Ritu Sarin: Could you start by giving us a post-mortem report on the Naxal attack on the Congress convoy and the Centre's knee-jerk reaction over the years?

This fight, or whatever you want to call it, against Naxalism has been going on for many years now. The resources and the funds allocated by the government from time to time don't measure up as far as success is concerned. Of course, in such a conflict, you cannot talk of success and failure. The important thing is to ensure that the levels of violence go down. In this incident, there has been a lot of talk. The Chhattisgarh chief minister said that there needs to be a synchronised inter-state programme on Naxalism because it is a problem that concerns seven to eight states. But I think that was uncalled for in this incident. What was the nature of the incident? Congress leaders were to address a function and then they were to leave. As police officers, we are taught that dispersal is as important as people coming to the function. But here it appears that on the dispersal, not much was planned. It is a problem of having to move about 30 vehicles over 80 kilometres. Now, you can move it in different ways. What is required is simple common sense and police tactics: do you want to move 30 vehicles all at once? You can send them two at a time or five at a time. If the state cannot ensure security for 80 km of road, I'm sorry all these bold statements are over-used. You have failed in the basics. In Punjab, we had declared certain roads as permanent patrol roads. So if somebody asked for an escort, we would say that you don't need an escort here, we are sure that this road is safe. We ensured that those roads were protected. That is the type of thinking needed to tackle these problems. In this case, it wasn't there. Why was it not there, I can't say. It could be because of the tremendous politicisation of the police and not realising that in an insurgency, the protection of moderate leadership is very important.

Ritu Sarin: You came back from Chhattisgarh a bit dissatisfied. You were on record saying that you couldn't function well because many of the suggestions you gave were not agreed to by the state government. One of your suggestions was also to increase the police stations for Bastar. If a lot of what you had said had been done back in 2006, do you think this flashpoint wouldn't have arisen?

What I had found out was that in many districts, the SPs controlled a very small area. That means the district administration controlled a very small area of the district. So, if the police presence had been slowly extended to cover most of Bastar, probably this would not have happened. Having a presence also means that information will automatically come to you about movements of people, the election of people and many other things. If you look at how West Bengal tackled Naxalism in the earlier phase in the '70s, it was by strengthening the police station. In Punjab, we raised the strength of the police force with bulletproof vehicles, with the latest weaponry. As a result, the police station was able to respond to terrorist attacks. Here also, they should have strengthened police stations in a planned way.

Subhomoy Bhattacharjee: Was the area where the Congress rally was held not suitable to hold such a rally?

If it was allowed to be held, then obviously the state government felt that it was alright. If the place was not suitable, you could always say that the rally couldn't be held there. If it is not suitable, it is your duty to prevent that. Now they are saying that that stretch of the road, 80 kilometres, was largely unpatrolled. It is a jungle area which stretched up to the borders of Orissa. But that should have been anticipated. It's not the first time buses have been attacked. It has been going on in Chhattisgarh for over 20 years now. The response has not been of the type that should be there. I thought the response was too slow. And the tendency to rely on outside forces interfered with the necessity of the states to strengthen their own police forces.

Coomi Kapoor: Should the methods used for fighting insurgency in Punjab be different from methods used to fight Naxalism?

In Naxalite areas, you need much more presence, you need procedures to be different. The movement has to be on foot, not on vehicles, because of the danger of mines. You need to determine the concentration of forces at a particular place. What should be the optimum distance they should travel to patrol that area and come back? What led to the death of those 55 policemen in 2007? They went out and didn't patrol. They stayed at one place. That is my understanding. We have to set our tasks not only according to the capability of the force but also according to the understanding of the situation. In Chhattisgarh, when compared to Punjab, you have to have much more presence, one which is concentrated. In every, say, 4-5 km you'd want to have a police force. That has to be worked out depending on the situation, the feedback from the local people and on your own capabilities.

Coomi Kapoor: For that kind of presence, don't you need central forces as well?

The presence of central forces is a sort of disincentive. Once the problem is over, what do we do with them? That problem exists in Punjab also.

Rakesh Sinha: We have had instances of states giving in to the demands of the Naxals by swapping jailed Naxals for officials held hostage. Should there be a policy to end this?

It depends on the political will. I don't know if you remember the IC-814 hijacking. You suddenly had a new element there. And that element was the relatives of the passengers. They took out demonstrations, the government buckled. The media comments were very strange. If I remember correctly, one comment was that the Prime Minister was informed after three hours or so. But now it appears that the Prime Minister has to get into everything. It is this over-centralisation that is affecting the process of proper administration.

Ritu Sarin: Now that the founder of Salwa Judum has been killed, how much of a setback is it for anti-Naxalism?

It shows the desire to be justified—that whatever was done is justified because Salwa Judum is bad and atrocities were committed, therefore, the Naxals had to kill and take revenge. So that means they feel a need to justify themselves. I read a headline that said a large number of people turned up for the funeral of the Congressmen. If that is true, then it shows a public reaction to what actually happened.

Ravish Tiwari: The one difference between the Punjab situation and the Naxal situation is that in Punjab, the state administration and the central government were on the same page. Do you think that in this case, the confusion between the Centre and the state makes it difficult to tackle this challenge?

It is wrong to think that the Centre and the state were on the same page in Punjab. There were many conflicting views coming out of Punjab. It happened in Assam too. It is happening in Chhattisgarh in the Naxalite areas. You can't construct a road, you can't build a school building, you can't build a medical centre. Because they will either not allow you to do it or they will blow it up after it is done. First you have to maintain law and order, then development will follow.

Arup Roychoudhury: Is it time to withdraw some of the forces from the Northeast and relocate them to central India?

If there is a suggestion demanding forces elsewhere, it will be done. That is a normal exercise that is carried out by the Home Ministry. But in this Naxalite area, I spoke to some retired officers and the assessment was that they have half the number of companies they should have as per assessment. Raising a force is not an easy job, it takes time. But it has to be done. My feeling is that the government should see to it that as per assessment, whatever (force) is required should be given and the state should also give whatever is required. From 2006 to 2013, there has been an improvement in the situation. The level of violence has come down. This incident itself, gruesome as it may be, doesn't show that the number of followers have gone up. It shows that there has been a concentration in some areas. They have grouped together to carry out the incident and create an impression, which they have done.

Unni Rajen Shanker: What do you think you achieved in Chhattisgarh and what are your regrets, if any?

When I left in 2006, I had submitted a large number of proposals. The new DG, who has been there for a year and a half, told me that he has disinterred the proposals and he is following up on them. I brought out the deficiencies. When a member of the police says that he controls only five per cent of his district, that has to be accepted. Once you accept that, you have to make sure he can control more of his district.

Dilip Bobb: After this incident, there has been a demand in some quarters for the use of the army. What's your view on that?

No, not at all. This isn't an army situation at all. A gun is a gun, an AK-47 or otherwise. We've dealt with these situations and it is not an army situation. It is definitely a police one. Even the Americans now accept that the war against terror is not to be waged by the Army. I do believe that Naxalism is a terror outlet.

Rakesh Sinha: Would you agree that the Naxals moved into areas where the states abdicated their responsibilities?

No, the states were never there. The forested areas were being administered by forest guards. They don't have weaponry and they aren't trained in military tactics. So there was no administration there. The Naxalites were moving into areas that were left un-administered. The British did not want to spend money unnecessarily on administrative set ups in areas with small population. The policy of keeping the tribals away from normal administration continued even after the British left. The Naxalites occupied those territories.

Manoj CG: The Centre has been holding peace talks with insurgent groups in the Northeast and there's been a significant reduction in violence there. Should the Centre hold or engage the Maoists in a dialogue?

Dialogue needs two parties. In the Northeast, in Assam, there are those who want to talk and there those who don't want to talk. There has been pressure there from all sides: Bangladesh is no longer supporting the insurgents, Myanmar is also going along with our requirements. So there has been pressure (on the rebels) from all sides. So the level of violence has come down. Ultimately, there is a certain degree of tiredness which the whole population feels. People want to move forward. In order to have talks, you need a political party with a defined leadership which is overground. You can talk to people who are overground, maybe parts of them are indulging in violence, but at least you can talk to a section of them. But in Naxalism, who do you talk to?

Vijaita Singh: Do you think UAVs are useful for anti-Naxal operations? Can they be a substitute for ground intelligence?

It depends on the kind of UAVs they have, the kind of cameras they have on board, and the communication equipment. Where do they transfer the information and to whom? I'm told they operate from Begumpet and will be shifting base to Bhilai in eight months to one year. But that is not the way to do things. If you want to shift to Bhilai, shift them tomorrow. Certainly, they can supplement whatever the ground intelligence finds out; they can't be a substitute. The UAVs will have a purpose in directing the operations. If the Americans can use it in different parts of the world, I don't see why we can't do it in our smaller areas.

Coomi Kapoor: You've been quoted as saying that the chief minister of Chhattisgarh asked you relax and not bother so much. Why do you think he called you there in the first place?

He has denied saying that, so maybe there is a misinterpretation in what he said and what I understood because English is not our first tongue.

Coomi Kapoor: But why did he call you there?

Sometimes people make mistakes.

Transcribed by Swetha Ramakrishnan