Quantcast
Channel: Bharatkalyan97
Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 11040

SoniaG UPA bid for unviable nuclear contract. Illegal DAE notification allowing OGL for atomic minerals

$
0
0

DAE, cancel and withdraw an illegal notification issued in January 2006.

DAE notification S.O. 61(E) of 18 January 2006, gazetted on 20 Jan. 2006 which revised the list of Prescribed substances, Prescribed equipment and Technology IS ILLEGAL.

Parliament has not approved the changes proposed in the list of Atomic Minerals in First Schedule of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

It was illegal to have issued and gazetted the DAE notification of 2006 WITHOUT FIRST ensuring approval of the Parliament to the proposed changes of the prescribed substances 
in Atomic Minerals under the Act.

DAE should IMMEDIATELY notify cancellation and withdrawal of the notification and prosecute action against those who have acted in contravention of the Rule of Law enunciated in the Act.
VP Raja, Addl. Secy, DAE letter of 2 Feb. 2006 to RK Sharma, Secy. General, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries
Section 2.1: Notification by the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, published in the Gazette of India (extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, sub-section (ii), dated 20th January, 2006).
The notification is illegal because the Act No. 67 of 1957 was NOT amended moving the selected list of Atomic Minerals in Part B of First Schedule of the Act to Open General Licence list, as Part C. Titanium bearing minerals and ores (ilmenite, rutile and leucoxene) continue to be listed as Atomic Minerals in part B of the First Schedule of Act No. 67 of 1957. See the Act No. 67 of 1957 (as amended upto 10th may 2012) at: http://mines.nic.in/writereaddata/Filelinks/e342d686_MMDR%20Act%201957.pdf issued by Controller-General, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, August 2012
Section 2: VP Raja, Addl. Secy, DAE letter of 2 Feb. 2006 to RK Sharma, Secy. General, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries

V.P. Raja, Additional Secretary, Govt. of India, Dept. of Atomic Energy, Anushakti Bhavan, Chhatrapti Shivaji Maharaj Marg, Mumbai 400001

2 Feb. 2006

D.O. No. 7/3(4)/2005-PSU/21

Dear Shri Sharma,
The Departmet of Atomic Energy vide its Notification S.O. 61(E) dated 18th January 2006, which has been gazette on 20th January 2006 has revised the list of Prescribed Substanes, Prescribed Equipment and Technology. This superseded the earlier notifications of the Department on the same subject dated 15th March 1995. A copy of the new notification is enclosed herewith.

Your attention I particular is drawn to Items 0A314 and 0A315 and the note thereunder.

Since this notification will have an impact on industries engaged in beach sand mining, you are kindly requested to bring this to the notice of all your members.

Ilmenite, Rutile, Leucoxene and Zircon will no longer be Prescribed Substances under the Atomic Energy Act with effect from 1st January 2007. Ilmenite, Rutile and Leucoxene will also get shifted from Part ‘B’ of the First Schedule to the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act 1957 to Part ‘C’ of the same Schedule. This change will become effective only after suitable amendments are carried out to the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulations) Act and passed by Parliament. However, Zirconium bearing minerals and ores including zircon will continue to be Atomic Minerals under Part ‘B’ of the First Schedule.

This is being brought to your notice as required under Section 4(2) of Right to Information Act, 2005.

With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Sd. V.P. Raja
Encl. As above.
Shri RK Sharma,
Secretary General, Federation of Indian Mineral Industries, 301, Bakshi House, 40-41, Nehru Place, New Delhi 110019

Tel. 022 22028328. Fax 022 22048476/22026726. Gram: ATOMERG email:raja@dae.gov.in

Illegal notification of 18 Jan. 2006 on Atomic Minerals and loot of Rs. 96,120 Crores worth Atomic Minerals - Complaints 
On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 4:34 PM, S. Kalyanaraman <kalyan97@gmail.com> wrote:
MINES AND MINERALS

(DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION) ACT, 1957

(No. 67 of 1957)

(As ammended up to 20th December, 1999)

[THE FIRST SCHEDULE

[See sections 4(3), 5(1), 7(2) and 8(2)]

SPECIFIED MINERALS

PART A. Hydro Carbons Energy Minerals

Coal and Lignite.
PART B. Atomic Minerals


Beryl and other beryllium-bearing minerals.
Lithium-bearing minerals.
Minerals of the "rare earths" group containing Uranium and Thorium.
Niobium-bearing minerals.
Phosphorites and other phosphatic ores containing Uranium.
Pitchblende and other Uranium ores.
[Titanium bearing minerals and ores (ilmenite, rutile and leucoxene)].
Tantallium-bearing minerals.
Uraniferous allanite, monazite and other thorium minerals.
Uranium bearing tailings left over from ores after extraction of copper and gold, ilmenite and other titanium ores.
[Zirconium bearing minerals and ores including Zircon].
PART C. Metallic and Non-Metallic Minerals

Asbestos.
Bauxite.
Chrome ore.
Copper ore.
Gold.
Iron ore.
Lead.
[ ]
Manganese ore.
Precious stones.
Zinc.]

MINES AND MINERALS

(DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION) ACT, 1957

(No. 67 of 1957)

(As ammended up to 20th December, 1999)


List Of Amending Act

An Act to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union.BE it enacted by Parliament in the Eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:

Preliminary (Section 1 - 3)
General Restrictions On Undertaking Reconnaissance, Prospecting And Mining Operations (Section 4 - 9A)
Procedure For Obtaining Reconnaissance Permits, Prospecting Licences Or Mining Leases in Respect of Land in Which the Minerals Vest in the Government (Section 10 - 12)
Rules For Regulating The Grant of Reconnaissance Permits, Prospecting Licences And Mining Leases (Section 13 - 16)
Special Powers of Central Government to undertake Reconnaissance, Prospecting or Mining Operations in Certain Cases (Section 17 - 17A)
Development of Minerals (Section 18 - 18A)
Miscellaneous (Section 19 - 33)
The First Schedule - Specified Minerals
The Second Schedule - Rates Of Royalty
The Third Schedule - Rates of Dead Rent

http://idsa.in/askanexpert/Whynuclearliabilityrulesultravires The Rules are ultravires of the Act and can be challenged IMMEDIATELY.

From The HIndu, 2011
"Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement following his meeting with President Obama in Bali, that any concerns the United States may have regarding India's nuclear liability regime would have to be resolved “within the four corners of the law” and in accordance with “the law of the land” was timely and assertive. It signalled that India would not be cowered into making legislative amendments to satisfy the demands of American nuclear suppliers, specifically regarding the controversial Section 17 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (“Act”), dealing with the right of recourse. However, the statements were also slightly disingenuous, since beneath this strident posturing lay a much more accommodating and pliable policy position, best exemplified by Rule 24 on the right of recourse in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011 (“Rules”), notified only a matter of days prior to the meeting. Not only does this rule fundamentally alter “the four corners of the law” that the Prime Minister referred to, it does so in a manner that ingeniously seeks to negate the effective will of Parliament, expressed in the Act passed last year with a large majority. In light of this significant impact that Rule 24 has, its exact terms need to be scrutinised carefully."

UPA bid for unviable nuclear contract revealed

Published: 20th September 2013 08:45 AM
Last Updated: 20th September 2013 08:46 AM
The UPA government is courting a nuclear scandal as it plans to sign a preliminary contract with US-based nuclear reactor building company Westinghouse ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with US President Barack Obama on September 27. A note for the Cabinet Committee on Security accessed by Express reveals the government is pushing for a preliminary contract betwee­n Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and Westinghouse Electric Company, without doing a complete viability analysis of the project to set up 6X1000 MW nuclear power reactors at Chayya-Mithivirdi in Gujarat.
The note pointed out that the authorities wanted to seek the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) first instead of going through the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to ink the deal in alleged violation of established norms.
“It is proposed to sign the preliminary contract prior to the visit of the Prime Minister to USA in end September 2013. Given the paucity of time, approval of the Atomic Energy Commission cannot be taken, instead approval of CCS is being solicited directly,” the CCS note said.
Further, to justify bypassing of the AEC, the note argued that “none of the work packages in the preliminary contract deal with actual nuclear activities”. The preliminary contract will cost about Rs 102 crore to the government exchequer. NPCIL and Westinghouse Electric Company had signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2012 under the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, which included negotiation of an Early Works Agreement for installation of nuclear reactors.
The CCS note suggested that the cost of the preliminary contract would be subsumed in the equity support from government if the main project is being taken up in collaboration with Westinghouse Electric Company. But, in case the Westinghouse collaboration is limited to a preliminary contract, the government will bear the entire cost.
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), headed by the Prime Minister, strongly denied dilution of key provisions of India’s nuclear law arguing that the proposed contract with Westinghouse is for a limited range of pre-project services only.
Although the CCS note clearly states that due to paucity of time they could not seek approval of the Atomic Energy Commission, the DAE in a statement issued on Thursday said the NPCIL would enter into this preliminary contract only with the approval of AEC and the Government of India.
“This contract, if approved, will not bind NPCIL to enter into a contract with Westinghouse for the supply of reactors without establishing safety and techno-commercial viability. The contracts, which will have to be approved by the competent authority of the Government, will be fully consistent with Indian law. There is no question of Indian law being violated or diluted. The projects will have to meet the highest standards of safety,” a DAE statement said.

http://newindianexpress.com/nation/UPA-bid-for-unviable-nuclear-contract-revealed/2013/09/20/article1793375.ece

http://intellibriefs.blogspot.in/2006/07/sethna-prefers-npt-to-indo-us-nuclear.html

JULY 06, 2006


Sethna prefers NPT to Indo-US nuclear deal

Sethna prefers NPT to Indo-US nuclear deal

MUMBAI: India would be better off signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which permits the exit of any signatory nation, rather than the nuclear deal with the US that will bind the country for 'perpetuity', top nuclear scientist Homi Sethna has said.

“NPT may be discriminatory, but we will still be allowed to exit whereas in the current Indo-US deal which is under negotiation, India will remain bound in perpetuity,” Sethna said while delivering a key note address at the Forum of Integrated National Security (FINS) here on Saturday evening.

"Therefore, I prefer NPT...to signing the current deal (with the US)," said Sethna, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that has been linked to the country's civil and military nuclear programmes.

"India is supposed to get only uranium for its nuclear programme to expand. Simply for this, so much compromising... is uncalled for," he said.

"The Americans were out of the nuclear power reactor building business for the last 25 years. So where is the question of (getting) technology from them?" asked the octogenarian scientist credited with playing a key role in the 1974 nuclear blast that saw India's emergence as a nuclear weapons power.

“Therefore, (in order to end the current global sanctions on the nuclear programme), we rather sign the NPT and it will give an escape route from going through all this trauma of separation and getting a special status agreement with IAEA (under the additional protocol),"he said.

"I do not know how we have been tied down to this situation," Sethna said.

"The Indian government should now seriously think about it (signing the NPT). Instead of being looked down upon as a non-signatory all the time, go ahead and sign and break it immediately may be within three hours," he said.

Asked whether it would be unethical on India's part to sign a deal with the US, he denied that this was the case, pointing to India's need for energy security.

Concluding a treaty with the US is a most difficult task, said Sethna, who has experience of dealings with the Americans during the 196Os and after the nuclear test in 1974.

"We had experience with them earlier. I am not saying Americans are not reliable. I want to say, they have a system which makes them feel that they are superior and want to dictate terms," he said to applause from a gathering that included scientists and security analysts.

Sethna said former prime minister Indira Gandhi had given oral instructions to go ahead with building a nuclear device after he informed her about China's progress in developing atomic weapons.

Speaking on the occasion, Former AEC chairman P K Iyengar also referred to the Indo-US nuclear deal and said the testimonies before the US Congress and the additions recommended by US Congressional panels to President George Bush's proposal have come as a "shock" to those who follow the intricacies of the nuclear deal.
End of The Indo-US nuclear Deal?
By: Dr.Dipak Basu 
May 06, 2007
Views expressed here are author’s own and not of this website. Full disclaimer is at the bottom.

  Feedback

(The author is a Professor in International Economics in Nagasaki University, Japan)Related articlesIndia Russia Nuclear issue: Indian media is silent about it Dr.Dipak Basu
End of The Indo-US Nuke Deal? Dr.Dipak Basu
What If India-US Nuclear Deal Fails Hari Sud 
USA"s nuclear design on India Dr.Dipak Basu
Discord on Indo–US Nuclear Deal Hari Sud 
Indo-US nuclear Deal and its consequences Dr.Dipak Basu
N-Deal: Plan B if the Deal Fails Hari Sud 
US Legislative Process: Indo-US N-Deal Hari Sud 
N-deal: Economic, Political and Technological Aspects Hari Sud 
Indo-American Nuclear Pact - Rationales Gaurang Bhatt
India"s Nuclear Surrender to USA Dr.Dipak Basu
P-6 and The Nuclear Truth Narayanan Komerath 
India's Options to Pakistan's Nuclear Threat Hari Sud 
Cost Pakistan Incurred to Build the Nuclear Bomb Hari Sud
Nuclear Black Market in Pakistan Abhijit Bagal
Has America Gained Control of Their Nuclear Weapons? Hari SudWe should pray that US would withdraw the Indo-US nuclear deal under pressure from the Democratic Party. It will be a blessing in disguise. The nuclear deal has little to do with the nuclear power generations but it aims at the elimination of India’s ability to produce any nuclear weapons. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India has refused to sign so far, is about to be imposed upon India through a back door with devastating consequences for India’s immediate future.

Dr Homi Sethna, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and one of the founding-father of India’s nuclear program, said that what Dr Manmohan Singh was about to sign was worse than joining the NPT regime. Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, has outlined how precisely commitments made by Dr Singh to Parliament and the people have been blatantly undermined and notes that if the deal goes through in its present form, it will "compromise the sovereignty of this country for decades to come". He has exposed the very enormous financial price that India will have to pay as well, between Rs 300,000 to Rs 400,000 crores in nuclear reactors that will be totally dependent for their existence on a yearly audit of our policies by the US Congress. Dr P.K. Iyengar, another former chairman of the AEC, has called the deal "giving up sovereignty".

History of Development:
India decided on a three-stage nuclear program back in the 1950s, when India's nuclear power generation program was set up. In the first stage, natural uranium (U-238) was used in pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). In the second stage, the plutonium extracted through reprocessing from the used fuel of the PHWRs was scheduled to be used to run fast-breeder reactors (FBRs) built by the Soviet Union and Russia in India.

“The plutonium was used in the FBRs in 70% mixed oxide (MOX)-fuel, to breed uranium-233 in a thorium-232 blanket around the core. In the final stage, the FBRs use thorium-232 and produce uranium-233 for use in the third stage reactors.” (See Ramtanu Maitra, "Thorium: Preferred Nuclear Fuel of the Future," Executive Intelligence Review, Nov. 18, 2005.)

The reason for India's commitment to switch over to thorium, is its large estimated thorium reserves of some 290,000 tons, it ranks second only to Australia. This would help India to bring independence from overseas uranium sources. India already began the construction of the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) in 2005 with the help from Russia. The fuel for the AHWR will be a hybrid core, partly thorium-uranium 233 and partly thorium-plutonium. If, according to the Indo-US nuclear Deal India cannot reprocess the spent fuel to secure plutonium for the sake of converting thorium into fuel, the thorium reactors will never take off.

The second concern of the Indian scientists is the scope of "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation" (Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act) that was promised to India in July 2005. India had assumed that this term encompassed the fuel cycle, namely enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel. In the discussions leading to the adoption of the Hyde Act, U.S. legislators argued that the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 specifically forbids export of these technologies, as also heavy water production technology, to other countries. India has developed its own technologies with the help from the USSR and Russia since 1974 in these three important areas. All these now would go down the drain.

China-Pakistan Collaboration:
China has already supplied Pakistan enrichment plants and heavy water plants, and nuclear weapons as well. Chinese nuclear plants offered to Pakistan will not be under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus, Pakistan can very well use these to produce nuclear weapons. Although China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of 45 nations and a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China like in all other international spheres does not care about its obligation to any international treaty if its national interest demands so. China’s national interest is to set up Pakistan against India by providing every weapons and missiles it has got.

Does India need US nuclear power plants?
Nuclear power has been virtually insignificant in India’s energy mix in the past, and will be no more important in the future. India has been generating electricity with nuclear reactors for more than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only 2% to 3% of its electricity today. India has not built more reactors because they have not turned out to be as safe, or as clean, or – most important – as economical as originally thought. Even if India were to achieve a 50% increase in nuclear power generation (which is unlikely) such a step would only increase India’s overall electricity output by one percent at most, and would only increase India’s overall energy output by a fraction of one percent.

The real issue is whether India needs any US assistance at all regarding its nuclear energy sector. The argument of Man Mohan Singh, as he said in the Parliament recently, that otherwise India would be a nuclear ‘Pariah’ is false. In 1974, USA has imposed sanctions so that India cannot get any nuclear related materials or technology. After 1998 USA has imposed more sanctions on India so that it cannot get any defense related technology or materials at all. However, India since 1974 has received every nuclear technology, and materials including conventional nuclear power plants, Fast Breeder reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants and heavy water plants from the Soviet Union and Russia without any restrictions attached to these. As a result, India is nearly self-sufficient regarding nuclear technology and can produce nuclear weapons despite all the efforts of the United States to stop it.
Only for the last two years, because of its membership of the NSG, Russia now wants to supply nuclear power plants with added safeguards that the plants cannot be used to produce any nuclear weapons. However, at the same time, it has offered offshore nuclear plants to India, which would be without any restrictions. India can have both or either of the on-shore or offshore nuclear power plants from Russia and as a result for the future development of electricity production, India does not need US support at all. Thus, it really does not matter if India would refuse to sign the Indo-US treaty on nuclear energy.
Even if India needs nuclear power plants to supplement it energy requirement in future, India does not need nuclear power plants from USA. Russia can still supply whatever India needs at a much lower price.

India’s nuclear weapons:
Section 103 of the Hyde Act suggests that the US would oppose development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state within or outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The section requires the US to work with the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to further restrict transfers of equipment and technologies related to uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and production of heavy water to all countries, including India. The legislation also requires the US government to seek to prevent transfer of these equipment and technologies from other members of NSG or from any other source if the transfers are suspended or terminated. Section 104(d) (2) stipulates that transfers to India cannot begin without suitable changes in NSG guidelines. There are concerns related to the supply of nuclear fuel to the plants in India, which would be used to produce nuclear weapons, by using end-use monitoring of spent fuel by the International Atomic Energy Commission and the US organizations. Also there are provisions in the legislation, which would putt a cap on fissile material production. These would end India’s nuclear weapons program.

About 90 percent of all nuclear facilities, including the Russian built Fast Breeder Reactors which can produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, will be included in the civilian sector and there will be regular inspection by the IAEA and the US authority to make sure that these facilities will not be used to produce nuclear weapons.

India for the military part of the nuclear sector will not be able to import technology or materials from any of the countries of the NSG, including Russia. Thus, India’s nuclear weapons program will disappear. This is the real aim of the Indo-US treaty. Man Mohan Singh’s recent declaration in the Indian parliament that India would maintain the option to test nuclear weapons is very theoretical. In practice, India will be unable to do that because of lack of availability of appropriate facility to develop and test nuclear weapons in near future.

Conclusion:
In the case of nuclear deal with the US also, India just like in 1991 and 1995 is accepting a subordinate position in relation to USA and the Western countries. The result will make Pakistan much stronger than India in very near future. That serves the geo-political interest of the United States with Pakistan as the bridge to the Islamic world.

The deal is primarily about making money, U.S. arms sales to India. U.S. exporters have mentioned selling as much as $1.4 billion worth of Boeing airliners, hundreds of F-16 or F/A-18 fighter jets, as well as maritime surveillance planes, advanced radar, helicopters, missile defense and other equipment. The Russian press has even complained that the nuclear deal is a ploy to squeeze Russia out of the Indian arms market.
U.S. Congress need take no action until a formal agreement for nuclear cooperation has been negotiated with India, and until the International Atomic Energy Agency has agreed with India upon suitable inspection arrangements, and until the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided whether to change its rules to accommodate the deal. Once an agreement is made and presented for consideration, U.S. Congress can add more conditions that seem warranted. Thus, it would be a total surrender for India to the U.S.
Thus, without the nuclear deal India would be able to maintain its nuclear plants by using reprocessed plutonium as a fuel and using its own uranium in the conventional plants. It will continue to get offshore nuclear plants from Russia. In that case it will be at liberty to test further nuclear weapons in future. Those who are advocating for the deal, which has a little chance of survival given the anti-nuclear lobby in the Democratic Party, are pushing India to a very insecure future.Dr.Dipak Basu 
http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_070506.htm

Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 11040

Trending Articles



<script src="https://jsc.adskeeper.com/r/s/rssing.com.1596347.js" async> </script>