India’s Nuclear doctrine: Thorium-based nuclear reactors and protection of thorium reserves
Do not reveal what you have thought upon doing, but by wise counsel keep it secret being determined to carry it into execution -- CHANAKYA NITI-SASTRA
Outline of a Thorium-based Nuke doctrine
A 2005 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency discusses potential benefits along with the challenges of thorium reactors and possibility of converting existing rectors to be thorium-based. (Thorium fuel cycle — Potential benefits and challenge", IAEA, May 2005) Full text: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
Thorium reserves of the country account for roughly one-third of the world reserves. A stable, sustainable and autonomous programme can be accomplished using these reserves for India and for countries of Indian Ocean Community.
• All existing nuclear reactors should be converted to be thorium-based
• All proposed nuclear reactors should be thorium-based
• Thorium (monazite) reserves should be safeguarded for the benefit of India and countries of Indian Ocean Community
Imperative of resumption of atomic tests
Simultaneously, atomic tests should be resumed to prove the effectiveness of the transmutation processes of Plutonium 239 and Uranium 233 generated in the three-stage thorium processes and to continuously validate the simulation models of effectiveness of transmuted nuclear materials.
The imperative of test is proven by the following statistics of tests conducted by nuclear powers of the world.
• USA: 1054 (1945-1992)
• Soviet Union: 715 (1949-1990)
• UK: 45 (1952-1963)
• France: 210 (1960-1996)
• China: 45 (1964-1996)
• India: 6 (1974-1998)
• Pakistan: 6 (1983-1998)
• N. Korea: 3 (2006-2013)
Potential for India’s nuclear leadership in Indian Ocean Region
India can take leadership role (by playing a catalytic role) in Indian Ocean Community countries offering to share with them our science and technology competence AND, as necessary, thorium reserves which are more than 33% of the world reserves. India can take over leadership of thorium nuke technology.
The decision of DAE to issue 20 Jan. 2006 notification opening up thorium-yielding atomic minerals to Open General Licence is perhaps linked to the Indo-US nuclear deal announced in June 2005. This notification should be nullified by the next Government and a new thorium-based nuclear doctrine announced with the necessary resumption of atomic tests.
Need to safeguard the country’s thorium reserves
The notification of Jan. 2006 transferring almost all atomic minerals to Open General License is ILLEGAL because the Atomic Minerals list in the Mines Act (No. 67 of 1957) which lists atomic minerals has not so far been amended. Any notification related to atomic minerals should have been issued only after the 1957 Act was amended by Parliament.
Since Parliament has NOT approved any amendment, the notification should have been withdrawn FORTHWITH.
As a consequence of the illegal Jan. 2006 notification, Dept. of Atomic Energy has stopped monazite clearance certification leading to the disturbing inference that DAE is a party to the ongoing loot and export of placer sand minerals. Local sources in Tamilnadu coastline note that that small trawlers are used in Gulf of Mannar to reach the mineral sands to Trincomalee and handed over for further transport to China. There are cases pending in Madurai Bench of Madras HC of illegal transport of monazite (thorium-containing placer sands).
Now the situation has reached a ridiculous state. IREL has been bypassed and almost the entire coromandel coast from Vizag downwards has been handed over by AP Govt. to a private miner. IREL stocks of Monazite (in Orissa/Puri silos) will be handed over to Toyota Tsusho allegedly to extract rare earth minerals. One can only guess on what controls exist to ensure that thorium is returned to IREL/DAE. This agreement of AP Govt. should be annulled FORTHWITH. Now it is known that AP has over 30% of the nation's monazite reserves.
Why should India get rid of her rich atomic minerals and rare earths by exports, of atomic minerals and rare earths without proper study of indigenous use and to promote the nuclear programme of the country?
Protection of atomic minerals and rare earths
To start with, we have to stem the rot of ongoing thorium loot by instituting joint army command to protect the nation’s rare earth reserves including monazite and other thorium-yielding atomic mineralsand then revisit Homi Bhabha's 3-stage nuke programme in the context of the Indo-US Nuke deal. A thorium reactor programme should be put on fast-track INDEPENDENT of and IN ADDITION to the slow pace of fast breeder reactor work under the 3-stage sequence. This parallel action of setting up a thorium reactor division in DAE will ensure India's leadership in the thorium reactor arena, in particular and as nuclear power in general in the comity of nations.
Imperative of nuclear energy to propel economic growth
Indo-US nuclear deal is premised on the inevitability of use of nuclear power to meet the growing energy needs of the nation till 2020 to match the growth in the manufacturing sector at a consistent annual growth rate of about12% per annum.
The 1998 Pokharan blast awakened the world to India’s technological potential as a responsible nuclear power. Similar re-assertion of India’s global strategic role as an economic power can be achieved by declaring an indigenous thorium-base nuclear energy programme founded on the three-stage thorium fuel cycle and taking advantage of the technological developments and opportunities to use thorium as a source of nuclear energy, exploring options such as Molten Salt Reactors. This leads to the imperative of India’s responsibility as a nuclear power to protect and safeguard the thorium reserves of the country which exceed over 33% of the world total, making India a pre-eminent leader in thorium-based nuclear technology. This has to be realized by enunciating a clear, unambiguous nuclear doctrine of building up the nation’s nuclear arsenal utilizing the nation’s indigenous uranium resources and in tune with comparable developments and military-posturing of other Asian powers. As a first step in protecting and preserving the nation’s thorium reserves, India should be a catalytic agent for constitution of an Indian Ocean Community (IOC) which will be fully supported by India’s nuclear, space and other technologies and founded the tenets of dharma-dhamma in the comity of nations to make IOC a counterpoise to the European Community.
India’s current thermonuclear designs emphasize plutonium-based devices supplemented as necessary by deuterium, tritium, and lithium deuteride. (Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 478–481, 487–490). [Ashley J. Tellis has been a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He was on assignment to the U.S. Department of State as Senior Adviser to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, during which time he was intimately involved in negotiating the civilian nuclear agreement with India.]
While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 33% of the world's known and economically viable thorium. ("Information and Issue Briefs – Thorium". World Nuclear Association.) India possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves ("UIC Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper No. 75 – Supply of Uranium". Uranium Information Center. Archived from the original on April 27, 2006)Our uranium reserves are very limited, adequate only 100 to 10,000 MW of first generation of uranium fuel reactors. This is the limiting value for our Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors.These reactors will produce enough plutonium which can go through the stages of reaching the fast breeder reactor stage which will convert thorium to Uranium 233.
It is clear that India can develop a nuclear arsenal through her native resources alone, generating between 16,180 and 18,306 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient to add some 2,697–3,051 nuclear weapons to the inventory.
“The primary weapons-grade plutonium producing facilities in the Indian nuclear estate would thus require a total of some 938–1088 MTU to sustain New Delhi’s strategic program during their operational lives. During this period, these facilities would be able to produce some 840–976 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium that, assuming 6 kilograms for each simple fission device, results in an aggregate inventory of some 200–250 weapons if India’s current stockpile is included. An arsenal of this size, which many in India believe would suffice for its deterrence requirements, can therefore be produced through its dedicated research reactors alone using a tiny fraction—about one-fiftieth—of India’s reasonably assured reserves of uranium...inventory of natural uranium required to sustain the PHWRs associated with both the current power program and the weapons program over the entire notional lifetime of the reactors involved—some 14,640–14,790 MTU—is well within even the most conservative valuations of India’s reasonably assured reserves of some 54,636 tons of uranium.” (Tellis, Ashley. "Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal", p. 22-23).
Thorium ore typically contains 0.30 percent uranium. As a byproduct of processing monazite, uranium can be produced.
Thorium has to be converted to Uranium 233 to become a nuclear fuel. In the final state, thorium and Uranium 233 produced by the thorium will run the reactors. This stage will mean that we will be released from the need to use plutonium and natural uranium. This thorium-based nuclear fuel cycle will ensure a self-sufficient system for the country’s energy needs.
This three-stage programme can generate upto 350,000 MW of electricity by thorium utilization.
The first stage of the programme uses Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) fuelled by natural uranium, and light water reactors, to produce plutonium.
In the second stage, fast neutron reactors burn the plutonium to breed U-233 from thorium. The second stage, comprising of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) are fuelled by mixed oxide of Uranium238 and Plutonium239, recovered by reprocessing of the first stage spent fuel. In FBRs, Plutonium239 undergoes fission producing energy, and producing Plutonium239 by transmutation of Uranium238. Thus the FBRs produce energy and fuel, hence termed Breeders. FBRs produce more fuel than they consume. Over a period of time, Plutonium inventory can be built up by feeding Uranium238.
Thorium232, which constitutes world’s third largest reserves in India, is not fissile therefore needs to be converted to a fissile material, Uranium233, by transmutation in a fast breeder reactor. This is to be achieved through second stage of the program, consisting of commercial operation of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs).
In the second stage, once sufficient inventory of Plutonium239 is built up, Thorium232 will be introduced as a blanket material to be converted to Uranium233.
In the third stage, advanced heavy water reactors (AHWRs) utilize the mix to generate two-thirds of the power from thorium itself.
This sequential three-stage program is based on a closed fuel cycle, where the spent fuel of one stage is reprocessed to produce fuel for the next stage. The closed fuel cycle thus multiplies manifold the energy potential of the fuel and greatly reduces the quantity of waste generated.
The design for an Advanced Heavy Water Reactor using thorium is now ready. Using this design and also importing Molten Salt reactor alternatives to use thorium, India’s nuclear programme can be restated to achieve indigenization of nuclear resource use by 2020 producing two-thirds of the nation’s energy needs.
Notice from this cable that USA opposes thorium based reactors in India.
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10NEWDELHI326_a.html
Wonder if this has anything to do with the killing of Indian scientists! Indian nuclear establishment needs to STOP meeting Americans ASAP in the interest of their own safety.
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10NEWDELHI326_a.html
Wonder if this has anything to do with the killing of Indian scientists! Indian nuclear establishment needs to STOP meeting Americans ASAP in the interest of their own safety.
Also, the role of NYT journalists and Ford Foundation must be probed in the deaths of scientists.
Kalyanaraman
| NUCLEAR SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE DISCUSSIONS IN MUMBAI | |
2010 February 22, 13:53 (Monday) | 10NEWDELHI326_a |
CONFIDENTIAL | CONFIDENTIAL |
-- Not Assigned -- | 8090 |
-- Not Assigned -- | TEXT ONLINE |
ENRG - Economic Affairs--Energy and Power | IN - India | KNNP - Nuclear Non-Proliferation | NSC - National Security Council | PARM - Political Affairs--Arms Controls and Disarmament | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PK - Pakistan| PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations | PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | |
-- Not Assigned -- | TE |
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- | -- Not Assigned -- |
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B. NEW DELHI 00205 Classified By: POL Minister Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 1. C) SUMMARY: U.S. and Indian interagency delegations met on the margins of the Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group (CNEWG) meeting in Mumbai Feb 3-4 to discuss collaboration on a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence (COE). Continuing discussions on proposals that had been tabled previously, the Indians outlined an Indian Center that contained elements of both proposals. Under the Indian proposal, U.S. involvement in the center would be to promote best practices for regulatory and physical security of existing nuclear processes and materials. India's proposal focused on setting up a research and development center dedicated to the world-wide deployment of technologies based on a purportedly proliferation-resistant thorium fuel cycle. It also contained some elements related to the physical security of facilities. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chair noted that the creation of their center was an Indian initiative that would not depend on U.S. involvement, underscoring that they envisioned the establishment of a sustainable institution rather than a medium-term cooperative project. DAE welcomed U.S. and IAEA participation on an international advisory panel, but did not further elaborate on a U.S. role. Though the Indian proposal did not fully meet the U.S vision for a COE, it demonstrated initiative and a welcome openness to serious engagement with the United States on cooperative nuclear security training and research programs. Both delegations agreed to look for ways to work together on elements common to both proposals. END SUMMARY. Two Visions for a Center of Excellence - - - 2. (C) An interagency delegation, led by the National Security Council, met on the margins of the Civil Nuclear Working Group (CNWG) in Mumbai February 4 to discuss possibilities for collaboration on a U.S.-India Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security (COE). The Indian delegation, led by Dr. Ravi Grover of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), also included Amandeep Singh Gill, Director of the Ministry of External Affairs' Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division. The U.S. proposal envisioned a focus on best practices and training on physical security, targeting an international audience of operators, regulators, security management, inspectors and response force personnel. The aim was to announce the intention to collaborate on such a center with the Indian Government at the Nuclear Security Summit April 10-11 in Washington. The Indian initiative, titled "Center of Excellence for Worldwide Deployment of Nuclear Energy," represented a different vision emphasizing instead the promotion of purportedly proliferation-resistant thorium fuel cycles with a strong emphasis on research and development. India's Vision: Worldwide Deployment Center - - - 3. (C) The Worldwide Deployment Center described by DAE would comprise four schools. The main school would be dedicated to the design and analysis of nuclear energy systems to promote the worldwide deployment of thorium-based reactors which they claimed would be intrinsically proliferation resistant. The focus on proliferation-proof thorium fuel plays to India's long-term leadership aspiration regarding thorium. When questioned on the matter, however, Dr. Grover accepted the center could consider "other proposed systems." The remaining three schools would have a component base for training and research on nuclear security including simulation, physical security, radiation measurement, protection devices, and radiation technology applications. These issues have some overlap with the topic areas of the proposed U.S. COE. Discussion of engagement on these issues was a new and welcome development, a change from India's prior resistance to discussing collaboration on training and research. 4. (C) Grover emphasized that sustainability was the "key" to the Worldwide Deployment Center. He underscored the priority DAE placed on creating a center that could attract top-quality researchers who would not see a posting to the center as a dead-end job. DAE had a vision of a composite NEW DELHI 00000326 002 OF 002 center that could be a fertile think-tank about more than just nuclear security. Grover underscored that the Deployment Center would be an Indian government body, staffed by the DAE, whose primary focus was research and development. The Center would include visiting scientists, scholars and an international advisory board, including U.S. and IAEA representatives, to consult on programs and training curricula. However, how this international participation would work in practice was left unclear in the discussion. Cooperation Apart from Thorium - - - 5. (C) The U.S. delegation stressed that the United States did not support thorium research, nor could U.S. involvement be construed as an endorsement of the commercial promotion of thorium-based reactors. In response, Grover implied that the DAE already had the funding it needed to establish such a center and was in the process of scouting land near Delhi on which to locate the center. In a later off-line discussion, DISA Director Gill suggested that the money for the Deployment Center was not in place, leaving a door open for possible collaboration. Grover seemed open to collaboration on training conducted at the center even if the United States was not involved in the main thorium component of the center. The U.S. delegation promised to develop U.S. views on the thorium focus of the center, although it was not part of the original COE vision and the commercial deployment and promotion aspects of the program could likely not be endorsed by the United States. 6. (C) The U.S. delegation representative from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission noted that the Indian proposal made no mention of the role of regulation in nuclear security. Grover made clear that Indian regulators had not been consulted about the COE, but offered to inquire whether regulatory issues might be included in the curriculum. The DAE planned to announce the construction of the center at the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in April and asked that the U.S. welcome the announcement. In a sidebar discussion U.S. delegation representatives underscored that in addition to potential concerns about the thorium component of the proposal, the project title "Worldwide Deployment" could be problematic in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit. Meeting with Rao - - - 7. (C) In subsequent meetings on the sidelines of the Sous-Sherpa Summit in the Hague February 12-13, the President's Nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gary Samore held a bilateral meeting with Foreign Secretary Rao in which the Indians continued their productive and helpful partnership on these issues. In their discussion, FS Rao helpfully referred to the proposed center as a "National Nuclear Center" rather than a "Worldwide Deployment" center. Recognizing that it would be India's center, the U.S. delegation again raised its concern about the research and development piece of the center being too narrowly focused on thorium, and suggested that India would attract a larger and potentially higher caliber of scientists it were more expansive. Rao underscored that India would like to announce the Center during the Summit and then work with the United States on details for the collaboration in advance of President Obama's visit to India. In a separate conversation at the Hague, DISA Director Gill, stated that India would provide the U.S. with an updated proposal based on these discussions. ROEMER
Protecting monazite reserves of Indian placer sands
- Cancel the DAE notification of 26 January 2006 which declared Atomic minerals as Open General Licence minerals
- Nationalise all stockpiles with private licencees
- Instruct the state governments to cancel the licenses issued to all private parties for mining in and/or export of placer sands all along the Indian coast
- Cancel the AP Government MOUs of December 2006 with private agencies and hand over mining licences to Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL)
- Declare Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) a PSU under DAE as the only agency authorized to mine in placer sands
- Review all shipments of placer sands during the last 6 years from January 2006 to evaluate the losses of resources (Note the Gagan Singh Bedi committee set up in Tamilnadu after the cancelling of mining leases of placer sands in Tamil Nadu; the report is still awaited for all districts in addition to Tirunelveli/Tuticorin)
- Review agreement with Toyota Tsoshu for Rare Earths including the handing over of monazite held in IREL silos. No monazite should be handed over to Toyota Tsoshu and all monazite should be retained by DAE for the country’s nuclear energy programme.
- Issue Geiger counters to all port authorities to ensure that no radioactive monazite is exported illicitly in shipments
- Alert the coast guard to watch out for smuggling of placer sands containing radioactive monazite consignments
- Hand over the security of the placer sand zones containing heavy concentrations of monazite to the control of a Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Command
- Institute a Thorium Energy Division in DAE to fast-track the researches into monazite and fast-track thorium-based nuclear energy program for the country. This can be on the lines of the mega 17.3b. dollar deal between nuclear giant AREVA and chemical giant SAVOY.
- Institute a study by DAE to convert existing reactors to use thorium-based nuclear fuel
- Fast track the Fast Breeder Reactor program of DAE within the three-stage nuclear development programme (called Homi Bhabha programme)
- Explore cooperation with countries of Indian Ocean Rim states for sharing thorium nuclear technology of India
- Institute a Minerals and Minining Regulatory Authority on the lines of the Telecom Regulatory Authority to control and monitor the sustainable development of the nation’s mineral resources
- Implement Shah Commission recommendations for placer sand minerals
- Review Indo-US Nuclear deal in the context of a change in nuclear doctrine to promote thorium-based nuclear energy.
- All present and future contracts for nuclear reactors should be so designed as to include an option for the use of thorium as nuclear fuel.
A blueprint for fast-tracking Thorium Reactor programme in India
See: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2013/09/thorium-nuclear-reactors-on-fast-track.html Thorium nuclear reactors on fast-track for India’s energy security
The thorium reactors can be rapidly commissioned in India with little or no modification to the existing reactors used to produce electricity.
I suggest that Nuclear Corporation of India and BHAVINI be given the responsibility to activate the use of thorium fuel cycle in four selected reactors for this thorium reactor programme which can be achieved in the next 4 to 6 months.
This should be independent of and complementary to the 3-stage nuclear programme of the country. The objective is to achieve production of 2/3rd electricity from thorium fuel in the selected reactors.
A separate Thorium division should be set up in DAE to work with NCI and BHAVINI to carry forward the time-bound programme, to demonstrate to the world the technological competence of Indian nuclear scientists for leadership role in the use of thorium fuel cycle.
Thorium division of DAE should be charged with the responsibility to evaluate alternative design options for further augmentation of the thorium reactors in the country using alternatives such as Molten Salt breeder reactors (MSBRs) whose efficiencies have been proven. The Thorium Division of DAE should also explore avenues for collaboration and cooperation with the countries of Indian Ocean Community to share the technologies possessed by Indian scientists in the areas of nuclear fuel fabrication, nuclear reactors, nuclear power generation and space technology.
Framework for the thorium nuclear reactors of India
Thorium cycles are feasible in all existing thermal and fast reactors, e.g., Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), Liquid Metal cooled fast breeder reactor (LWRs)[including WWERs especially Light-water Thorium Reactor (WWER--T)], High temperature gas cooled reactors(HTGRs), Molten Salt breeder reactors (MSBRs) and in Accelerator Driven System (ADS).
It should be possible to incorporate the thorium cycle in some of the existing reactors without major modifications in the engineered systems, reactor control and the reactivity devices. (IAEA, 2005, p.5)
It is possible to incinerate weapons-grade plutonium (WPu) in combination with thorium in light-water reactors of WWER-1000 type type to burn and not breeed 239Pu. For this, mixed thorium plutonioum oxide, containing ~~5% PuO2, could be used as driver fuel. The exclusion of uranium from fuel composition results in an essential increase in the rate of plutonium incineration compared to the use of standard mixed uranium plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. The spent mixed thorium plutonioum oxide on achieving the standard burnup (~~40 MW days/kg HM) of LWR fuel is not only degraded in terms of WPu content but also becomes 'proliferation-resistance' with the formation of 232U, which has very strong gamma emitting daughter products. (IAEA, 2005, p.10)
The stock of civil plutonium could be significantly decreased by using the same in combination with thorium in WWER-1000 type reactors. A direct replacemet of low enriched uranium oxide fuel is possible by mixed thorium plutonium oxide fuel without any major modifications of core and reactor operation. In such a reactor, there is no need to use burnable absorber in the form of gadolinium, integrated into the fuel. The 240Pu isotope, present in significant quantities in civilian grade plutonium, is a good burnable absorber. (IAEA, 2005, p.11)
Both weapons Pu and civilian Pu could be efficiently disposed in combination with thorium as mixed throium plutonium oxide containing 20 to 30% PuO2 in commercial LMFBRs. In small LMFBR cores, like the demonstration type FBTR in India, the PuO2 content in (Th,Pu)O2 fuel could be much higher and in the range of 70 to 80%. (IAEA, 2005, p.11)
To overcome the constraints imposed by Nuclear Suppliers' Group for supply of uranium/plutonium to India -- even despite the Indo-US Nuclear Deal -- the plutonium/uranium released from the throium nuclear reactors can be augment the needs of Fast Breeder Reactor Programmes under the 3-stage nuclear programme of India.
The goal to be achieved is thus simple, feasible and dramatic. Two-third nuclear power production from thorium nuclear reactors will come from thorium fuel, using India's indigenous thorium reserves, thus conserving scarce uranium/plutonium nuclear fuels.
http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/te_1450_web.pdf
See: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2013/09/thorium-nuclear-reactors-on-fast-track.html Thorium nuclear reactors on fast-track for India’s energy security
The thorium reactors can be rapidly commissioned in India with little or no modification to the existing reactors used to produce electricity.
I suggest that Nuclear Corporation of India and BHAVINI be given the responsibility to activate the use of thorium fuel cycle in four selected reactors for this thorium reactor programme which can be achieved in the next 4 to 6 months.
This should be independent of and complementary to the 3-stage nuclear programme of the country. The objective is to achieve production of 2/3rd electricity from thorium fuel in the selected reactors.
A separate Thorium division should be set up in DAE to work with NCI and BHAVINI to carry forward the time-bound programme, to demonstrate to the world the technological competence of Indian nuclear scientists for leadership role in the use of thorium fuel cycle.
Thorium division of DAE should be charged with the responsibility to evaluate alternative design options for further augmentation of the thorium reactors in the country using alternatives such as Molten Salt breeder reactors (MSBRs) whose efficiencies have been proven. The Thorium Division of DAE should also explore avenues for collaboration and cooperation with the countries of Indian Ocean Community to share the technologies possessed by Indian scientists in the areas of nuclear fuel fabrication, nuclear reactors, nuclear power generation and space technology.
Framework for the thorium nuclear reactors of India
Thorium cycles are feasible in all existing thermal and fast reactors, e.g., Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), Liquid Metal cooled fast breeder reactor (LWRs)[including WWERs especially Light-water Thorium Reactor (WWER--T)], High temperature gas cooled reactors(HTGRs), Molten Salt breeder reactors (MSBRs) and in Accelerator Driven System (ADS).
It should be possible to incorporate the thorium cycle in some of the existing reactors without major modifications in the engineered systems, reactor control and the reactivity devices. (IAEA, 2005, p.5)
It is possible to incinerate weapons-grade plutonium (WPu) in combination with thorium in light-water reactors of WWER-1000 type type to burn and not breeed 239Pu. For this, mixed thorium plutonioum oxide, containing ~~5% PuO2, could be used as driver fuel. The exclusion of uranium from fuel composition results in an essential increase in the rate of plutonium incineration compared to the use of standard mixed uranium plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. The spent mixed thorium plutonioum oxide on achieving the standard burnup (~~40 MW days/kg HM) of LWR fuel is not only degraded in terms of WPu content but also becomes 'proliferation-resistance' with the formation of 232U, which has very strong gamma emitting daughter products. (IAEA, 2005, p.10)
The stock of civil plutonium could be significantly decreased by using the same in combination with thorium in WWER-1000 type reactors. A direct replacemet of low enriched uranium oxide fuel is possible by mixed thorium plutonium oxide fuel without any major modifications of core and reactor operation. In such a reactor, there is no need to use burnable absorber in the form of gadolinium, integrated into the fuel. The 240Pu isotope, present in significant quantities in civilian grade plutonium, is a good burnable absorber. (IAEA, 2005, p.11)
Both weapons Pu and civilian Pu could be efficiently disposed in combination with thorium as mixed throium plutonium oxide containing 20 to 30% PuO2 in commercial LMFBRs. In small LMFBR cores, like the demonstration type FBTR in India, the PuO2 content in (Th,Pu)O2 fuel could be much higher and in the range of 70 to 80%. (IAEA, 2005, p.11)
To overcome the constraints imposed by Nuclear Suppliers' Group for supply of uranium/plutonium to India -- even despite the Indo-US Nuclear Deal -- the plutonium/uranium released from the throium nuclear reactors can be augment the needs of Fast Breeder Reactor Programmes under the 3-stage nuclear programme of India.
The goal to be achieved is thus simple, feasible and dramatic. Two-third nuclear power production from thorium nuclear reactors will come from thorium fuel, using India's indigenous thorium reserves, thus conserving scarce uranium/plutonium nuclear fuels.
http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/te_1450_web.pdf