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Remembering Kargil war heroes in school textbooks -- Ardhra Nair. NaMo, Smriti Irani to note Vijay Diwas and instruct textbook writers. Our school children should remember and pay tribute to the soldiers of Bharat who sacrificed their lives defending territorial integrity of the nation.
Kalyanaraman
Kargil struggles to get into school textbooks
Written by Ardhra Nair | Pune | July 26, 2013 2:44 am
SUMMARY
It has been 14 years since Pakistani intruders were driven out of Tiger Hill and Captain Vikram Batra,Captain Manoj Pandey,Captain Sourabh Kalia besides numerous unsung heroes became irreplaceable names in the history of contemporary India.
It has been 14 years since Pakistani intruders were driven out of Tiger Hill and Captain Vikram Batra,Captain Manoj Pandey,Captain Sourabh Kalia besides numerous unsung heroes became irreplaceable names in the history of contemporary India. And while the Armys bravehearts rewrote history with their blood,the education system does not find it significant to include their mention in history books for basic introduction to young Indian minds.
The Maharashtra state board has no mention of Kargil in social science books till standard ten.
The case is no different with languages books,where no stories about their bravery is featured. Instead,the social science book of the state board focuses on history,the latest event to be touched being Goa liberation. According to N K Jarag,head,State Council of Educational Research and Training (SCERT) that designs content of the textbooks,”Children between standard one to eight do not have the understanding (to grasp facets of Kargil).” Jarag agrees Kargil/ Kargil heroes deserve a mention in textbooks for standard nine and 10.
SCERT follows NCERT guidelines. A quick look at some guidelines which aim at enabling students to be familiar with some key political events and figures in the post-independence period,events and processes of recent history,to take a historical perspective of making sense of contemporary India makes one wonder why none of India’s post independence conflicts,including Kargil,feature in the textbooks.
While this is the case with the state board,the CBSE class 12 political science book has a passing mention of the Kargil conflict (Box- 1).
This,when earlier editions of the syllabus included a rather elaborate account of Kargil (Box- 2). Even in Sainik Schools in the city/ state,Kargil is covered only in military training through individual initiatives.
“We conduct talks by inviting guest lecturers. In fact,a subject called ‘Purandar te Kargil’ was taught to our students for two years under military training. But we have now stopped the same. It is mandatory for Sainik School girls to know the history of Kargil,but it is unfortunate that it does not form a part of the syllabus,” said Shraddha Walimbe,principal,Rani Laxmibai Military School for Girls.
According to a department head in the University of Pune,Indian history in textbooks predominantly follows the outlines of non-violent struggle and the Gandhian thoughts.
“Our policy seems to be not to project ourselves as imperialists through the history books. Also,on a bigger history of contemporary India where governance,politics,administration or foreign policy are the elements,Kargil looks like a relatively small event,” he said. Suhas Palshikar,former advisor to the NCERT,said Kargil is a relatively “smaller or minor” event from the academic perspective,unless it is about war history or Indo-Pak relations. “In academic perspective,the relation between India-Pakistan gains more significance than armed conflicts between the two countries.”
Veteran soldiers have a different take. Major General (retd) G D Bakshi,veteran security analyst,said,”I had written to the authorities asking them for inclusion of Kargil in the education system,but there was no response. Representation of military history is a neglected aspect in the country.”http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/pune/kargil-struggles-to-get-into-school-textbooks/
Army Chief Pays Tribute to Kargil War Martyrs
All India | Indo Asian News Service | Updated: July 25, 2014 10:58 IST
General Singh, who is retiring on July 31, paid homage at the Kargil war memorial in the Drass area.
"I want to assure you as chief of the army staff that the Indian Army is deployed at the border and has the capability to protect India's sovereignty and integrity," General Singh told the media.
He added that the army is "fully geared to take on challenges" and that the present government is committed towards ensuring the needs and aspirations of the soldiers.
Each year since 1999, the army observes Vijay Diwas to remember its soldiers who laid down their lives in Kargil district in the cold desert region of Ladakh during the conflict between India and Pakistan.
The Kargil conflict was the most serious military engagement between the two neighbours since the war of 1971 that resulted in the division of Pakistan into two countries and the creation of Bangladesh.
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/army-chief-pays-tribute-to-kargil-war-martyrs-564884
Kargil War
| May–July 1999 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Location | Kargil district, Kashmir, India | ||||
| Result | Pakistani military retreat;[1] India regains control of occupied territory[2] | ||||
| Territorial changes | Status quo ante bellum |
| Strength | |
|---|---|
| 30,000 | 5,000 |
| Casualties and losses | |
Indian official figures
Pakistani claims
| Pakistani official figures Other Pakistani claims Indian claims |
The Kargil War (Hindi: करगिल युद्ध kārgil yuddh, Urdu: کرگل جنگ kārgil jang), also known as the Kargil conflict,[note (I)] was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along theLine of Control (LOC). The conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay (Victory in Hindi) which was the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector.[19]
The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC,[20]which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind bycasualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister andChief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces,[21][22][23] led by General Ashraf Rashid.[24] The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian positions along the LOC.
The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. To date, it is also the only instance of direct,conventional warfare between nuclear states (i.e., those possessingnuclear weapons). India had conducted its first successful test in 1974; Pakistan, which had been developing its nuclear capability in secret since around the same time, conducted its first known tests in 1998, just two weeks after a second series of tests by India.
Further information: Kargil order of battle
Conflict events
| Date (1999) | Event |
|---|---|
| May 3 | Pakistani intrusion in Kargil reported by local shepherds |
| May 5 | Indian Army patrol sent up; Five Indian soldiers captured and tortured to death. |
| May 9 | Heavy shelling by Pakistan Army damages ammunition dump in Kargil |
| May 10 | Infiltrations first noticed in Dras, Kaksar, and Mushkoh sectors |
| Mid-May | Indian Army moves in more troops from Kashmir Valley to Kargil Sector |
| May 26 | IAF launches air strikes against infiltrators |
| May 27 | IAF loses two fighters — MiG-21 and MiG-27;. Flt Lt Nachiketa taken POW |
| May 28 | IAF MI-17 shot down by Pakistan; four air crew dead |
| June 1 | Pakistan steps up attacks; bombs NH 1A |
| June 5 | Indian Army releases documents recovered from three Pakistani soldiers indicating Pakistan’s involvement |
| June 6 | Indian Army launches major offensive in Kargil |
| June 9 | Indian Army re-captures two key positions in the Batalic sector |
| June 11 | India releases intercepts of conversation between Pakistani Army Chief Gen Pervez Musharraf, while on a visit to China and Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Aziz Khan in Rawalpindi, as proof of Pakistani Army’s involvement |
| June 13 | Indian Army secures Tololing in Dras |
| June 15 | U.S. President Bill Clinton, in a telephonic conversation, asks Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull out from Kargil |
| June 29 | Indian Army captures two vital posts: Point 5060 and Point 5100 near Tiger Hill |
| July 2 | Indian Army launches three-pronged attack in Kargil |
| July 4 | Indian Army recaptures Tiger Hill after an 11-hour battle |
| July 5 | Indian Army takes control of Dras. Sharif announces Pakistani army’s withdrawal from Kargil following his meeting with Clinton |
| July 7 | India recaptures Jubar Heights in Batalik |
| July 11 | Pakistan begins pullout; India captures key peaks in Batalik |
| July 14 | Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declares Operation Vijay a success. Government sets condition for talks with Pakistan |
| July 26 | Kargil conflict officially comes to an end. Indian Army announces complete eviction of Pakistani intruders. |
There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing some territory held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after international pressure.
The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1D from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1D (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1D, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians.[68] This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route.[69] The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh.
The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artilleryand anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered more than 8,000anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report.[70] Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US.[71] The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1D, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war.
The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1D. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route.[72] This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that were of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH 1D, point 5353 was the highest feature in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH 1D.[73] The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict.[74] Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.
Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1D, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on the peak in which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them – which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat.
As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line-of-sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun.
It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness. French made Mirage 2000H of the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces.[20] However, The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory.[75] One Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, due to Stinger SAMs.
On May 27, 1999, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the Batalik sector and bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out of his way to locate his comrade but was shot down by a shoulder-fired Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds.[20]
In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for thewind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as −15 °C to −11 °C (12 °F to 5 °F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause.
Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators;[76][77] according to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control.[34]
Withdrawal and final battles
Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, who was then an aide to President Bill Clinton, reported that U.S. intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control.[78] Following the Washington accord of July 4, 1999, when Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on.[79]
The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement.
India
A number of Indian soldiers earned awards for gallantry:[90]
- Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra
- Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous
- Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous
- Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra
- Captain Anuj Nayyar,17 JAT Regiment, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous
- Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari, 18 Grenadiers, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous
- Major Saravanan, 1 Bihar, Vir Chakra, Posthumous
- Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous
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Memorial of Operation Vijay![]()
Kargil War memorial, built by the Indian Army, is located in Dras, in the foothills of the Tololing Hill. The memorial, located about 5 km from the city centre across the Tiger Hill, commemorates the martyrs of the Kargil War. A poem "Pushp Kii Abhilasha"[164] (= Wish of a Flower) by Makhanlal Chaturvedi, a renowned 20th century neo-romantic Hindi poet, is inscribed on the gateway of the memorial greets visitors. The names of the soldiers who lost their lives in the War are inscribed on the Memorial Wall and can be read by visitors. A museum attached to the Kargil War Memorial, which was established to celebrate the victory of ‘Operation Vijay’, houses pictures of Indian soldiers, archives of important war documents and recordings, Pakistani war equipments and gear, and official emblems of the Army from the Kargil war.A giant national flag, weighing 15 kg was hoisted at the Kargil war memorial to commemorate the 13th anniversary of India’s victory in the war.[165]
References
- Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil the CCC Kargil Project.
- Kargil Conflict (GlobalSecurity.org)
- Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella (RAND Corporation)
- War in Kargil (Center for Contemporary Conflict) PDF download
- Essay on the outcomes of the Kargil War
- Stephen P. Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1502-1.
- Kargil Review Committee (2000). From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report. SAGE Publications. ISBN 0-7619-9466-1. (Executive summary of the report, Online)
- Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests? ACDIS Occasional Paper by Suba Chandran, Published 2004 by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois.
- An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999, by Shaukat Qadir, RUSI Journal, April 2002 (PDF)
- V.P. Malik (2006). Kargil; From Surprise to Victory. Harper Collins, New Delhi, India.
Indian literature on Kargil war
- M. K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-7099-734-8.
- Amarinder Singh (2001). A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999. Motibagh Palace, Patiala. ASIN: B0006E8KKW.
- Jasjit Singh (1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-86019-22-7.
- J. N. Dixit (2002). India-Pakistan in War & Peace. Books Today. ISBN 0-415-30472-5.
- Ranjan Kumar Singh. Sarhad Zero Mile. Parijat Prakashan. ISBN 81-903561-0-0.
- Mona Bhan. Counterinsurgency, Democracy and the Politics of Identity in India. Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series.
- Indian Armed Forces site on Kargil
- Animated timeline and other Kargil stories – India Today
- Impact of the conflict on civilians – BBC
- The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted – YaleGlobal Online
- Kargil Debacle: Musharraf's Time Bomb, Waiting to Explode
- Brief analysis of the Kargil conflict by Center for Strategic and International Studies (PDF)
- Kargil—nine years on The News International, Pakistan
- POSTCARD USA: Kargil, Kargil everywhere – Pakistan's Daily Times
- Pakistan's lessons from its Kargil War
- Video of Pakistani PoWs from the conflict
- Video – Tiger hill, Kargil hill's turning point
- Video of Indian army handling over bodies of Pakistani soldiers to Pak army
- India Pakistan 1999 Kargil war documentary
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This audio file was created from a revision of the "Kargil War" article dated 2006-08-10, and does not reflect subsequent edits to the article. (Audio help)KARGIL WAR 15 YEARS ONHow the initiative at sea was seizedThe role of the Indian Navy in the Kargil war has not been talked about much. The former Navy Chief gives a first-hand account of the Navy’s Operation Talwar as the Kargil conflict unfolded
Admiral Sushil KumarVERY little has been spoken or written about what the Indian Navy did during the Kargil conflict of 1999. In fact, it is largely believed and mistakenly so, that the Indian Navy played no role at all. While the Army and Air Force undoubtedly played a stellar role and won the war for us, the Navy, albeit on the sideline, made a silent but significant contribution. And this is a first-hand account of how the Kargil conflict unfolded and what the Navy’s Operation Talwar was all about. I recall the initial phase of how the Kargil conflict began. As the Navy Chief, I was also officiating as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee since General Ved Malik, the Army Chief, was abroad on an assignment.![Specialist hydrographic survey teams of the Indian Navy were conjoined with the Army’s artillery batteries to pin-point gun locations]()
Specialist hydrographic survey teams of the Indian Navy were conjoined with the Army’s artillery batteries to pin-point gun locations.![The three Chiefs of the Services during the Kargil war: (From left) Admiral Sushil Kumar, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis and General Ved Prakash Malik]()
The three Chiefs of the Services during the Kargil war: (From left) Admiral Sushil Kumar, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis and General Ved Prakash MalikThe reports that first came in were quite vague and hazy. They alluded to stray incidents along the Line of Control with Pakistan. There was also a report of an Indian Army patrol that had not returned and of shepherds having seen strangers on our side of the Line of Control (LoC). Despite the uncertain nature of these reports, the Army was understandably concerned and requested for air effort by way of armed reconnaissance. At that stage, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis, the Air Chief, quite rightly advised, that hastily inducting the Indian Air Force may send the wrong signal. With scanty reports available, the situation was confused and seemed to be only a minor border incident in an area that had always been regarded as no-man’s land.More than a border incidentBy the time General Malik returned from his trip abroad, it became clear that the incursion on the Himalayan border in the Kargil sector was not just a mere border incident. Not only was the extent of the Pakistani intrusion very vast but it also appeared that something sinister was afoot. The manner in which the intruders had entrenched themselves on our side of the LoC, in well-prepared concrete bunkers at strategically commanding locations, clearly showed that this was a well-planned manoeuvre that had been executed over a carefully calculated time frame. There was no doubt that Pakistani treachery had caught us by surprise. Promptly, the Indian Government swung into action and gave the Indian Armed Forces a clear-cut directive: Evict the intruders. But do not cross the LoC was the Prime Minister’s diktat which proved to be a diplomatic masterstroke. This was the start up for Operation Vijay. For Navymen like me who had been around during the India-Pakistan war of 1965, the lasting memory had always been of the mischief carried out by the Pakistan Navy at sea. When all attention had been on the land war, a couple of Pakistan Navy destroyers had sneaked in one night and lobbed a few shells onto a deserted beach on the Gujarat coast. Ever since then, the Pakistan Navy has celebrated that event as “Pakistan Navy Day.”By early June 1999, as our Army and Air Force were preparing for action on the LoC, task forces of the Indian Navy’s Western Fleet had already been deployed to their battle stations — to seize the initiative at sea. With the situation getting tense, it was at an important war council briefing that the Prime Minister reiterated his Directive of not crossing the LoC.Operational constraintFor the Army and Air Force this was surely an operational constraint but not so for the Navy, as we always operate in international waters anyway. Moreover, coercive diplomacy has always been the Navy’s forte and the tactic of exerting pressure from over the horizon has always been a well- tested strategy referred to as gunboat diplomacy from Nelsonian times.We realised that the Indian Navy’s forward deployment had certainly had the desired effect when we learnt that Pakistan had frantically started escorting its oil tankers at sea, for this indeed was their lifeline for survival.By the middle of June, the Army and Air Force had scaled up their operations. With tension mounting, the situation looked as though it would escalate beyond a border conflict. At this time the Navy’s Operational Commanders re-appreciated the situation and decided to prepare for hostilities. The Navy’s Eastern Fleet from the Bay of Bengal was rapidly mobilised and deployed in strength to the Arabian Sea.And so as the operations on the Himalayan heights at Tololing and Tiger Hill reached a crescendo, the Indian Navy remained poised with both fleets in full readiness. As we approached what seemed like the precautionary stage for war, operation orders for combat were issued with the rules of engagement clearly defined for commanders at sea. This was a very important threshold for us. The codename assigned was Operation Talwar.The silent force![]()
By the middle of June, the Army and Air Force had scaled up operations. The situation looked as though it would escalate beyond a border conflict. The Navy’s Operational Commanders re-appreciated the situation and decided to prepare for hostilities .![]()
The Navy’s Eastern Fleet from the Bay of Bengal was rapidly mobilised and deployed in strength to the Arabian Sea .![]()
As the operations on the Himalayan heights at Tololing and Tiger Hill reached a crescendo, the Indian Navy remained poised with both fleets in full readiness.![]()
As we approached the precautionary stage for war, operation orders for combat were issued with the rules of engagement clearly defined for commanders.![]()
We knew Pakistan Navy was on the defensive when we monitored a special message from the Pakistan Navy high command to all their warships. Threat of nuclear retaliationIt was around this time that Pakistani generals started resorting to threats of nuclear retaliation. Much of it was rhetoric but it could not be dismissed altogether, as we were obviously dealing with a desperate foe whose misadventure had been exposed, through recovered Pakistani documents and captured prisoners of war. By the end of June 1999, full-scale hostilities seemed imminent. At a crucial tri-Service briefing, the Army Chief General Ved Malik issued an advisory for the Indian Armed Forces — you better prepare for war, be it declared or otherwise. We in the Navy were fully armed and ready for battle.Here I must add that while our task forces were well poised; we had our fingers crossed. Our warships were vulnerable with no Anti-Missile Defence (AMD) against the Pakistan Navy’s deadly Harpoon Exocet sea-skimming missiles. It was a serious vulnerability but the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command, Vice Admiral Madhavendra Singh, and I had taken stock of the situation. There is always the fog of war and the adversary may not be entirely aware of the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, we had deployed in preponderant strength and our strike forces were aggressively poised. It certainly had the desired effect. We knew that the Pakistan Navy had gone on the defensive when we monitored a special message from the Pakistan Navy high command to all their warships ‘Remain in harbour’.Seizing the initiative at seaThe signal from the Pakistani Naval (PN) Headquarters said it all and that day, at the briefing for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, I informed my colleagues that the Indian Navy had achieved what it had set out to do. We had seized the initiative at sea. Tri-Service cooperation had many facets during the Kargil operations and the Navy was able to chip in where needed. The Navy’s squadron of specially equipped electronic warfare aircraft operated extensively along the Line of Control in support of land operations. Specialist hydrographic survey teams of the Indian Navy were conjoined with the army’s artillery batteries to pin-point gun locations. But all this is trivia compared to the overall canvas of tri-service understanding and cooperation that Kargil 1999 portrayed. Many too are the lessons that the Kargil conflict has brought forth. Most important of all being that the Indian Armed Forces have the natural ability and resilience to face adversity when the chips are down. Kargil had caught us by surprise, yet motivated by the Government, the Armed Forces turned the tables onto the Pakistani intruders.Force-multiplying effectWhat Kargil also demonstrated was that when the Service Chiefs are in sync everything falls into place with a force-multiplying effect. General Malik, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis and I had trained together initially at the National Defence Academy as young cadets while still in our teens. In later years we served together on various operational and staff assignments and we also had the opportunity to serve concurrently as Vice Chiefs of our respective service.When Kargil erupted we finally came together as the three Service Chiefs of the Indian Armed Forces. All this certainly mattered and was in sharp contrast to what happened on the other side of the border.Undoubtedly, students of military history will remember Kargil as an operation conducted on the snowy Himalayan heights where the Indian Army and the IAF brought glory to the country. The role that the Indian Navy played during Kargil may yet remain lost as a footnote. But that is the way navies operate anyway; over the horizon and unseen. Perhaps, that is the reason why the Navy has always been known worldwide, as the silent service.The writer was the Navy Chief during the Kargil warhttp://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140724/edit.htm#7
