Saving archaeological heritage in Afghanistan -- Hans Curvers, ASOR blog

During a crisis or conflict, interventions first focus on emergency relief. Once the ‘post-conflict stage’ is reached, the focus shifts to reconstruction. As soon as peace and stability are restored, the exit strategy starts. A straightforward linear process. Where does archaeology fit in?

In the Afghan reality, however, there is no such linear process. Afghanistan is neither a ‘post conflict’ nor a ‘conflict’ state: it is both at the same time. In a country where tribal and personal power structures prevail, efforts are impeded not only by lack of capacity, but also by corruption and an absence of political will. Archaeology is no exception.

Over the past thirty years, Afghanistan’s archeological heritage has been severely damaged and looted; over 2800 archaeological and historical sites need protection. The illegal trafficking of cultural artifacts also constitutes an ongoing problem. UNESCO’s and ICOM’s (International Council of Museums) efforts have focused on the protection of Afghan antiquities, but the Afghan government lacks sufficient capacity to guard sites and prevent treasures from being smuggled abroad.

The Russian invasion in 1979 resulted in an exodus of archeologists and curators of the National Archeological Institute (NAI). Between 1992 and 1994 more than 70% of the Kabul National Museum’s artifacts were looted. During the Taliban regime (1996-2001), pre-Islamic art was specifically targeted and destroyed. The most prominent example remains the destruction of the two giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan, which were blown up not only because they were pre-Islamic, but also to manifest the Taliban’s power over the Hazara Shia majority in Bamiyan. As such, the Taliban perceived and used culture as a weapon of war.

A new Antiquities Law (2004) aimed at reinstalling care and respect for Afghanistan’s Archeological Heritage, but its application and enforcement is a big challenge. Development and politics have replaced war as the immediate threats to Afghanistan’s heritage.

The situation at Mes Aynak (2009 to date) may serve as a good example of the present status of archaeological heritage in Afghanistan. A 30-year concession to start mining copper and other mineral resources threatens a unique complex of ancient mining facilities and Buddhist monasteries, presenting an apparent dilemma between development and conservation. The stakeholders in the project span the full range from the World Bank, responsible for the overall development program, to the local tribal chief tasked with solving day to day problems among the work force.

Mes Aynak is located 40 kilometers southeast of Kabul, and archaeological remains are spread out over at least six square kilometers. Discovered in 1963 by a French geologist, the site along the ancient Silk Route includes Buddhist monasteries and temples, forts, residential areas and mines, dating from at least the first century BC through the 10th century AD. Sites at Mes Aynak have revealed a unique assortment of metal, glass, and wooden objects, as well as painted murals and sculpture. Archaeological remains reveal the unique meeting of the Hellenistic, Persian, Central Asian, Tibetan, Indian and Chinese worlds, reflecting Afghanistan’s position at the center of ancient trade routes.

The presence of immense copper deposits drew people in antiquity, as well as Soviet geologists during the 1970s. Today it is estimated that at least 5.5 million metric tons of copper worth perhaps $100 billion or more could be mined from the valley. Al Qaeda had a base in a Soviet mining tunnel, and after American forces pushed out the Taliban, looters began exploiting the site. In 2007 the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) paid $3 billion to lease the site for copper mining, which promises to provide hundreds of millions of dollars a year to the Afghan government in royalties: a clear challenge to use the resources wisely and create prosperity again.

The protection of cultural property and/or mitigation of the mining project’s impact at Mes Aynak is on the agenda of all stakeholders, at least nominally. Since 2010 the Délégation Archéologique Française en Afghanistan (DAFA) has partnered with the Ministry of Information and Culture, while World Bank funding allows the Program Management Units (implementation organizations that operate at the central, regional, and provincial levels) to engage teams of foreign archeologists to assist the national archeologists at Mes Aynak and develop plans for conservation. Approximately $10 million in project funding has been provided to date.

In 2010 DAFA provided an initial plan for excavation and conservation, so work could start. But the difficulties were many. To name just two basic examples, payment of worker salaries was haphazard and efficient security procedures for large numbers of workers entering the excavation were not in place; busses were checked over and over again due to a lack of coordination. Removal of land mines also continues in parts of the site.

We assume good intentions by all parties, but the reality is far removed from ‘best practices’. The World Bank sought assistance from UNESCO for DAFA to develop a comprehensive Archeological Management Plan (2013-2018), but UNESCO staff and consultants are generally unable to visit sites outside Kabul. DAFA’s financial means are insufficient and its presence on site is limited. Small matters, such as the lack of fuel for vehicles, consume much effort and can bring work to a halt.

And what to do with the wealth of excavated objects, for which no space is available in the Kabul Museum, even if fragile items could be safely transported there? The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) supervised the building of a large storage facility, for which they engaged a local contractor associated with the governor of Logar province: the same man who had allowed systematic plundering of the site before the mining concession. Storage of the objects on-site may ultimately serve him best.

The non-governmental organization Alliance for the Restoration of Cultural Heritage (ARCH) International, Inc., organized an expert meeting in June 2012 to address some of these concerns. Mining engineers and archeologists expressed fears about the application of such low standards. The concerns were then integrated into a Request for Inspection and submitted to the World Bank by Afghan citizens. But in the subsequent response the World Bank management pointed out that certain concerns are not its responsibility, since a commercial contract holds the government and the mining company accountable.

Agreements are not transparent, thus parties can get away blaming others. For example, the agreement between World Bank and government clearly states that Program Management Unit is ultimately responsible for monitoring the project. But the Program Management Unit saw its environmental consultant leave and also fired its coordinating archeologist. Both consultants complained about the lack of leverage with other stakeholders. It seems the Program Management Unit is the perfect construction for both the World Bank and Ministry of Mines to execute their plans while escaping responsibility.

The Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) is the operator of the mining project but has had no direct input into the archeological project. Monitoring progress at the site, they constantly pressed for faster completion. But at the same time, a recently provided MCC feasibility study reveals that mining work can only start in 2016 or later. Attempts to coordinate and conserve some of the sites are still on the agenda – in theory. In the meantime, poor security conditions have reduced the Chinese presence to a skeleton crew.

Afghanistan’s National Archeological Institute archeologists did not recognize the necessity for capacity building either by the experienced Afghan archeologists of the Academy of Sciences or by the international archeologists. Indeed they tended to perceive the latter as rivals, their presence as intrusive. To increase the number of local archeologists, freshly graduated students with no field experience were mobilized. While all these measures offered a temporary solution, they do not contribute to the development of necessary capacity.

Archeological heritage, and the threat to it, can only be understood in context. Politics and socio-economics should be included in order to attune proposals for assistance. The World Bank masterfully hides behind clauses and legal language, and Program Management Unit reports that archeological work is proceeding according to plan. In the meantime a long series of plans have been written and subsequently changed, but nobody knows which plan is being followed. Archaeologists and the Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture remain silent; the former because they fear expulsion from the project if they speak up, and the latter because it is much weaker than the Ministry of Mines or the local stakeholders.

A 2013 Program Management Unit report mentions the implementation of a program of documentation and archiving and refers to a conservation schedule. However, archeologists were given less than a month to wrap up their documentation. An archeological “report” controlled by administrators does not help to implement best practices at Mes Aynak. Today a core group of foreign archeologists monitors the progress on site, apparently without time pressure but still without a coherent plan.

Agreements can serve to define responsibilities but only if their implementation has realistic chances. Meanwhile, it is fruitless to speak of ‘lessons learned’ in a system where the principal function of reports is to cover up reality. Just mentioning achievements in statistics and not allowing for peer-review is a recipe for disaster. What remains is the hope that awareness of the prevailing low standards in Afghanistan may lead to insights and improvement, one day.