culture Connect Ambassador Daniel Libeskind presented a program to Jamia Millia Islamia students and faculty on 9/11-related issues, achieving success in America as an immigrant, and his conceptualization of a new building for the WTC site. -- Senior Indian journalist M.J. Akbar participated in our book reading and panel discussion on Pamela Constable,s book "Fragments of Grace: My Search for Humanity from Kashmir to Kabul." -- We held conferences on "Civil Society, Multi-Cultural Democracies, and the Media" at Islamic institutions in Lucknow and Jaipur. -- Mary Washington College Professor Stephen Farnsworth gave a lecture on American Muslims in US Presidential Elections to Jamia Millia Islamia and the Institute of Objective Studies, a Muslim think-tank. -- Consulate Mumbai held well-recieved DVC programs on Cyber Terrorism and plans to do so in the future. Other Programs -------------- 31. (SBU) USAID, through American NGO IFES, has since May 2005 conducted the Muslim Women's Initiative. The program, part of the Mission's gender and law program, will extend at least to September 2007 (and possibly beyond) in selected districts of Karnataka state, including Bangalore. The program goal is to increase Muslim women's awareness and assertion of their rights under Islam and Indian law; the first phase targets 7,500 primary beneficiaries and 22,500 indirect beneficiaries. The program also enlists Indian NGOs to provide legal aid and counseling services. Muslim Personal Law Boards in nearby districts are asking the NGOs to provide similar services in their areas. This initiative will branch out into Rajasthan state in November, and is expected to grow to other states if Mission expands its overall gender and law program after FY2007. IFES will help Muslim women's groups coordinate advocacy to reform harmful interpretations of religious law (including aspects of divorce law) starting this autumn. Empowering women by educating them on their legal rights will create a bulwark against their potential abuse from authority figures, including their husbands. 32. (SBU) USAID, through a USAID contractor, is conducting a Cross-Cutting Agra Program (CAP, August 2005 - March 2007). Agra's 1.2 million people and significant Muslim population are growing at twice the national average. This program targets young people from poor and marginalized communities who are at risk to be both victims and perpetrators of violence. CAP's goal is to empower Agra youth into taking an active role in city development, slum upgrading, reviving lesser-known monuments, and employing youth (especially girls) in local tourism and other economic sectors. 33. (SBU) USAID is also conducting a major assessment of workforce development needs for the most vulnerable segments of society, especially adolescent school drop-outs, and within that Muslim youth will be a particular focus. 34. (SBU) PA,s small grant to an Indian think-tank, the Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), fostered a cross-border exchange between Indians and Pakistanis and prompted meaningful discussions on local governance and democracy. The institute's report entitled "Indian Local Government Delegation in Pakistan - Ambassadors of Peace" details the March 2005 visit to Pakistan of 33 local government representatives from 18 Indian states (Ref G). Both the 15-day visit and the published report were funded in large part by PA in cooperation with ISS and a partner NGO in Pakistan. 35. (SBU) CAO held a ground-breaking visit to Jammu in June 2005, effectively opening Jammu's door to future programming and making the task of East Carolina University representatives easier for their September visit to University of Jammu to promote a web-based virtual classroom project funded by ECA. 36. (SBU) Culture Connect envoys and former Georgetown University basketball players Omari Faulkner and Courtland Freeman gave workshops in schools and participated in the sports week of Jamia Hamdard, one of Delhi,s largest Muslim universities, in October 2004. 37. (SBU) SPAN Magazine (see above) ushered traditional Hindi and Urdu poetry gatherings into the digital age with the American Center,s first ever Mushaira (Urdu) and Kavi Sammelan (Hindi) held via digital video conference in June 2005 before a live audience. The DVC, which featured Indian poets in New Delhi and American poets in Washington, highlighted the cultural diversity that is enjoyed by both the United States and India. 38. (SBU) IO regularly organizes video and film screenings at the American Center. Recent videos have included "Thomas L. Friedman Reporting: Searching for the Roots of 9/11" and "Covering Catastrophe," which were shown to several groups in 2004 and 2005. 39. (SBU) Honoring the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, PA in September 2005 hosted a 9/11 paper show and book display in the American Center, New Delhi. The paper show was also shown at the New Delhi "World Anti-Terrorism Day" event, where the Embassy's speaker outlined how the US assists and supports other countries in combating terrorism and extremism. 40. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chennai holds an annual roundtable where Hindu, Muslim, and Christian religious leaders meet to discuss issues of mutual interest. 41. (SBU) An Urdu-language panel discussion on "Urdu in the American Media," held in New Delhi in March 2005, featured CAO as moderator for three US "target of opportunity" speakers who were in India to attend an earlier conference: Ms. Naiyara Jahan (fiction writer and head of "Urdu Markaz" newspaper in Los Angeles); Mr. Khalil-ur-Rahman (editor for "Daily Urdu Times" in New York); and Dr. Wakil Ansari (New York-based physician and columnist for "Daily Urdu Times"). 42. (SBU) Poloff in New Delhi met frequently over the past year with a group of high school students who were creating an Internet site -- www.effortsunited.com -- on the causes and consequences of global violence. The site won the State Department's "Doorways to Diplomacy" contest in June 2005. After the winner was announced, the DCM held a media event with the students, to encourage and publicize their efforts. Outreach to Other Minority Groups --------------------------------- 43. (SBU) CAO inaugurated the first International Summer School for Jain Studies, a new summer school for American college students on the Jain religion, in June 2005. ACAO served as the Chief Guest at the valedictory of the school on July 31, 2005. PA,s presence at these events underlined US support for freedom of religion, expression, tolerance and scholarly endeavor. 44. (SBU) On September 11, 2005, CPAO visited New Delhi,s historic and revered Bangla Sahib Gurdwara (Sikh place of worship) to address a special Sikh prayer service in memory of the victims of Hurricane Katrina and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. Addressing a gathering of over 1,000 Sikh devotees, he thanked the Sikh community for its prayers, moral support and contributions. This interaction and outreach took on special significance in the context of the misinformed and unfortunate backlash against Sikhs after 9/11 in some American cities. Indian NGOs: Partners and Resources ----------------------------------- 45. (SBU) We interact regularly with a cross-section of NGOs, both religious and secular, that encourage inter-faith dialogue, secularism, and actively counter religious extremism of all kinds, as well as providing material comfort to victims of hate crimes. We ensure these NGO leaders participate in the IV program; USAID and PA ensure that they have access to USG funding. We express our support by visibly attending their public events. We make sure that their information on the activities of extremists is included in the Human Rights Report and the Religious Freedom Report. 46. (C) State and local governments in western India have a complicated relationship with NGOs working on human rights issues and on religious tolerance. NGOs often criticize state bodies for not doing enough to deal with extremism. In Gujarat in particular, NGOs have pointed out just how widespread the state was involved in the fueling of the 2002 riots and how it has failed to bring those responsible to justice. We tend to support such NGO views on Gujarat. NGOs also report that the Gujarat state government is actively working against them, using a variety of legal means such as tax laws as well as political harassment. The state government's activities in Gujarat have not contributed to a healing of communal wounds that were incurred in 2002, and in fact may be making extremist views more popular among frustrated and scared Muslims in Gujarat, if many of our contacts are to be believed. Still, in our view the vast majority of Gujarat Muslims are as tolerant and moderate as most Muslims elsewhere in India. 47. (SBU) We interact with many NGOs that focus on combating extremism. Among those we meet with on a regular basis are the following: -- South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre: a network of individuals that investigates, documents, and disseminates information on human rights protections and violations (www.hrdc.net/sahrdc) -- Asian Centre for Human Rights: promotes human rights throughout Asia (www.achrweb.org) -- Centre for Social Research: leading women's rights organization (www.csrindia.org) -- Druk National Congress: promotes human rights in Bhutan (www.bhutandnc.com) -- Institute for Conflict Management Studies: leading think-tank on the causes and ideologies of terrorism and extremism (www.satp.org) -- Center for Study of Society and Secularism: promotes secularism and inter-faith dialogue (www.csss-isla.com) -- Citizens for Justice and Peace: uses the Indian legal system to enforce India's laws on secular tolerance and anti-communalism (www.sabrang.com) -- Society for the Promotion of Rational Thinking: promotes communal harmony in a state that was rocked by communal violence in 2002 and where reconciliation and justice have still not been achieved (www.mysprat.org) 48. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi) Mulford
Date:2010 February 25, 13:57 (Thursday) Canonical ID:10NEWDELHI356_a
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TAGS:BG - Bangladesh | BT - Bhutan | CE - Sri Lanka | IN - India | MV - Maldives | NP - Nepal | PK - Pakistan | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
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1. (SBU) The following are 2010 Regional Security Initiative
(RSI) program proposals for South Asia. Compiled by the RSI
Coordinator at Embassy New Delhi, they include proposals
covering Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the
Maldives, and India.
2. (SBU) Regional Technical Conference(s)
Need for project: South Asia is one of the most
terror-afflicted regions in the world, yet regional
counterterrorism cooperation has lagged, impeded by regional
political dynamics and long-standing bilateral tensions.
India, in particular, has been reluctant to engage in
regional cooperation involving Pakistan, which it has
regarded as a source of support for terrorism. The November
26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai (known as "26/11") underscored
that government officials in the region are ill equipped to
deal with an enemy that increasingly has the capacity to
commit large-scale attacks with minimal effort; governments
often lag even further on preparedness for emerging threats.
Recognizing these realities, Indian officials are
increasingly open to regional cooperation on technical
issues, as opposed to themes that touch on broader political
issues. This technical cooperation is needed both to develop
the capabilities of governments in the region, as well as to
engage the regional heavyweight, India, in a regional
approach to counterterrorism cooperation.
Description of the program proposed: In an effort to
increase the capacity of law enforcement and government
officials throughout South Asia, we propose a one week
regional conference addressing a range of technical issues,
including countering terrorist finance and narcotics,
bioterrorism, and cyber security. The technical focus of
these topics will avoid regional sensitivities while engaging
key government officials with an urgent need to bolster their
technical skills. This proposal could be executed through a
series of smaller conferences, though we are proposing a
single conference with break-out sessions for each topic to
economize on conference expenses and to maximize the chances
that governments will find something to like and agree to
participate. We would invite technical specialists from
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
and the Maldives to India to discuss their respective
approaches to these issues and to raise awareness of these
threats. Additionally, we would bring in expert speakers
from outside the region to highlight global best practices
and to suggest a program of further trainings and exchanges.
A successful conference could lead to more detailed follow-on
conferences on each of the technical issues and the emergence
of a community of practice among regional technical
specialists.
Time frame for implementation: Late 2010/Early 2011
Where implemented: New Delhi, India
Implementing body: U.S. Department of State, with expertise
drawn from other agencies.
Audience of program: Approximately 42 regional participants
representing law enforcement, financial intelligence units,
drug interdiction agencies, first responders, and security
agencies involved in bioterrorism prevention and disaster
management.
Funding breakdown: (Note: costs would increase somewhat if
separate conferences are held.)
Estimated Cost: $108,916
Facilitator's travel/per diem/lodging: $60,000 ($3,000 per
person x 20pp)
Flights for regional participants: $31,500 ($750 per person
x 42pp)
New Delhi per diem: $2,916 ($486/day per person for 6 days)
Facility rental costs: $4,500
In-country costs (vehicle rental, etc): $10,000
Tie to law enforcement: This conference is an effort to
increase the technical abilities of law enforcement and
government officials who require specialized technical skills
to address and respond to bio terrorism, cyber terrorism, and
terrorist finance, and narcotics.
Relation to RSI: By limiting the content to technical
issues, this conference has the potential to engage all the
countries in the region.
What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate
NEW DELHI 00000356 002 OF 008
this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies
have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not
duplicative?): The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this
proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New
Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the region.
3. (SBU) Regional Counterterrorism Training Center
Need for project: Unlike most other regions, South Asia
lacks a consolidated regional training center in which law
enforcement agencies can receive concurrent counterterrorism
training to address common regional threats. A regional
center in Bangladesh would provide a central training
facility for law enforcement agencies from across South Asia.
It would also encourage cooperation and communication among
the various law enforcement agencies in South Asia and, over
time, improve levels of trust and facilitate coordination.
Australian CT coordinator Ambassador Bill Paterson briefed
the UN Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) in Dhaka last
November on a proposal to establish a regional law
enforcement training center similar to the center in Jakarta.
In an effort to move this project forward, the European
Union is sending a scoping team to Dhaka in February 2010 to
assess the environment and sustainability of this type of
training center. This type of regional CT training center is
a large undertaking and, although the E.U. is taking the
lead, they will look to donor countries to provide assistance
to ensure the success of the facility. Due to the scope of
this project, implementation will be phased, thereby
providing an opportunity for funding to be approved in
several tranches.
Description of program proposed: The program is a joint
effort between the United States, European Union, Australia,
the United Kingdom, and other potential donors. Bangladesh
would provide land and facilities. The proposed program
would provide funds to conduct a feasibility study; engage
subject matter experts to advise the host government on the
center's organization, personnel and logistic requirements;
develop the initial curriculum; fund instructors; and support
other start-up costs for the center.
Time frame for implementation: The target date for
conducting the feasibility study is mid-year 2010, with a
goal of conducting the first training programs in the
following 12-18 months, depending on the identification of
the center's location and pre-existing infrastructure.
Where implemented: Bangladesh hosts the Bangladesh Institute
of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT), which provides
United Nation Peacekeeping Operation training to contributing
nations in the region, including Nepal, Maldives, China,
Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The
United States enjoys good relations with Bangladesh and there
is growing international support for locating the training
center in Bangladesh, which would be accessible to and
noncontroversial for countries across the region.
Implementing body: ICITAP would provide the subject matter
experts to advise the Bangladesh government in the
establishment of the center. Once operational, donor
countries would finance training and provide instructors.
Bangladesh's law enforcement agencies would have
responsibility for operating the center. A governing board,
if modeled on the Jakarta Center, would include seats for the
primary donor countries, most likely the United States and
European Union. A seat for a SAARC representative could help
encourage regional participation.
Audience of program: The program would appeal to the various
law enforcement agencies in South Asia. As the center
matures, additional countries could be included in its
training programs.
Funding breakdown: We request $2 million, using ATA and CTE
funds, to cover the feasibility study and provide an ICITAP
subject-matter expert to assist establishing the training
center. This can be broken into tranches based on how soon
the funds would be needed: (i) funding for feasibility study
(now until mid-2010), (ii) funding for subject matters
experts to assess and advise on course content (mid to late
2010)), (iii) funding for training and classes (early to mid
2011).
Tie to law enforcement: Regional law enforcement is the
program's primary focus.
Relation to RSI: The proposed center supports RSI objectives
to increase regional law enforcement and counterterrorism
capabilities and cooperation. The program would also build
NEW DELHI 00000356 003 OF 008
political will among participating nations to combat
international terrorism and enhance trust and cooperation
between law enforcement agencies in the region.
What have the S/CT sponsors of the project done to coordinate
this program with this interagency?: Mission Dhaka's
interagency counterterrorism working group discussed the
proposal for the training center and consulted with UNCTED,
UNDP, and the diplomatic missions of the EU, UK, Australia,
Spain, Japan, Denmark, and other potential donors. A donors
joint working group will coordinate efforts to avoid
duplication. The RSI Coordinator in New Delhi cleared the
proposal with other countries in the region.
4. (SBU) Regional Cyber Security Training
Need for project: South Asia is one of the most
terror-afflicted regions in the world and also a global hub
for information technology and services. The confluence of
these realities, together with broader Asian power dynamics,
makes the region particularly vulnerable to cyber terrorism,
an increasingly serious threat to global security. Cyber
attacks are not only disruptive and costly, but can also
imperil critical infrastructure. Developing a robust cyber
security cadre to thwart and respond to these attacks will
bolster the safety and security of national infrastructure
and other interests. India, in particular, has identified
cyber security as a priority in the Counterterrorism
Cooperation Initiative (CCI) concluded during Prime Minister
Singh's state visit in November. Senior Indian officials
have also stressed that cyber security is the kind of
technical issue they would welcome addressing through a
regional approach, something they have shied away from in the
past.
Description of the program proposed: We propose sending a
mixed group of officials from South Asian countries to attend
cyber security training at United States Telecommunications
Training Institute (USTTI) and to meet U.S. law enforcement
and government officials tasked with securing the United
States against cyber attacks. In an earlier proposal, five
Indian officials were authorized to attend USTTI training.
This program would expand to include officials from other
countries in the region (with the exception of Pakistan), as
well as consultations with U.S. officials. The attendees
would participate in the Cyber Security Awareness Raising and
Capacity Building course for one week, and spend a second
week meeting U.S. officials at the Department of Defense,
Federal Communications Commission, Department of State, and
other agencies. (Note: Embassy Islamabad is already
conducting cyber security training through DS/ATA and
expressed skepticism that Pakistan and India would cooperate
on this issue.)
Time frame for implementation: October/November 2010, TBD.
Specific dates would be based on the dates the course is
offered.
Where implemented: The training would take place in the
Washington, D.C. The RSI Coordinator at U.S. Embassy New
Delhi would be the logistical point of contact for the event.
Implementing body: U.S. Department of State, in coordination
with the United States Telecommunications Training Institute
(USTTI), and other agencies.
Audience of program: Government officials from the regional
countries (except Pakistan) with technical and law
enforcement functions.
Funding breakdown: (Note: Based on six participant per
country, except Pakistan. Numbers of participants could be
scaled back to reduce costs.)
Total Cost: $108,000
Roundtrip flights for 30: $60,000 ($2,000 per person)
Washington, D.C. per diem: $96,180 ($229/day per person for
14 days)
USTTI administrative cost: $4,500 ($150 per person)
Incidentals: $1,320
Tie to law enforcement: Law enforcement officials from the
host governments with cyber security functions will be
invited to attend.
Relation to RSI: This is a regional program to enhance the
ability of government and law enforcement officials to
counter cyber terror attacks.
What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate
this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies
NEW DELHI 00000356 004 OF 008
have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not
duplicative?): The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this
proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New
Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the South Asia
region. This is an extension of a previously funded program.
5. (SBU) India-Pakistan Security Dialogue
Need for project: South Asia remains one of the most
terror-afflicted regions of the world, but regional
approaches to counterterrorism have been inhibited by
political dynamics and long-standing bilateral tensions.
Official relations between India and Pakistan have been
frozen since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, though
unofficial contacts between think tanks and others have
continued. As a matter of long-standing U.S. policy, the
United States plays no official role in this dispute, which
it regards as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan to
be worked out by the parties themselves; however, we continue
to encourage them to do so through peaceful dialogue.
Between official dialogue and public awareness efforts (like
the recent 'Aman Ki Asha' campaign), there is considerable
scope for unofficial, Track II engagement between think tanks
and retired officials who retain considerable influence in
official circles in each country. Adapting the successful
model of the India-Bangladesh Strategic Dialogue, which
contributed to an about-face in relations between India and
its neighbor to the East, we propose supporting a Track II
dialogue between think tanks in India and Pakistan to build
trust and examine areas for potential cooperation.
Description of the program proposed: We propose funding two
rounds of an India-Pakistan Track II dialogue to assess areas
for possible engagement aimed at restarting official dialogue
between the governments. The dialogue would be modeled after
the successful India-Bangladesh Security Dialogue. Working
through India's Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and a
similar think tank in Pakistan we would bring together
regional civil society leaders for meetings in New Delhi and
Islamabad, or possibly a third country. Both organizations
will be encouraged to share the conference recommendations
with decision-makers in their respective countries.
Time frame for implementation: September 2010 * January
2011
Where implemented: One round each in New Delhi and
Islamabad, or possibly in a third country.
Implementing body: Observer Research Foundation (India) and
a Pakistan based think tank (TBD).
Audience of program: Indian and Pakistani think tanks and
opinion leaders, and indirectly government officials.
Funding breakdown:
Total: $100,000; each round would cost an estimated $50,000.
Lodging: $11,700 (3 days x 13 x US$ 300)
Airfare: $4,600 ($460 x 10pp)
Direct Conference Costs: $26,500
Conference Secretariat Costs: $7,200
Tie to law enforcement: The dialogue addresses the capacity
of the governments to prevent terrorism in South Asia,
including law enforcement cooperation and capacity building.
Relation to RSI: This kind of focused bilateral dialogue is
an important first step in developing regional approaches to
counterterrorism cooperation, and no relationship in the
region is more important when it comes to counterterrorism
than this one.
What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate
this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies
have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not
duplicative?) The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this
proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New
Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the South Asian
region, including Embassy Islamabad.
6. (SBU) India-Bangladesh Security Dialogue (Rounds 3 & 4)
Need for project: South Asia remains one of the most
terror-afflicted regions of the world, but regional
approaches to counterterrorism have been inhibited by
regional political dynamics and long-standing bilateral
tensions. Improving bilateral relationships is an important
first step toward developing a broader regional approach to
counterterrorism, as well as addressing localized terrorist
threats. In this regard, the first round of the S/CT-funded
NEW DELHI 00000356 005 OF 008
India-Bangladesh Track II dialogue can be counted a
tremendous success. This dialogue did much of the work
behind the scenes to prepare for the breakthrough January
2010 visit of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheik Hasina to
India, which resulted in five MoUs, three of them on
counterterrorism cooperation. Bangladesh and India have
resolved to work together to stem the movement of terrorists
across their borders and to broadening their relationship.
S/CT should continue its support for this unprecedented
counterterrorism cooperation in a difficult region with two
more rounds of Track II dialogue.
Description of the program proposed: We propose extending
the successful India-Bangladesh South Asia Security Dialogue
for two more rounds. Working through India's Observer
Research Foundation (ORF) and the Bangladesh Enterprise
Institute, the first rounds of the dialogue brought together
regional civil society leaders, government officials and law
enforcement agency representatives for dialogues in Dhaka. A
second round is scheduled to take place in New Delhi in March
2010 with some government participation, making it more of a
track one-and-a-half rather than just track two. To further
develop this successful initiative, we propose funding a
third and a fourth round of dialogue, in part to focus
further attention on counterterrorism cooperation, to
encourage more direct involvement from government officials,
and to solidify this fruitful bilateral cooperation as a
foundation for further regional cooperation.
Time frame for implementation: September 2010 * January
2011
Where implemented: One additional round each between New
Delhi, India and Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Implementing body: Observer Research Foundation (India) and
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (Bangladesh).
Audience of program: Indian and Bangladeshi think tanks,
security agencies, police officers and governmental officials
with equities in law enforcement and security.
Funding breakdown:
Total: $100,000; each round would cost an estimated $50,000.
Lodging: $11,700 (3 days x 13 x US$ 300)
Airfare: $4,600 ($460 x l0pp)
Direct Conference Costs: $26,500
Conference Secretariat Costs: $7,200
Tie to law enforcement: Members of the Security Council and
law enforcement agencies from each country attended the first
dialogue and are invited to the second round. The dialogue
addresses the capacity of the governments to prevent
terrorism in South Asia, including law enforcement
cooperation and capacity building. The first round
contributed to the conclusion of three counterterrorism and
law enforcement-related MoUs during the visit of Bangladeshi
Prime Minister Sheik Hasina to India, and there is scope for
further progress.
Relation to RSI: This kind of focused bilateral dialogue is
an important first step in developing regional approaches to
counterterrorism cooperation.
What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate
this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies
have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not
duplicative?) The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this
proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New
Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the South Asian
region, including Embassy Dhaka. It is an extension of a
previously funded program.
7. (SBU) Training for South Asian Governments in Countering
Bulk Cash Smuggling
Need for project: Cutting off the financing of terrorist
groups is a key component of our national strategy to combat
terrorism. A large number of terrorist organizations operate
in South Asia including, but not limited to, al-Qa'ida,
Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Tehrik*i-Taliban), Harakat
ul-Jihad-i-islami/Bangladesh, Harakat ul-Jihad-Islami,
Harakat ul-Mujahedin, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar I
Jhangvi. In order to operate and grow, these groups depend
on and receive funding from outside sources including wealthy
donors and grass root organizations in Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, UAE and other Gulf and Islamic states. Much of this
funding is smuggled across regional borders. In order to
detect and stop the flow of cash and other illicit items
across the borders, the USG needs to assist South Asian
NEW DELHI 00000356 006 OF 008
governments in building their border enforcement capacity.
The creation of robust border enforcement regimes in South
Asia is important to reaching our counterterrorism goals of
denying funding to terrorist networks.
Description of the program proposed: The USG will seek to
build financial investigative capacity, strengthen border
control and increase regional cooperation by training key
government agencies from Afghanistan, Pakistan, UAE,
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. This will be a two-year,
two-phase project that will be provided to customs and border
control agencies to strengthen their capacity to investigate
and interdict bulk cash smugglers and bulk cash couriers at
all ports of entry including land crossings, ports and
airports. The first phase of the project will include a
regional Bulk Cash Smuggling (BCS) course and a Regional
Operational Cash Courier course. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) will provide these courses, which are designed
to build capacity to target, detect, interdict and
investigate cash couriers. The second phase of the program
will be a "Train the Trainer" course to establish advanced
training divisions and experts within host countries to train
personnel on the detection, interdiction and investigation of
illicit cash couriers and BCS.
Time frame for implementation: 2010-2011.
Where implemented: United Arab Emirates.
Implementing body: Department of Homeland Security/ICE and
CBP.
Audience of program: Customs, border protection, federal
investigative agencies, Financial Intelligence Units, Air and
Port Authority Police/Border Guards from Pakistan,
Afghanistan, UAE, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal
Funding breakdown:
Total: $250,000
FY 10 - Basic and Advanced BCS courses: $150,000
FY 11- Train the Trainer Course: $100,000
Tie to law enforcement: The program will strengthen the
capacities of law enforcement agencies to stop illicit
financing of terrorist groups.
8. (SBU) Training for South Asia Financial Intelligence Units
Need for project: Cutting off the financing of terrorist
groups is a key component of our national strategy to combat
terrorism. A large number of terrorist organizations operate
in South Asia including, but not limited to al-Qa'ida (AQ),
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), Tehrik*i-Taliban (TTP), Harakat
ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Harakat
ul-Jihad-Islami (HUJI), Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM),
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), and Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ). In order
to operate and grow, these groups depend on and receive
funding from outside sources including wealthy donors and
grass root organizations in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf and Islamic states.
Building the capacity of governments in South Asian countries
to stem the flow of funds to terrorist groups is essential to
disrupting their activities. The creation of robust
financial investigative capabilities in South Asia is
critical to reaching our counterterrorism goals.
Description of the program proposed: In an effort to build
financial investigative capacity and increase CT cooperation
in South Asia, we propose regional training through
conferences/seminars and exchange programs for Financial
Intelligence Units (FIU) from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India,
Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal. We propose building the
capacities of the FIUs through 1) regional
conferences/seminars and 2) training and exchange programs.
Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka have the most advanced
financial investigate capacities in the region and therefore
should host the conferences/seminars. However, none of the
South Asian countries have met all the standards and
requirements necessary for admission to the Egmont Group.
Therefore, representatives from other countries that have met
Egmont Group requirements and are internationally recognized
as having robust Counter
Terrorist Finance (CTF) regimes such as Australia, Singapore,
Thailand and Malaysia would be invited to participate in the
training. Other presenters at the conference/seminar could
include multilateral organizations such as the Financial
Action Task Force's (FATF) regional body, the Asia Pacific
Group and the Egmont Group. The seminars/conference would
provide training in financial investigation techniques. The
second phase of this project would include an exchange
NEW DELHI 00000356 007 OF 008
program between FIU officials from Pakistan, Bangladesh,
India, Sri Lanka and Nepal with FIUs in Australia, Singapore,
Thailand and Malaysia. This would include hands-on practical
training in financial investigations.
Time frame for implementation: 2010-2011. The first year
would be a conference or series of seminars and second year
would be the exchange program.
Where implemented: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives,
Australia, Singapore, Thailand or Malaysia.
Implementing body: Department of Treasury.
Audience of program: Officials from FIUs from Pakistan,
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Australia,
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.
Funding breakdown:
Total: $300,000
Conference/Seminars: $150,000
Exchange Program: $150,000
Tie to law enforcement: Building the capacities of financial
investigations is necessary in order law enforcement agencies
to stop illicit financing of terrorist groups and to try
terror financing and money laundering cases in their judicial
systems.
9. (SBU) Support for Enactment by Pakistan of AML/CTF
Legislation, in compliance with Asia pacific Group 2009
Mutual Evaluation Recommendations.
Need for project: Pakistan's legislature is coming close to
finally enacting a long-awaited anti-money laundering law. On
January 27, the National Assembly adopted the Anti-Money
Laundering Bill 2009. The progress was, in large part, a
response to international pressures, including the detailed
criticism by the regional FATF body, the Asia Pacific Group
on Money Laundering (APG), in its 2009 Mutual Evaluation
Report (MER). While the new legislation is an important
step, it falls short of providing for a comprehensive
Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF)
legal regime in full compliance with international standards.
Pakistan seeks admission to the Egmont Group, and eligibility
will depend on enactment of further amendments and revisions
to the new AML legislation. These efforts must be completed
in advance of May 2011, the next opportunity for Egmont
review.
Description of the program proposed: Background: Pakistan's
on-again/off-again efforts at enacting and implementing an
AML/CTF regime have been half-hearted at best. After years
of delay, the government finally issued, by executive order,
an AML Ordinance in 2007. The Ordinance was reissued, with
some additional amendments, in November 2009 -- constituting
the version now enacted by Parliament. Some additional AML
provisions have also been included in the country's
anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism legislation. The
legislation as passed, however, falls short of international
standards and requirements necessary for admission to the
Egmont Group. For example, the law still requires that a
bilateral mutual legal assistance agreement (MLAA) be in
place before Pakistan can engage in international cooperation
or share evidence concerning money laundering investigations
or prosecutions.
Accordingly, further "tweaking" of the new AML legislation
will be required. Pakistan's legislature, however, remains a
largely dysfunctional institution, capricious in its
attention, and ineffectual in pursuing its agendas. The
challenge will be to keep key government officials and
ministries focused on the need for refinement of the new AML
legislation, so that they, in turn, can continue to exert
pressure on the legislature. (Programming Note: Direct
participation in the legislative drafting process in Pakistan
has not proved to be generally feasible for USG or Embassy
personnel--or for other international institutions or
partners--regardless of subject matter area. Accordingly
programs aimed at influencing the legislative process will
need to work through a combination of "sideways" efforts
including development of personal relationships, provisions
of technical expertise, and engagement of third country
partners to provide comparative models.)
Post proposes funding efforts designed to promote and
encourage amendments to the new legislation to bring it into
full compliance with FATF requirements, consistent with the
clear recommendations of the APG MER and necessary as a
precursor to Egmont review in 2011. The Program would use
NEW DELHI 00000356 008 OF 008
periodic U.S. Department of Justice Intermittent Legal
Advisors (ILAs), with substantive background in AML/CTF
legislation, assigned to post on a TDY-basis, working with
Post's Resident Legal Advisor (DOJ), Treasury Attach and
with the NAS, POL and ECON Sections. The ILAs would be
tasked with implementing the following efforts designed to
maintain momentum and pressure for enactment of AML/CTF laws
through:
-- Mobilization of regional resources and models from across
the APG, to promote compliance with APG MER recommendation
and to emphasize reforms still necessary to satisfy Egmont
review. While South Asia as a region has noticeably lagged
in the area of AML/CTF enforcement, many Southeast Asian
nations, notably Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, have been
regional leaders in these efforts. The ILAs would facilitate
engagement of Pakistani officials and parliamentarians with
regional counterparts, through regional events and programs,
and through the organization of study visits by Pakistani
officials, including parliamentarians, to Egmont member
countries with successful AML/CTF legislative regimes.
--Continued direct efforts by ILAs at "lobbying" of relevant
Pakistani officials, across the Pakistani interagency and in
Parliament, on the need for further revision of the AML law,
through one-on-one meetings, provision of relevant reference
and resource materials, and clarification and reinforcement
of APG's MER recommendations. Many Parliamentarians, for
example, are poorly schooled in issues relating to AML/CTF,
but are not always an easy group to corral into a large
conference setting; the ILAs would use direct meetings or
small group sessions to break down current apathy and
resistance to further consideration and enactment of the
AML/CTF amendments.
--Facilitate participation of US and international AML
experts in programs in Pakistan designed to promote further
modification of the new AML/CTF regime, including both small,
focused workshops and larger conferences. As has been the
case in other settings, DOJ ILAs would enlist direct
involvement of DOJ's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section (AFMLS) -- the lead office in the USG for AML
legislative policy coordination. ILAs would also work with
appropriate embassy officials to coordinate efforts with
other international donors working in the AML/CTF area,
including Asian Development Bank and UNODC.
Time frame for implementation: 2010-2011
Where implemented: Islamabad, with regional visits/programs
to appropriate counterpart countries and venues in South and
Southeast Asia.
Implementing body: At Post Islamabad: DOJ Resident Legal
Advisor and NAS Section. Supported by DOJ Office of Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT),
Washington, DC.
Audience of program: Pakistani Parliamentarians, legislative
staff, and relevant officials from Ministries of Law and
Justice, Interior and Finance.
Funding breakdown:
Total: $600,000 for eighteen months
Intermittent Legal Advisors (2-3 month TDY): $300,000
In country (Pakistan) workshops/conferences (including travel
costs for experts): $150,000
Regional conferences/study tours: $150,000
Tie to law enforcement: Sound and comprehensive AML/CTF
legislation is the building block on which all law
enforcement efforts are based. At present, Pakistani lacks
such a fully adequate legal framework. The lack of effective
laws is reflected in the weak record of Pakistani law
enforcement in pursuing such cases. Legal reform is a
critical component of larger efforts to promote more
aggressive AML/CTF enforcement efforts in Pakistan. Such
reform is also a precursor for Egmont membership -- which, in
turn, is a vehicle for greater international cooperation in
building AML/CTF cases.
ROEMER
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10NEWDELHI356_a.html
FS RAO ON COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, PAKISTAN, CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION, TIP
Date:2010 January 14, 15:11 (Thursday) Canonical ID:10NEWDELHI63_a
Original Classification:SECRET Current Classification:SECRET
Handling Restrictions:-- Not Assigned -- Character Count:8508
Executive Order:-- Not Assigned -- Locator:TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:ENRG - Economic Affairs--Energy and Power | IN - India | KNNP - Nuclear Non-Proliferation | KTIP - Trafficking in Persons | PARM - Political Affairs--Arms Controls and Disarmament | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PK - Pakistan | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE
Office Origin:-- N/A or Blank --
Office Action:-- N/A or Blank -- Archive Status:-- Not Assigned --
From:India New Delhi Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:Central Intelligence Agency | China Beijing | Defense Intelligence Agency | Department of Homeland Security | Director of National Intelligence | Federal Bureau of Investigation | France Paris | Japan Tokyo | Joint Chiefs of Staff | National Security Council | Russia Moscow | Secretary of Defense | Secretary of State | South and Central Asia Collective | United Kingdom London | United Nations (Geneva) | United Nations (New York) | United Nations (Vienna) | United States Central Command | United States Pacific Command | White House
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Classified By: Ambassador Timothy Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (SBU) This is an action request. See paragraph 5.
2. (S) SUMMARY. Foreign Secretary Rao, at the request of
Home Minister Chidambaram, summoned Ambassador Roemer January
13 to seek permission for National Investigative Agency (NIA)
officials to travel to the United States to interview two
known associates of David Headley. Chidambaram appears to
have deliberately moved this issue from intelligence and law
enforcement channels to political channels.
3. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED. FS Rao and Ambassador Roemer also
discussed India's relations with Pakistan, civil nuclear
cooperation, trafficking in persons (TIP), and defense
foundational agreements. Rao said External Affairs Minister
Krishna had phoned Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi January
13 to convey new year's greetings; both sides adhered to
familiar positions on dialogue and action against terrorism.
Ambassador Roemer used the meeting as an opportunity to press
Rao for action on the few remaining impediments to civil
nuclear cooperation, including a new concern that the
liability legislation may not fully conform with
international standards (reftel). Noting Rao's commitment to
cooperate on trafficking in persons that she expressed during
Secretary Clinton's meeting with Prime Minister Singh in
November, Ambassador Roemer asked Rao to welcome the visit to
India of Ambassador CDeBaca in February. In the context of a
discussion of upcoming visits to India, including that of
Secretary of Defense Gates, Rao dismissed public
"apprehensions" about moving forward on defense foundational
agreements, suggesting that the government wanted to move
forward on the agreements. END SUMMARY.
Headley Case
- - -
4. (S) At the Home Minister Chidambaram's request, Foreign
Secretary Rao summoned Ambassador Roemer January 13 to
request permission for officials from the National
Investigative Agency (NIA) to travel to the United States to
interview Headley's legal wife Shazia Gilani, who lives in
Chicago, and his Moroccan girlfriend Fazia Outalha, whose
whereabouts were not clear. NIA wants to probe both womens'
roles as abettors and co-conspirators in the Mumbai attacks.
Rao alleged that Gilani apparently had knowledge of Headley's
terrorist activities and sent him a coded message on November
26, 2008 (the date of the Mumbai attacks), congratulating him
on "graduation day," adding that she was watching it unfold
on television. Rao had little to share about Outalha, but
noted that the NIA has her email address.
5. (S) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: Chidambaram appears to
have directed Rao to request the meeting in order to move
this issue from intelligence and law enforcement channels to
political chanels, which speaks both to the importance
Chidambaram places on the on-going Headley investigation as
well as his stature within the government. Post requests
urgent cleared guidance on how to respond.
Pakistan
- - -
6. (C) Rao noted that External Affairs Minister (EAM) Krishna
called FM Qureshi on January 13 to convey new year's
greetings and to ask for a progress report on the trial of
the accused Mumbai conspirators. Qureshi said the government
of Pakistan was doing its best to move forward and asked for
resumption of the Composite Dialogue. Rao said the Indian
NEW DELHI 00000063 002 OF 003
government wanted dialogue but that dialogue would be
meaningless without progress against terrorism. Ambassador
Roemer encouraged dialogue and asked when the next Indo-Pak
interaction would take place. Rao reported that the
Pakistani election commissioner would come to Delhi in late
January. She noted that India and Pakistan had each released
fishermen who had been detained near the border, adding that
more would soon be freed. She also noted that the Indian
government had recently invited the speaker of the Pakistani
Parliament to attend a commonwealth meeting. Rao noted
acerbically that the Speaker "found time to meet with
Kashmiri separatists and to speak of jihad and a 1000 year
war for Kashmir," which she described as typical Pakistani
behavior. She concluded that while Pakistan says it wants
peace and to normalize relations, it continues to push its
agenda on -- not to seek resolution of -- the Kashmir issue.
Rao pointedly reaffirmed that India wanted to handle its
problems with Pakistan bilaterally. She described recent
track II efforts as helpful, but not officially linked to the
Indian government.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
- - -
7. (C) Ambassador Roemer seized the opportunity to press Rao
on outstanding civil nuclear cooperation issues. On
reprocessing and Part 810 assurances, he stressed the urgent
need for responses to our proposals. Rao said the Part 810
response was forthcoming, but that she had no knowledge of
the reprocessing state of play and suggested both sides
needed to be flexible.
8. (C) On liability legislation, Ambassador Roemer stressed
deep disappointment that the government had failed to meet
its pledge to adopt legislation in 2009. Rao claimed it was
due to bureaucratic hang-ups and unspecified "questions from
certain quarters," and that the draft text needed to clear
the Ministries of Law and Finance, as well as the Presidency,
before being tabled in the next session of Parliament. She
pledged to call these ministries to encourage them to
expedite its clearance. Ambassador Roemer also cited
concerns that draft legislation may not meet the standards of
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage (CSC) and thereby fail to meet India's commitment in
the 2008 Letter of Intent (reftel), to which Rao offered no
substantive response.
Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
- - -
9. (C) Ambassador Roemer raised the proposed visit to India
of Ambassador CDeBaca in February and stressed the importance
of engaging on this issue; he also noted Rao's commitment to
cooperate with us on the issue that she expressed during
Secretary Clinton's meeting with Prime Minister Singgh in
November. Rao said that while the Indian government was as
opposed to trafficking as was the United States, it remained
sensitive to anything perceived as too intrusive. She said
MEA would be in touch with us further, but offered no firm
answer with regard to the visit.
Strategic Dialogue Ministerial, FS Visit to U.S.
- - -
10. (SBU) With regard to a possible ministerial-level meeting
of the Strategic Dialogue in Washington, Rao shared that
External Affairs Minister Krishna would not be available to
travel to Washington until after the Parliament budgetary
session ended on May 12. Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar later
clarified that Krishna was already set to travel to Central
Asia April 9-12 and to Europe April 20-24, so it would be
NEW DELHI 00000063 003 OF 003
difficult for him to travel to the United States prior to
mid-May. Rao noted she would like to visit Washington in the
Spring prior to EAM Krishna's visit, and may stop in New York
for speaking engagements at the Council on Foreign Relations
or the Asia Society.
Defense Framework Agreements
- - -
11. (C) In response to Ambassador Roemer's suggestion that
Secretary of Defense Gates would likely raise the possibility
of making progress on the defense foundational agreements,
Rao noted that agreements like the Logistics Support
Agreement (LSA) should not be controversial since Indian
Naval vessels engaged in anti-piracy patrols already rely on
the U.S. for refueling. Rao observed that the public debate
needs to be better informed. Rao dismissed an interjection
from Joint Secretary for the Americas Gaitri Kumar about
political "apprehensions," saying that such concerns are a
hold-over from the "prior" era in which the Communist party
constrained foreign policy. She said the Indian government
shared the U.S. perspective and that the only issue now was
how to educate naysayers. Ambassador Roemer suggested that
we package the various agreements so the Indian government
did not need to repeatedly make the case to Parliament.
ROEMER
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10NEWDELHI63_a.html
TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR LEVEL ENGAGEMENT ON TERRORISM FINANCE
Date:2009 December 30, 13:28 (Wednesday) Canonical ID:09STATE131801_a
Original Classification:SECRET,NOFORN Current Classification:SECRET,NOFORN
Handling Restrictions:-- Not Assigned -- Character Count:28453
Executive Order:-- Not Assigned -- Locator:TEXT ONLINE
TAGS:AE - United Arab Emirates | EFIN - Economic Affairs--Financial and Monetary Affairs | KTFN - Terrorism Finance Traffic | KU - Kuwait | PINR - Political Affairs--Intelligence | PK - Pakistan | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | QA - Qatar | SA - Saudi Arabia Concepts:-- Not Assigned --
Enclosure:-- Not Assigned -- Type:TE
Office Origin:-- N/A or Blank --
Office Action:-- N/A or Blank -- Archive Status:-- Not Assigned --
From:Secretary of State Markings:-- Not Assigned --
To:Department of the Treasury | Kuwait Kuwait City | Pakistan Islamabad | Qatar Doha | Saudi Arabia Riyadh | United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi
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B. (B) RIYADH 1499
C. (C) KUWAIT 1061
D. (D) KUWAIT 1021
E. (E) ABU DHABI 1057
F. (F) DOHA 650
G. (G) ISLAMABAD 2799
Classified By: EEB/ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary
Douglas C. Hengel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (U) This is an action request cable. Please see para 3.
2. (S/NF) Summary: In August 2009, Special Representative to
the President for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP)
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in coordination with the
Department of Treasury established the interagency Illicit
Finance Task Force (IFTF). The IFTF is chaired by Treasury
A/S David Cohen. It focuses on disrupting illicit finance
activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the external
financial/logistical support networks of terrorist groups
that operate there, such as al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT). The IFTF's activities are a vital
component of the USG's Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak)
strategy dedicated to disrupting illicit finance flows
between the Gulf countries and Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
IFTF has created a diplomatic engagement strategy to assist
in the accomplishment of this objective. The strategy
focuses on senior-level USG engagement with Gulf countries
and Pakistan to communicate USG counterterrorism priorities
and to generate the political will necessary to address the
problem. The IFTF has drafted talking points for use by all
USG officials in their interactions with Gulf and Pakistani
interlocutors. These points focus on funding for terrorist
groups threatening stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
targeting coalition soldiers. These points have been cleared
through the relevant Washington agencies.
3. (SBU) Action request: Drawing on the background materials
for respective countries, and in preparation for the upcoming
visits by Ambassador Holbrooke and Treasury U/S Levey in
January, the Department requests all action posts deliver the
general talking points in paras 5-6 and country specific
talking points contained in the following paras: (1) Saudi
Arabia ) para 8, (2) Kuwait ) para 10, (3) UAE ) para 12,
and (4) Pakistan ) para 13. The talking points should be
delivered by Ambassadors/Charge D'Affaires.
4. (C) In response to State 112368, the Department has
received responses from Embassies Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
Doha, and Islamabad regarding the resource capabilities
devoted towards these efforts. The Department also received
each Mission's evaluation of the effectiveness of host
country institutions working on combating terrorism financing
along with post's recommendations on ways forward.
----------------------------------------
General talking points for all Embassies
----------------------------------------
5. (SBU) Threat financing:
Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and
achieving stability in Af/Pak are top U.S. priorities.
These objectives require effective actions against terrorist
fundraising in the Gulf by
al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other Af/Pak-based violent
extremist groups, all of which undermine the security of the
entire international community. We will not succeed without
your cooperation.
Long term success in combating terrorist financing requires a
comprehensive, strategic approach that includes the following
elements:
(1) aggressive action to identify, disrupt and deter
terrorist donors, fundraisers and facilitators;
(2) appropriate legal measures, including effective
prosecution, to hold terrorist financiers and facilitators
publicly accountable and to send a strong message of
deterrence to current and would-be donors that their actions
face significant legal and social repercussions.
(3) strong oversight of charities, including their
overseas branches, to ensure that these organizations are not
supporting terrorist and extremist elements;
(4) strict enforcement of UN 1267 sanctions; and
(5) full compliance with international anti-money
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
standards, including vigorous enforcement.
6. (SBU) Charities:
The United States strongly supports legitimate charitable
activities and is a strong proponent of private charitable
giving.
We recognize and admire the emphasis placed on charity within
Islam and we seek to work cooperatively with governments and
organizations in the Islamic world to ensure that legitimate
charitable activities thrive.
At the same time, we want to increase our cooperative efforts
to ensure that extremists and terrorists do not exploit
charitable giving.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
Country-specific background material and talking points
--------------------------------------------- ----------
7. (U) Saudi Arabia background
(S/NF) While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes
seriously the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has
been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to
treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a
strategic priority. Due in part to intense focus by the USG
over the last several years, Saudi Arabia has begun to make
important progress on this front and has responded to
terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States
through proactively investigating and detaining financial
facilitators of concern. Still, donors in Saudi Arabia
constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni
terrorist groups worldwide. Continued senior-level USG
engagement is needed to build on initial efforts and
encourage the Saudi government to take more steps to stem the
flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists
and extremists worldwide.
(S/NF) The USG engages regularly with the Saudi
Government on terrorist financing. The establishment in 2008
of a Treasury attache office presence in Riyadh contributes
to robust interaction and information sharing on the issue.
Despite this presence, however, more needs to be done since
Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for
al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups,
including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars
annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan.
In contrast to its increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt
al-Qa'ida's access to funding from Saudi sources, Riyadh has
taken only limited action to disrupt fundraising for the UN
1267-listed Taliban and LeT-groups that are also aligned with
al-Qa'ida and focused on undermining stability in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Saudi Arabia has enacted important reforms to
criminalize terrorist financing and restrict the overseas
flow of funds from Saudi-based charities. However, these
restrictions fail to include &multilateral organizations8
such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO),
Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim
Youth (WAMY.) Intelligence suggests that these groups
continue to send money overseas and, at times, fund extremism
overseas. In 2002, the Saudi government promised to set up a
&Charities Committee8 that would address this issue, but
has yet to do so. The establishment of such a mechanism,
however, is secondary to the primary U.S. goal of obtaining
Saudi acknowledgement of the scope of this problem and a
commitment to take decisive action.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department received post's
comments regarding embassy staffing at Riyadh and
recommendations for enhancing bilateral cooperation (ref B).
The Department agrees with post's recommendation that the
U.S. must reinforce, on a political level, the Saudi Arabia
Government's recent acknowledgement that terrorist groups
other than al-Qa'ida are a threat both to it and to regional
stability. The Department also supports post's assessment
that consistent engagement, including the exchange of
actionable intelligence, by senior USG officials is
paramount. We plan to discuss these issues with the SAG
during upcoming senior-level USG visits.
8. (U) Saudi Arabia talking points
(S/REL USA, SAU) We recognize your government's efforts to
disrupt al-Qa'ida networks in the Kingdom and we reaffirm our
commitment to support the Saudi government in its actions on
terror finance. We encourage your government to continue
efforts against al-Qa'ida and stress the importance of
sharing and acting on information related to terrorist
financing.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We note your concerns with fundraising in
the Kingdom by al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups and urge
decisive action to enforce the UN 1267-mandated asset freeze
against Taliban and LeT fundraising similar to Saudi efforts
to enforce UN 1267 sanctions and take other appropriate
action to target al-Qa'ida.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are
aligned with al-Qa'ida and that your government's support for
disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central
and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise
funds.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We urge your government to assume
responsibility for the overseas operations of charities and
NGOs headquartered in the Kingdom. We encourage you to
prevent terrorists and their supporters from exploiting
religious events (Hajj, Umrah, Ramadan) to raise funds. We
acknowledge the recent adoption of stricter financial
controls on charities, but urge greater regulation and
oversight of the Saudi charitable sector.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We would like to stress our interest in
broadening and deepening this dialogue and information
exchange as we still lack detailed information on the
ultimate sources of terrorist financing emanating from the
Kingdom. We commend your government for recent efforts to
put terrorists and terrorist financiers on trial, and we
encourage you to publicize details of prosecutions to
maximize the deterrent effects.
(S/REL USA, SAU) You have had success in detaining and
deterring financial facilitators. However, we encourage your
government also to focus on the long-term and more
fundamental goal of dissuading donors from funding violent
extremism.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We commend your government's effort over the
past several years to use the media, internet, and other
forms of public outreach to discourage extremism. We
emphasize that a critical component in this campaign is
cutting off the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to foreign
religious, charitable, and educational organizations that
propagate violent extremist ideologies to vulnerable
populations.
9. (U) Kuwait background
(S/NF) The USG has consistently engaged the Government of
Kuwait (GOK) about the specific activities of terrorist
financiers in country, Kuwaiti charities financing terrorism
abroad, and Kuwait's lack of a comprehensive anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime. While the
GOK has demonstrated a willingness to take action when
attacks target Kuwait, it has been less inclined to take
action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators
plotting attacks outside of Kuwait. Al-Qa'ida and other
groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds
and as a key transit point.
(S/NF) The GOK has undertaken a number of initiatives to curb
terrorist financing in the charitable sector (ending direct
cash donations, increasing monitoring and supervising mosques
and charitable organizations, and enhancing enforcement of
regulations by a Ministry of Social Affairs task force). It
also recently arrested some Kuwait-based al-Qa'ida
facilitators, but it is too early to assess whether this
marks a change in Kuwaiti policy of co-opting terrorists as a
means of deflecting potential attacks against Kuwaiti
interests.
(S/NF) Kuwait's law prohibits efforts to undermine or attack
Arab neighbors, a basis for the prosecution of al-Qa'ida
facilitators, Kuwait remains the sole Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) country that has not criminalized terrorist
financing. The GOK faces an uphill battle to implement
comprehensive terror finance legislation due to a lack of
parliamentary support. However the government is also not
currently prepared to push hard on this issue. The GOK at
times has obstructed or been slow to enforce UN-mandated
asset freezes of Kuwait-based entities.
(S/NF) A particular point of difference between the U.S. and
Kuwait concerns Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS).
In June 2008 the USG domestically designated all RIHS offices
RIHS under Executive Order 13224 for providing financial and
material support to al-Qa'ida and UN 1267-listed al-Qa'ida
affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah,
and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The United States nominated RIHS
for listing under UNSCR 1267 but Indonesia placed a technical
hold on the RIHS listing due concerns regarding RIHS's
presence in Indonesia. Libya also placed a hold - probably
at Kuwait's behest - citing insufficient information on
RIHS's activities. Indonesia has rotated off the United
Nation's Security Council so only Libya's hold on RIHS
remains. (Department note: Libya's hold will drop in 2010
unless one of the newly elected UNSC Members places a hold on
our request to list RIHS.) In Kuwait, RIHS enjoys broad
public support as a charitable entity. The GOK to date has
not taken significant action to address or shut down RIHS's
headquarters or its branches, which is consistent with GOK
tolerance of similar behavior by Kuwaiti citizens and
organizations as long as the behavior occurs or is directed
outside of Kuwait.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department appreciates postVs
thorough description of the staffing situation at Mission
Kuwait (ref B). The Department commends U.S. Embassy Kuwait
for taking an active approach in proposing a strategy to
build GOK capacity in combating financial crimes through
training and seminars focused on legislation and law
enforcement (ref C). The opportunity to engage the GOK on
improving its capabilities to deal with financial crimes is
enthusiastically welcomed by agencies in Washington.
Washington agencies appreciate post's assessment and
identification of several focal areas that deal with
financial crimes. These goals closely track the work of the
IFTF Capacity Building Working Group. The Department
commends Embassy Kuwait's recent support of Kuwait's National
Anti Money Laundering Committee's AML conference in early
December 2009. In response to post's request, the Department
will work with relevant members of the Washington
inter-agency to provide comments and feedback to the draft of
Kuwait's amended AML law.
10. (U) Kuwait talking points
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our
strong bilateral relationship. We would like to see our
cooperation on counter-terrorist financing improve to a level
that matches our excellent cooperation in many other areas.
In this respect, the recent Kuwait anti-money laundering
conference held in Kuwait is a positive step forward.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti
donors serve as an important source of funds and other
support for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The arrest
in August of six Kuwaiti men who were plotting terrorist
attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks an important step
in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage you
to keep up the positive momentum.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are
aligned with al-Qaida and that your government's support for
disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central
and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise
funds.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government's generosity
for a wide range of important causes and for the positive
contributions made by Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait
for some of the initiatives taken to enhance oversight of
charitable donations, but we need you to do more to prevent
the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your
government to separate and protect legitimate charitable
activity from those that fund terror. We have particular
concerns about their foreign activities.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued
absence of counterterrorism legislation criminalizing
terrorist financing will continue to prevent effective
counterterrorist efforts.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the
passage of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and
comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterror
financing laws will enhance your government's ability to
prosecute those seeking to undermine Kuwait's security, but
will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait's financial sector
as a whole.
(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our
concerns with your government regarding RIHS on numerous
occasions. We designated the organization in the United
States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on
information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups
in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its
concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have
taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their
countries.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work
more closely with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities
cannot be used to support terrorists.
11. (U) United Arab Emirates background
(S/NF) UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a
variety of terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups, including Hamas.
Washington agencies note, however, that they have limited
information on the identity of Taliban and LeT donors and
facilitators in the UAE. Hence there is limited information
to be shared with local interlocutors. Nonetheless, the point
can be emphasized that the UAE's role as a growing global
financial center, coupled with weak regulatory oversight,
makes it vulnerable to abuse by terrorist financiers and
facilitation networks.
(S/NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's
comments regarding personnel staffing at Mission UAE and the
challenges post faces. The Department is supportive of the
action plan laid out on engaging with the UAE on Taliban
finance issues (ref E). The Department assesses that a
bilateral commitment by the United States and the UAE to
focus on weaknesses within its financial regulatory measures
is an important step in making progress on strengthening UAE
efforts to disrupt potential terrorist financing.
12. (U) United Arab Emirates talking points
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate the depth and breadth of our
bilateral relationship. Since 2001, we have developed a
strong partnership with your government in countering
financial support for al-Qa'ida, and more recently, in
constricting Iran's ability to use UAE financial institutions
to support its nuclear program.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We would like to extend our cooperation and
partnership to efforts to deal with the threat represented by
Taliban and LeT fundraising in the UAE. We believe that the
United States and UAE, which both have troops in the field in
Afghanistan, share a common interest in curtailing any
Taliban or LeT fundraising activities and fully implementing
UN 1267 sanctions on such activities on behalf of these
groups in the UAE.
(S/REL USA, ARE) However, we are pleased that concerns have
been raised in the UAE regarding the Taliban and LeT
fundraising. We also commend the calls for increased
vigilance, information sharing, and enforcement actions to
disrupt and deter this activity.
(S/REL USA, ARE) In our view, the alignment of the Taliban
and LeT with al-Qa'ida means that our mutual efforts to
disrupt the financing of these groups also is critical to the
stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We emphasize the need to prevent the
Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to
travel and raise funds.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate your government's willingness
to work with the USG on cash courier interdiction and note
that such efforts are crucial to undermine al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, and other groups' ability to exploit the UAE as a
fundraising and facilitation hub. We urge your government to
strengthen its regulatory and enforcement regime to interdict
cash couriers transiting major airports.
13. (U) Pakistan background
(S/NF) Pakistan's intermittent support to terrorist groups
and militant organizations threatens to undermine regional
security and endanger U.S. national security objectives in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistani senior
officials have publicly disavowed support for these groups,
some officials from the Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) continue to maintain ties with
a wide array of extremist organizations, in particular the
Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations. These
extremist organizations continue to find refuge in Pakistan
and exploit Pakistan's extensive network of charities, NGOs,
and madrassas. This network of social service institutions
readily provides extremist organizations with recruits,
funding and infrastructure for planning new attacks. On the
international stage, Pakistan has sought to block the UNSCR
1267 listings of Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists by
requesting that China place holds on the nominations. China
recently placed a technical hold on the designation of three
Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists nominated by India,
although China did not prevent the most recent
Pakistan-related U.S. designation nomination in June.
(S/NF) The Department has received post's comments regarding
personnel staffing and the detailed description of the
challenges faced by Embassy Islamabad in the area of
terrorism finance (ref D). Department leaves it to post
discretion to determine which departments within the host
government should receive the points provided in para 16 so
that Pakistan fully understands the priority the USG places
on this issue.
14. (U) Pakistan talking points
(S/REL USA, PAK) Emphasize that Pakistan's support for
disrupting financing to the Taliban and LeT obligatory
pursuant to their obligations under UNSCR 1267 and successor
resolutions, and is critical to achieving stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We are deeply concerned that Pakistan has
failed to enact an AML/CTF law that meets APG/FATF standards.
As you may realize the FATF is currently engaged in a
&International Co-Operation Review Group8 exercise, that
is likely to have very negative multilateral repercussions if
the Parliament does not pass an adequate AML/CTF law.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress your government's obligation,
under UNSCR 1267, and successor resolutions to strictly
enforce existing sanctions against the 142 Taliban, LeT
leader Hafiz Saeed, LeT/JUD, al Rashid Trust, al Akhtar Trust
and other individuals and entities on the UN 1267
Consolidated List.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to support the
international community's efforts to combat terrorist
financing. Your government's views of UNSCR 1267 listing
requests for LeT and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups
should be made on the merits of the requests and not linked
to politics, including what country made the nomination or
which countries are referenced in the public statements of
the cases.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to comply with UN
and domestic legal obligations to enforce sanctions on the
Pakistan-based, UN-proscribed NGOs al Rashid Trust and al
Akhtar Trust, and all successor organizations that continue
to funnel money and provide other forms of support to the
Taliban and LeT.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We emphasize that social services provided
by NGO extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD)
challenge the legitimacy of your government to provide for
its people. This includes relief efforts in the Internally
Displaced Person (IDP) camps of the Northwest Frontier
Provinces by the new LeT/JUD charity Falah-e Insaniyat
Foundation.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress that our governments must work
together to ensure that there are moderate alternatives to
terrorist-controlled social welfare networks upon which IDPs
and other vulnerable populations currently rely. We must
work together to develop and support NGOs not affiliated with
terrorist groups, and establish a comprehensive oversight and
enforcement mechanism for NGOs that is consistent with the
Financial Action Task Force's international standard.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government in the strongest
possible terms to take action against the Haqqani network,
which is funneling weapons and fighters across the border to
fight U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This
network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who was listed by the UN
under UNSCR 1267, funds its activities through illicit
activities, including kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery,
narcotics, smuggling, and fraud.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government to replace the
anti-money laundering decree recently promulgated by your
Executive Branch with legislation fully consistent with the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and to
ensure that the current decree can stand in court. The FATF
Forty Plus Nine Recommendations are international standards,
which Pakistan, by virtue of its membership in the
Asia-Pacific Group, committed to.
15. (U) Qatar background
(S//NF) Department Note: Qatar is one of the four Gulf
countries included in the IFTF, and accordingly, the IFTF
developed the background information included in para 16 for
inclusion in the diplomatic engagement strategy. However,
given the current focus of U.S. engagement with the GOQ on
terror finance related to Hamas, it would be
counter-productive for Embassy Doha to engage the GOQ at this
time on disrupting financial support of terrorist groups
operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Qatar has adopted a largely passive approach to
cooperating with the U.S. against terrorist financing.
Qatar's overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is
considered the worst in the region. Al-Qaida, the Taliban,
UN-1267 listed LeT, and other terrorist groups exploit Qatar
as a fundraising locale. Although Qatar's security services
have the capability to deal with direct threats and
occasionally have put that capability to use, they have been
hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for
appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking
reprisals.
(S//NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's
comments regarding personnel staffing and the thorough
description of the coordination process on terrorist finance
issues at Embassy Doha (ref F). Department appreciates post's
assessment that GOQ definitions of what constitutes terrorism
differs occasionally from those of the USG. Department agrees
with post's suggested approach on this issue of engaging with
direct discussions with host government officials.
----------------------------------------
Points of contact and reporting deadline
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16. (U) Please direct any questions or comments on this
request to EEB/ESC/TFS (Jay J. Jallorina or Linda Recht).
Posts are requested to report back on responses from other
governments by January 19, 2010.
CLINTON
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE131801_a.html