Congress Party and Muslims - Part I
Girish
Congress Party was founded in 1885. From an elite organisation set up largely to discuss issues and concerns ‘natives’ with the rulers, in the early part of the twentieth century it evolved into a mass organisation seeking independence from those rulers, and articulating the views of all sections of the society. Here we examine the relationship of the party with one significant section of the society, viz Muslims.
The relationship of the Congress Party with Muslims can be divided into three distinct phases. The first attempt at co-opting them in the emerging mass movement started with the Party’s support for the Khilafat movement. This first phase can be called the Engagement Phase and can be said to have lasted until Independence.
Post Independence the needs of the party changed. This phase marked the attempt by the party to identify a particular role for them. The phase can be termed the Identity Phase and started to become weak in the late 1970s and finally died out in the 90s. The third phase can be said to be the Vote Bank phase. Although their value as a vote bank can be said to have started in the latter part of the Identification phase, crystallisation of their true value in this sense for Congress Party started only after the BJP came to power.
Pre-independence Phase: This phase marked the entry and participation of Muslims in the Congress Party’s programs. The party had four presidents who were Muslims until 1920, but little evidence of mass participation in its affairs by that community. Congress joined the Khilafat movement in 1920 and in 1921, Hakim Ajmal Khan, one of the founders of the Khilafat Committee was elected as its fifth Muslim President. Two years later Maulana Mohammed Ali was elected as President.
Many chroniclers identify Congress’ participation in Khilafat movement had two consequences: a) Estrangement of Jinnah and b) Muslim involvement in mass politics led by Congress. This initiative initiated the involvement of common Muslims in mainstream political action for the first time after the traumatic post-1857 experiences. Jinnah’s move to the UK and re-entry transformed as a crusader for Pakistan is too well known. The cause chosen, however, had nothing to do with the immediate concerns of Indian Muslims. Specific issues of the community, in particular that of the poorer Muslims were not taken up by the party. This could be understandable as the priority for the party then was to gain independence.
Post Independence Phase: In the first two decades following independence, Congress was practically the only national political force. It emerged as a broad coalition articulating the needs of all sections of the society. In that sense it never had the problem of having to protect its constituency. Congress’ dealings towards Muslims to a large extent were shaped by the Pakistan factor.
Significant sections of the party were not reconciled to partition. This prompted a desire to show Pakistan and by extension to the world, that Muslims were comfortable in India and that the two nation theory was flawed. Being a symbolic initiative, disproportionate effort was put in the superficial aspects – religious symbols, language, literature, and pop culture. Parsing identities (as other minorities have done) and integrating themselves with the national mainstream would have helped the Muslims economically and socially.
But this would have impacted the story vis-à-vis Pakistan. India would have had to face nitpickings from Pakistan that Muslims left in India had to compromise their identity to remain there. So rather than encourage them to parse their identity in terms of religion, culture, language, nation and engage with the others, the party preferred to showcase their separate identity for its own project.
For the elite it might not have mattered much, but poorer Muslims had to compromise a lot sociologically and economically for this effort of showmanship. Secularism as defined by Congress and clarified by the liberal elite provided the intellectual garb for this exercise.
In this phase although the Muslims voted for Congress, it was not dependent on them electorally. Since there was no real competitive political force, other interest groups including those representing majority interests were part of the Congress big tent. These interests served as a brake and restrained the party in the ‘secularisation’ exercise.
Their limited electoral dependence on the Muslims too provided no incentive for the party to move beyond these token gestures. Progressively the party internalised this so much that their version of Secularism became an ideology, and sought to consecrate it in the constitution in 1976. All through, the party took care to keep the definition of secularism fuzzy. Later when the 42nd / 44th amendments were being repealed, the party ensured that the term ‘secular’ was not defined explicitly.
The third Phase commenced with loss of power in 1989. Impetus for this started in 1967 when the party lost ground for the first time, but extraneous events ensured that the party bounced back in 1971-72, 1980, and 1984. On the ground however it steadily lost support. Significant chunks of social coalitions went out of its umbrella. From 1996, it was evident that even Muslims were going out its fold in major parts of the country.
With the emergence of the BJP as a potential ruling party the Muslims especially in the North opted for tactical voting to ensure BJP’s defeat by voting for whichever party had the potential to do so.
Ironically while this impacted BJP’s prospects, it significantly reduced the ‘power’ of their vote – any party that is capable of defeating the BJP tended be sure of the community’s support, thus incentivising them to take the community for granted. Sensing this, Congress started seeing them as a force capable of providing it with power and sustaining its grip on the same. To do this it has to – a) ‘outbid’ and defeat competing political parties, and b) project itself to be a party capable of winning the seat and hence power. Congress has started wooing them therefore with specific targeted offers.
In its dealings with Muslims, from merely co-opting to micro targeting benefits, Congress has come a long way.
One common element in each of the phases has been to stress the differences the community has with other components of the society. By extension one wonders if Congress really wanted Muslims to integrate with the national ethos. It suited them politically to keep them apart. It might be argued that for a minority, integrating to the extent possible (without necessarily compromising on what could be their defined core interests) with the majority community will be an expected route. That would also help them gain the benefits of a growing economy.
Indeed other minorities in the inherently multicultural India have done this. However Congress’ engagement with the Muslim community is characterised by its efforts to preserve, stress, and underline the differences although for different reasons from time to time. Consequently the party has benefited from them for these multiple purposes. How this has benefitted the Muslims will be a separate question!
Congress Party and Muslims - Part II
In part 1, we had checked out how the Congress Party has effectively kept the Muslims if India in ‘isolation’ using them to fulfil its political objectives.
It might be worthwhile to explore how this has affected Muslims. (The term ‘explore’ is used to admit that the subject requires a more detailed evaluation than what is attempted here!)
1. Solidified Political Islam: Here it is important to define Political Islam or Islamism. As against Islam which can be seen as a religion, a spiritual endeavour, where the human mind explores and seeks to connect with the Almighty, Political Islam or Islamism has far narrower objectives. Here we define it as use of (the adherents of) Islam to fulfil political objectives, more specifically to obtain political power and exercise the same. History is replete with examples where this has happened. One common element in all those examples is that irrespective of the starting point, it morphs into a race to purity and the ultimate winners are the religious intermediaries. Since the competition for support among adherents is based on religious principles, sooner or later relative purity becomes the de rigueur. As someone remarked, the ultimate result of all versions of Political Islam is Mullahcracy. We have plenty of examples from Iran to Egypt, with our own neighbour, Pakistan being a shining example of how it worked/ is working out.
Creation of Pakistan in 1947 after a period of Political Islamic activism might have lead many to believe that residual India may not see such a movement. Steps of Congress to micro target Muslims for political ends have on the other hand solidified this process.
Elections in a democracy are essentially to determine people’s representatives to wield temporal power. In a hypothetical situation, it may be perfectly okay to seek votes on religious basis to determine leader of a Jamaat or an Imam in a local mosque. Elections to the parliament, assembly or the local body are for totally different objectives. Voting on religious base warps the choice. In the long run, this degenerates into a race to extremity.
2. Aggressive Assertion of Identity Symbols: Which brings to the next aspect/ consequence. Islam is viewed by its adherents as a ‘way of life.’ There is stress on how things need to be done. One consequence of this is a lot of emphasis on external appearances. ( I have personally heard of discussions on how a bearded man is seen as a better believer than an unbearded one, a man wearing a shorter dish dash as more pious, a veiled woman is closer to god and so on) This may be perfectly all right in a religious setting. The spiritual quest often may need many such props. However in the setting of seeking voting support on religious basis, this leads to aggressive demarcation of ‘us and them’. This has two consequences, both related – a) progressive retreat into a zone of comfort, and b) progressive distancing from the ‘other’ on matters not germane to the point of difference. The difference between Muslims and the others may be restricted to religion but ends up extending beyond that.
3. Ghettoisation: The term ‘progressive retreat into a zone of comfort’ may incorporate the word ‘comfort’ but the reality may not be that positive. If that zone of comfort is characterised by inevitably increasing radicalisation, the people retreating effectively lose the support of rule of law. Not surprisingly the doctrinaire elements of the leadership talk of superiority of Shariah over the Constitution. Once one has signed away Constitutional protection in favour of something administered by the Ulema, it is difficult for the Constitution to come to their support.
4. Progressive Distancing from the Other: Unlike the medieval times, space and time are shrunk in modern societies. In particular in the urban world one is made to learn the rules of coexistence. One of the visible aspects of this distancing of the Muslims from the others is the difficulty faced by them is renting / buying property, especially in urban areas. The reverse is also true in many cases (I had read that a well respected BJP candidate in a parliamentary constituency in Tamil Nadu had rented a house for his election office. The local Jamaat pressurised the owner to take the house back. The owner complied and let the injunction supercede his personal friendship) Living together mandates acceptance and compromises on both sides. If one side is forced by its own eco system to reject compromises, then living together will become an issue.
5. Forcing them into artificial social constructs: Profiting from Muslim vote banks often requires stitching it with another social component (here caste). Thus we have the KHAM alliance, the MY alliance or the Ali- Coolie – Bengali construct. People familiar with Gujarat or Bihar can testify how natural these alliances are on the ground. Eventual rupturing of the alliances put the components in a spot. Given the distancing from the ‘other,’ a break leads to disappointment and eventual alienation from the process.
6. Agenda set by a small group: Increasingly it is becoming clear that the current idea of ‘secularism’ in India is a construct created and sustained by a small group of elite working on its own conceptualisation. It is also becoming clear that this elite and its conceptualisation is practically unconnected with the rest of the country (Exploring this would be a fascinating study, but would be a major digression from the current topic). Keeping the Muslims isolated fulfils the vision constructed and propagated by this elite. In the separate identities this elite sees syncretism, and evidence of its own openness.
However it is unclear how this conceptualisation benefits the Muslims. Consequently, while this elite may be okay with vote bank politics, the reality is the average Muslim has to live and work with the Ram Lal, Kishen Chand, or John, rather than Booker Winners or Tenured Professors in US Universities. Acceptance by the latter and resentment of the former does not help him or her one bit.
Pursuit of wealth, achieving progress on developmental and social indicators are all matters pertaining to the temporal world. Success for any group can be achieved only by dealing with others around, making compromises and working towards a greater, shared goal. Conflating these objectives with spiritual leads to warped results – particularly on the temporal front. Sops (like reservations) and circuses (subsidising pilgrimages) cannot alter the reality.
Congress’s efforts on Muslims have benefited it immensely, but are preventing the Muslims from seeking out and reaching a working social contract with others in the Republic.
http://centreright.in/2011/11/congress-party-and-muslims/