What was the robbed tele exchange used for? What data was transferred using 700+ high capacity wi-fi lines? Who received the data? Did the data transfers include data involving national security?
CBI should investigate and provide the answers. Avoiding payment of telephone line charges is only a thin end of the wedge.
Gurumurthy's expose is shocking beyond belief. It is shocking that the principal law officer of NaMo Government compromises national security.
NaMo, restitute kaalaadhan, the nation trusts you.
S. Kalyanaraman
Sarasvati Research Center
Mr Attorney, You Got Facts, Law Right on Marans?
By S Gurumurthy
Published: 13th July 2015 04:25 AM
Former communications minister Dayanidhi Maran | PTI
CHENNAI: Provide “clinching evidence” that can prove allowing Sun TV network’s operation would impinge upon national security, reported the media on July 11. This is not Marans demanding from the Home Ministry. But this is the Information and Broadcasting Ministry asking the Home Ministry. The issue has ceased to be Maran versus the Home Ministry anymore. It is now I&B Ministry versus the Home Ministry. Marans no more need to argue their case. The I&B Ministry seems to have taken their Vakalat.
This interesting duel became public last month with a report in a Maran-friendly media, on June 20, 2015 that, in a shot in the arm for the Kalanithi Maran-promoted Sun TV network, Attorney-General Mukul Rohatgi has said the refusal by the Ministry of Home Affairs to grant security licence to the media group is “not legal”. The I&B Ministry sought and got the AG’s opinion, which it seemed to be looking for. The AG had signed the opinion on June 18. It means the media got it within 24 hours, on 19th, for it to print on 20th. Maybe the opinion had reached the media before the Home Ministry got it. A week later, on June 28, media reported that the Home Ministry, unfazed, rejected the AG’s opinion and stood its ground that Sun TV network did not deserve security clearance.
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HC exposes fraud Sun TV network’s security issue came to light in August last year.
On August 20, 2014, the NDA’s I&B ministry cancelled the permit granted by the UPA government in 2012 to the Maran family-owned Kal Cables to run its cable network. Reason: it had not obtained security clearance from the Home Ministry. Kal Cables, which distributes Sun TV network channels, had been operating since April 2003. How come then it was faulted for not obtaining security clearance after nine years, in August 2014? In the answer to the question lay buried Marans’ fraud when Dayanidhi Maran was the self-proclaimed ‘Prime Minister’ of Telecom from 2004 to 2007 and textile minister from 2009 to 2011.
The wrongdoing of Marans was exposed by the judgment of Madras High Court (Sept 5, 2014) on the Kal Cables’ writ against the cancellation of its permit. The headline of the judgment “that the court had set aside cancellation on the ground that no opportunity was given to Kal Cables by the Home Ministry” was deceptively in Marans’ favour. The heart of the judgment was deadly against them.
From the text of his opinion it is clear that the AG had read, or was shown, only the headline of the judgment. That perhaps led him to believe that the High Court had gone totally against the Home Ministry. The judgment, one of the finest pieces of prose on facts and law, was delivered by Justice V Ramasubramaniam. Read on for how devastating is the indictment of Marans by the learned judge - not a word of which figures in the AG’s opinion. Actually, the court was so hard on Dayanidhi Maran that he had to join the appeal against the judgment asking that the court’s indictment of him be expunged. Are you aware of this? Mr AG. You may not be because you had said in your opinion that you were just “informed” of the appeal proceedings.
File Disappears for 7 Years
First, the Justice faulted the original permit given to Kal Cables. He had said that government could take action against Kal Cables - read Marans - about the manner in which ‘provisional’ permission for 10 years was granted to it on September 30, 2006, when its promoter Dayanidhi Maran was a Union Minister too. The court noticed two startling facts, which you failed to, Mr AG. First, the “provisional” permission given was “subject to security clearance”, which Kal Cables never got and yet it had been operating its cable network from 2006. Next, more shocking, the Kal Cables file containing the provisional permit subject to security clearance just disappeared and did not move to the Home Ministry at all. It was detained in the I&B Ministry for 7 years from 2006 till 2013! That meant that even the UPA government, in which Maran was minister for 5 out of 10 years and his party the DMK was alliance partner for 10 years, could not give security clearance to Marans. Why? Why was the file kept back from the Home Ministry? These questions need answers first. The AG, who obviously believed that the court had decided in Marans’ favour, seems to be unaware that it had almost suggested that the government could act against Marans on how permission was given in 2006 and how the file was kept away from the Home Ministry for 7 years. Mr AG, had you been aware of this, would you not support the court order for action against the Marans?
Marans Ducked Security Clearance
Next, the law relating to TV network and cables was amended in the year 2011 making ‘security clearance’ condition precedent for registering operators of both businesses. But existing operators were allowed the facility of deemed registration for the remaining period of their permission. Kal Cables, which had got provisional permission till Sept 29, 2016, requested for deemed registration under the new law, on December 18, 2012, representing “we have obtained due permission from the Ministry.” Simultaneously it also gave undertaking to comply with the Act, rules, regulations, order, directions or guidelines. This representation of Kal Cables that it had “due” permission was fraudulent as the stipulation of “security” clearance was not complied with.
Consequently, the undertaking that it had complied with the law, rules and directions was equally fraudulent. And yet, on June 19, 2012, Kal Cables got deemed registration for 10 years from Sept 30, 2006 - without complying with the stipulation of security clearance.
The High Court has ruled that the requirement of security clearance was always part of the rules. Kal Cables had ducked this vital requirement as the file that disappeared did not go to the Home Ministry. Intriguing, isn’t it? Mr AG, will you say that the government need not act against Marans despite the court saying it can?
Threat, Said Maran’s Ministry
The AG has noted in his opinion that, “the CBI is investigating Dayanidhi Maran for setting up 300 illegal telephone lines at Kalanidhi Maran’s home to facilitate SUN TV Service thereby gaining pecuniary advantage of Rs 443 cr.”
But the AG dismisses it as just an economic offence. Is it just that, Mr AG? Or, is it just the Home Ministry’s view that illegal telephone lines are security threat? No.
Are you aware, Mr AG, that it has been the long-held view of the Telecom Ministry itself that illegal telephone exchanges are a grave threat to national security? A full year before Dayanidhi Maran became Telecom Minister, how illegal telephones were security threat was discussed at the meeting on April 26, 2003, chaired by the Telecom Secretary himself and attended by intelligence agencies and cellular operators. Taking note of this meeting, in its order of May 24, 2010, the Telecom Appellate Tribunal [TDSAT] ruled: “Operation of clandestine/illegal telecommunications facilities has serious implications from national security point of view.” This is a matter of serious concern and all possible steps need to be taken by all concerned to curb such activities. Mr AG, was this brought to your notice?
Mr AG, is not the illegal and secret telephone exchange operated by the Telecom Minister himself even more serious - an undetectable subversion? Even more grave because, being the minister’s secret lines, the exchange was kept out of the eye of the system deliberately. Mr AG, does not the operation of 764 illegal high speed lines, which could carry unmonitored and undetected millions of pages of documents and voice and video, by the very man entrusted to protect national security as per the decision of his own ministry in 2003, make the offence graver? Mr AG, are you not aware that the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951 prohibit interconnection of ISDN lines to the public telecommunications network?
Why, do you know? Because carrying traffic from Private Network to Public Network and vice versa will result in flow of unmonitored traffic from a private network to the public network bypassing the authorised “monitor-able” gateways and result in security threat to the nation. This is precisely what Marans’ illegal exchange of 764 ISDN lines did.
Kept connected the 764 fraudulent lines to public network for three years. Can you deny Mr AG, that it was potential danger to national security? On top of all this, Maran, superseding a senior official of BSNL chose a person close to a TADA detainee to use the 764 smuggled high speed telephone lines? [NIE dated July 3, 2015] Mr AG, would you not advise a probe into whether there could be actual national security breach?
Post Script: Mr AG, do you remember the Blackberry Case? The order of the government to ban Blackberry unless it stopped providing encrypted content was based on the perception of potential threat to national security. If encrypted communication of just a couple of sentences is potential threat to national security, is not secret and unlicensed telephone exchange of 764 high speed lines, which could carry a reservoir of data - video and voice - without being detected, not potential threat to national security? Think about it Mr AG.
http://linkis.com/newindianexpress.com/9Ldpw
Mr AG, Isn't Maran Money Laundering Threat to National Security?
By S Gurumurthy
Published: 14th July 2015 03:26 AM
CHENNAI: The Attorney General’s firm opinion is that economic offences, which include charges of money laundering, do not constitute a threat to national security.
The AG says that to hold Marans’ offences as constituting prejudice to the security of the state, they must have done something “threatening national security”, in the sense of actual or imminent threat, to deny them security clearance. The test of actual and imminent threat adopted by the AG to exonerate Marans seems totally misconceived. The threat to national security need not be actual or imminent. Even potential threat prejudices national security. The Cable Television Network (Regulation) Act 2000 uses the words “in the interest of the security of India” or the words “in the interest of the security of the State”. They comprehend potential threat, which is markedly different from “threatening the security of India” in the sense of actual threat. According to the Home Ministry, Marans have caused prejudice to the security of the State in two ways.
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One, they had set up an unlicenced, clandestine and unmonitored telephone exchange of 764 high-speed telephone lines, which undeniably constitute potential threat to national security [Mr Attorney, you got facts and law right on Marans? NIE June 13, 2015]. Two, they also stand charged for money laundering, which according to the Home Ministry constitutes potential threat to economic security of India. A critique of the AG’s view to the contrary not only confirms the Home Ministry’s view, but leads to the position that his view that money laundering is no threat to national security is itself a national security risk. Read on.
Security of State
The AG says that Marans’ television and cable businesses are protected under the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Art 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. The freedom is only subject to the restrictions imposed by Art 19(2).
One such restriction, security of the state, is discussed by the AG in his opinion. The AG refers to the decided cases on Art 19 to contend that “Security of State” in Art 19(2) means crime or violence intended to overthrow the government, levying war and rebellion against the government, external aggression and crimes and the like.
On the decided cases, the AG says that, from the stand of the Home Ministry itself, it is clear that none of the cases instituted against the Marans — meaning including the charge of money laundering — would fall under threat to “national security”.
By that logic, the AG then boldly says that the Home Ministry “seem to suggest that economic security of the state should be covered under the Article 19(2) of the Constitution. I do not warrant for the same”.
Mr AG, do you really mean that economic security is not comprehended within the meaning of security of the State in Art 19(2)?
Mr AG, you seem to be unaware of this observation of the High Court in Marans’ case itself, which directly conflicts with your opinion.
AG Needs to Update Himself
Again, the AG’s contention that economic security is not comprehended within national security is clearly based on an outdated view of law. The AG needs to be updated on this branch of law fast in the interest of national security, as he will be advising and arguing for the government time and again on this vital issue. The world has changed dramatically in the last couple of decades. The Center for Strategic Conferencing Institute for National Strategic Studies 2011 [National Defense University Press Washington, DC] says: “Economic security is a major element of national security, even as borders are less important than ever.” The Congressional Research Service Report to US Congress titled Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for US Policy [Jan 4, 2011] says that the US national security consists, among others, first, physical security and second, economic security. How then can any one doubt that economic security is integral to national security? Then, Mr AG, is not your view that in Art 19(2) of the Constitution of India “there is no concept of economic security which the Home Ministry seeks to rely on” clearly outdated? The Home Ministry seems to be far more updated on the issue than you, Mr AG.
Money Laundering: Threat to Security
Mr AG, you say that, in your considered view the “charge of economic offences for denying security clearance in the instant case cannot amount to threatening national security.” It means that economic offences are no threat to national security. Now see how outdated are the AG’s view here too. A report on Economic Crimes by the Indian Audit and Accounts Service [2007] says: There is a growing recognition in the world that the economic offences are, many times, part of other serious crimes posing serious threat to the security of the nation.” And, of all economic offences that endanger national security, money laundering is the most serious.
A report titled “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Global Threat” published by the US Department of State [2004] says that money laundering poses international and national security threats through corruption of officials and legal systems and threatens the financial stability of countries and the international free flow of capital. Mr AG, none of the cases relied on by you had had occasion to consider whether money laundering is a threat to national security. They are, therefore, no authority to say that money laundering is not a national security threat. Mr AG, can you deny this? And yet you say that according to decided cases economic security or economic offences are not integral to national security.
Mr AG, bribery and money laundering are considered the world over as a deadly combination against national security. You seem to have ignored this totally. You have even failed to notice the Preamble to UN Convention On Corruption to which India is a signatory. The UN Convention has noted that all member states are concerned about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption “to the stability and security of societies” and points to links between corruption and other forms of crime, “in particular, organised crime and economic crime, including money laundering” and that cases involving vast quantity of assets can threaten political stability and security of the country”. The Marans have been charged with both bribery and money laundering, Mr AG. They allegedly got paid `740 crore for Dayanidhi Maran, as Minister, pressuring a businessman who owned the Aircel cellular company to sell his company to Maxis Group of Malaysia. They are believed to have laundered the bribe back as genuine investment in Sun Group. The Enforcement Directorate has seized the asset representing the bribe under the money laundering law. This is precisely what money laundering means. An article in the US Federal Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement Bulletin [May 2001] titled “Money Laundering: A Global Threat and the International Community’s Response” defines money laundering as “the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income to make it appear legitimate”. This is precisely the charge against the Marans. They are alleged to have concealed the bribe taken by them in the Maxis deal and recycled it to make it appear as legitimate capital.
Mr AG, will you still assert that the allegation of money laundering against the Marans is no threat to national security? No, you cannot. And how ridiculous then it is for the I&B Ministry to ask the Home Ministry for “clinching evidence” that can prove allowing Sun TV network operate would impinge upon national security?
Finally Mr AG, will you withdraw your opinion and give another one consistent with the latest law and correct facts?