Dr Maleeha LodhiTuesday, May 28, 2013
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From Print Edition
The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.
What should be made of a distinguished former Indian foreign secretary’s assertions about his country’s nuclear posture and policy? In a speech last month in Delhi, Shyam Saran made several pronouncements about the evolution of India’s nuclear policy and the current status of its nuclear deterrent.
He cast these remarks as his personal views. But Saran is current chairman `of India’s National Security Advisory Board. Many in India and outside saw his statements as articulating official policy on a sensitive issue, while maintaining deniability. The Times of India, for example, said Saran was “placing on record India’s official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi”. And Islamabad asked Delhi for an official clarification.
Saran’s assertions merit careful consideration. It is not surprising that he is irked by “adulatory remarks” in “Western literature” about the safe and secure custody of Pakistan’s nuclear assets by the ‘Strategic Planning Group’ (presumably he means the Strategic Plans Division). Insisting this is unmerited as the military has stewardship of these assets, Saran overlooks the fact that it is the National Command Authority headed by the prime minister that is Pakistan’s apex nuclear authority. Saran also disapproves of the international community’s growing acknowledgement of the security-driven nature of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He strains to explain that India’s nuclear capability is security not prestige-driven – an explanation that has come four decades too late.
However, the most consequential part of his speech for Pakistan’s security policymakers is where he presents a scenario that culminates with India engaging in “massive nuclear retaliation” against Pakistan. He posits an escalatory ladder that presumably starts with a sub-conventional event or terrorist attack, after which Pakistan tries to dissuade India from carrying out punitive conventional retaliation, by deploying its tactical nuclear weapons. India responds by using strategic weapons.
Saran warns that any nuclear attack – whether by strategic or tactical weapons – would be met by “massive retaliation” from India. This will be “designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary”. “Any nuclear exchange once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level”. “Pakistan”, he declares, should “be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons”.
Several of Saran’s assumptions are open to question. First there is a presumption that Pakistan’s decision to develop battlefield nuclear weapons represents a nuclear war-fighting option. Official spokesmen have repeatedly said that Pakistan regards the surface-to-surface solid fuel-based Hatf IX (Nasr), or any additional battlefield weapon that may subsequently be developed, as primarily weapons of deterrence. Their purpose is to reinforce deterrence and restore nuclear stability that has been disturbed by i) growing conventional asymmetry in the region as India’s military build-up continues; ii) provocative Indian military doctrines that aim to bring conventional military offensives to a tactical level and iii) India’s development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, whose purpose is to neutralise Pakistan’s strategic capabilities.
As for Saran’s claim that “significant shifts” in Pakistan’s nuclear posture have altered the regional nuclear equation, the fact is that Islamabad remains committed to its nuclear policy of achieving credible nuclear deterrence at the lowest practical level. The central tenet of its nuclear policy is for its capability to be maintained for the purpose of deterrence against aggression and war-prevention in all its manifestations, thereby preserving peace. Pakistan also believes that credible deterrence requires appropriate levels of conventional and nuclear capabilities to be developed and maintained.
Most importantly Saran’s escalatory scenario lays bare an underlying frustration that India’s Cold Start Doctrine, now known as “proactive operations”, has been challenged if not blunted by Pakistan’s TNW response. That is why this emerges as the main thrust of his remarks and leads him to depict TNWs as “nuclear blackmail” by Pakistan. In doing so he also reaffirms the Indian intent to preserve the limited war option and prevent Cold Start from being rendered irrelevant.
That Saran believes that India can or should consider a punitive war against its nuclear neighbour in retaliation for an act of terror carried out by a non-state actor is disconcerting enough. But he then warns that if Pakistan tried to deter an Indian conventional attack by its TNWs, India would retaliate with nuclear weapons. This represents dangerous thinking. But the strategic hole in Saran’s escalatory scenario is this. In holding out the threat of “massive retaliation” he fails to factor in Pakistan’s full spectrum capabilities to counter “massive retaliation” not to speak of its potent second strike capability. It is surprising why this typical but dangerous Mutually Assured Destruction scenario has not been carefully thought through to its logical conclusion.
One interpretation of why Saran has focused attention on TNWs and declared a “massive retaliation” Indian response is that this seeks to play on Western fears about the risks of inducting battlefield nuclear weapons and the nuclear danger this could expose the region to. This may be designed to galvanise international pressure on Pakistan to abandon the TNW option. In the unlikely event that this were to happen it would ‘restore’ Cold Start and re-establish India’s conventional military edge over Pakistan.
The rationale for Pakistan’s decision to pursue a TNW capability is well known. It bears repetition to understand why there appears to be mounting Indian frustration with this development as indicated by Saran’s speech. Pakistan perceived a number of rapid developments in the past decade to adversely affect the region’s strategic equilibrium established after the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by both countries. They included the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal and the NSG exemption under which India was enabled to conclude fuel supply agreements with many countries. These significantly enhanced India’s ability to expand its strategic arsenal and in turn altered Pakistan’s security calculations.
Meanwhile, the new Indian military doctrine and efforts to develop BMD, which came on the back of these developments, became game-changers. The effort to find space for limited conventional engagement below the nuclear threshold impelled Pakistan to seek a response at the tactical level in the nuclear domain. In trying to call Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff’ by operationalising proactive war-fighting strategies, these Indian moves urged Pakistan to develop TNWs to deter Cold Start and re-establish nuclear stability. By adding another layer to the country’s deterrence capability Hatf IX aimed to close the gap at the operational and tactical level.
Against this backdrop what Saran now seems to be signalling is that if Pakistan thinks it can deter limited conventional war by tactical nuclear weapons then India too has options and can use strategic weapons in “massive retaliation”. This makes little strategic sense but it is dangerous talk in a situation where there is a delicate balance in a strategic relationship that remains undefined between the nuclear neighbours.
Nuclear powers do not define their relations by threats or bluster. The only answer to new and old dilemmas created by the region’s nuclearisation is for both nations to engage seriously and constructively to build a better understanding of each other’s nuclear policy, doctrines and postures. This means advancing the nuclear dialogue with the aim of putting in place credible and meaningful confidence building measures in both the strategic and conventional military spheres.
The glacial progress on CBMs in expert-level talks over the past decade underscores the need to step up that effort. Indian officials have generally been dismissive about Pakistan’s proposal for a Strategic Restraint Regime. This has three interlocking elements designed to achieve strategic stability – measures for nuclear restraint, conventional military balance and resolution of disputes. Even if Delhi finds it difficult to accept the linkage between these components of strategic stability, the separate proposals tabled in these areas are worthy of consideration.
The two countries have a mutual interest in stabilising their nuclear relationship. The way forward is not by ill-thought nuclear signalling but in engaging substantively to narrow the perception gaps and address the issues that lie at the root of both countries’ security predicaments and the region’s nuclearisation.
Update | May 7. Here is the full text of the speech.
On April 24th, the Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, delivered an important address in New Delhi affirming the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent. Mr. Saran has over two decades of close engagement on strategic matters, including time spent as Foreign Secretary and Special Envoy dealing with the US-India civil-nuclear agreement. What he said, speaking in his personal capacity, bears close scrutiny.
The tone of these remarks is defensive at the outset, reflecting domestic criticisms of the pace of Indian strategic modernization programs. Mr. Saran also takes aim at US, Pakistani, and Chinese analysts who maintain that India sought the Bomb for reasons of status rather than national security. He seeks to set the record straight, making significant observations and recommendations in the process. Here are a few passages:
Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s strategic programme continues apace. [Note: unless Mr. Saran is referring to China's help with Pakistan's nuclear power sector, this is especially noteworthy.]
Pakistan is the only country where nuclear assets are under the command and control of the military and it is the military’s perceptions and ambitions which govern the development, deployment and use of these weapons. This is a dangerous situation precisely because the military’s perceptions are not fully anchored in a larger national political and economic narrative. The pursuit of a more powerful, more effective, and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal, dictated by the Pakistani military, may run in parallel with a steadily deteriorating political, social and economic environment. Would it be possible to island an efficiently managed and sophisticated nuclear arsenal amidst an increasingly dysfunctional polity? There is an air of unreality about the often adulatory remarks about the Pakistani military’s stewardship of the country’s military assets.
What Pakistan is signaling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level. This is nothing short of nuclear blackmail, no different from the irresponsible behavior one witnesses in North Korea. It deserves equal condemnation by the international community because it is not just a threat to India but to international peace and security. Should the international community countenance a license to aid and abet terrorism by a state holding out a threat of nuclear war?
Mr. Saran argues that strategic misperceptions regarding the state of India’s nuclear deterrent and the reasons for it can be dangerous. His public remarks, which include helpful clarifications on steps taken to assure India’s second strike capabilities, may signal more to come. He concludes that, “The secrecy which surrounds our nuclear programme… is now counter-productive,” adding,
I would hope that the Government makes public its nuclear doctrine and releases data regularly on what steps have been taken and are being taken to put the requirements of doctrine in place. It is not necessary to share operational details but an overall survey such as an annual Strategic Posture Review, should be shared with the citizens of this country who, after all, pay for the security which the deterrent is supposed to provide for them.
Pakistani authorities have also been close-lipped about their strategic programs and requirements. The people of Pakistan, like those in India, have been in the dark regarding the size and costs of their nuclear deterrent. Would more openness be helpful, or would it add even more impetus to the nuclear competition in southern Asia? This could go either way. It is clear, however, that the absence of disclosure hasn’t slowed down the competition.
“What Pakistan is signaling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level.”
As Robert said “Pakistan has in few uncertain words declared that such an attack would be a threat to Pakistan’s existence,and that they’d more or less nuke at the border if there was a major blitzkreig attack like that.”
But if India does not respond to Pakistans sustained support to Terrorists, even this Status Quo is also not good.
I am not a supporter of Nuclear Weapons but India is in a dangerous neighbourhood. Mr. Shyam Saran’s statement not only raises the bar for Pakistani Military but also the cost of any further “Mumbai 2008″ like events for ISI.
If countries like USA, France and Israel can do it. Why not India.
O.K. Let’s go with that scenario. Pakistani terrorists manage to kill 10,000 Indians. Enraged Indian leaders proclaim their intent to invade and occupy half of Pakistan for 5 years. Distrustful Pakistanis assume India plans to occupy Pakistan for 50 years.
George,
O.K. Let’s go with that scenario. Pakistani terrorists manage to kill 10,000 Indians. Enraged Indian leaders proclaim their intent to invade and occupy half of Pakistan for 5 years. Distrustful Pakistanis assume India plans to occupy Pakistan for 50 years.
Our Tolerance is our main problem — aggression is not and is responsible for the destruction of our civilization mainly. Today’s Pakistan(East or West) is also a proof of that.
So, please, don’t try to teach us on that matter at least.
“But the Indian government has also disowned ‘Cold Start’, the conventional war doctrine that was supposedly designed to punish further Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India. Obviously, mixed messages, the bane of deterrence efforts.”
http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/india-has-no-cold-start-doctrine-army-chief-70159
April 30, 2013 - Updated 941 PKT
From Web Edition
NEW DELHI: India will retaliate massively even if Pakistan uses tactical nuclear weapons against it. With Pakistan developing "tactical" nuclear warheads, that is, miniaturizing its weapons to be carried on short-range missiles, India will protect its security interests by retaliating to a "smaller" tactical attack in exactly the same manner, as it would respond to a "big" strategic attack, said a report published in The Times of India.
Articulating Indian nuclear policy in this regard for the first time, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, said, "India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective." This is significant, because Saran was placing on record India's official nuclear posture with the full concurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in New Delhi.
Giving a speech on India's nuclear deterrent recently, Saran placed India's nuclear posture in perspective in the context of recent developments, notably the "jihadist edge" that Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability have acquired.
Saran argued that as a result of its tactical weapons, Pakistan believes it has brought down the threshold of nuclear use. "Pakistani motivation is to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes such as the horrific 26/11 attack on Mumbai. What Pakistan is signalling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level. This is nothing short of nuclear blackmail, no different from the irresponsible behaviour one witnesses in North Korea," he said.
One of the main reasons for Pakistan miniaturizing its nukes is actually to keep its weapons from being confiscated or neutralized by the US, a fear that has grown in the Pakistani establishment in the wake of the operation against Osama bin Laden. "Pakistan has, nevertheless, projected its nuclear deterrent as solely targeted at India and its strategic doctrine mimics the binary nuclear equation between the US and the Soviet Union which prevailed during the Cold War," Saran said.
However, warning Pakistan, he added, "A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons."
There have been significant shifts in Pakistan's nuclear posture recently. First is the movement from uranium to a newer generation of plutonium weapons, which has enabled Pakistan to increase the number of weapons, outstripping India in weapons and fissile material production, although they are still to be verified. Pakistan has claimed it has miniaturized nuclear weapons to be used on cruise missiles and other short-range missiles. The newer generation of Pakistan's weapons is also solid-fuelled rather than liquid, making them easier to transport and launch.
http://www.thenews.c...s:-Shyam-Saran-